traditional public function

In 1925, the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was incorporated as a not-for-profit membership corporation to regulate interscholastic sports among public and private high schools in Tennessee. Nearly all public high schools in the state, totaling about 290 or 84 percent of the Association's voting membership, belong to it, along with 55 private schools. The Association's legislative council and board of control consist of high school principals, assistant principals, and superintendents elected by member schools, with meetings often held during school hours. Revenue comes primarily from gate receipts at tournaments and some membership dues. The Tennessee State Board of Education long acknowledged the Association's role in regulating interscholastic athletics, designating it in 1972 as the organization to supervise and regulate athletic activities for public schools and approving its rules, including the recruiting rule at issue. In 1996, the State Board replaced the designation with a statement recognizing the value of interscholastic athletics and authorizing voluntary membership in the Association, though State Board members continued to serve in ex officio capacities and Association employees remained eligible for the state retirement system. In 1997, the Association's board of control, composed entirely of public school administrators at the time, found that Brentwood Academy, a private parochial high school member, violated the rule against undue influence in recruiting by writing to incoming students and their parents about spring football practice. The Association placed Brentwood's athletic program on probation for four years, declared its football and boys' basketball teams ineligible for playoffs for two years, and imposed a $3,000 fine. Brentwood Academy sued the Association and its executive director in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the enforcement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for Brentwood, finding state action. The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women. Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment. In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university. The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 establishes a nationwide program to regulate surface coal mining operations. Title II creates the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement within the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through that office, bears primary responsibility for promulgating regulations and enforcing the Act's provisions. The Act implements a two-stage regulatory scheme consisting of an interim phase and a permanent phase. In the interim phase, which began after the Secretary published regulations on December 13, 1977, mine operators must comply with selected federal performance standards. These standards govern land restoration, topsoil segregation, hydrologic balance, and related matters. States may issue permits subject to those standards, but the federal government retains independent enforcement authority. On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal producers operating in Virginia, together with 63 of its member companies and four individual landowners, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the interim regulatory program's performance standards and enforcement provisions of the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the town of Wise intervened as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' challenge focused primarily on the interim regulatory program's performance standards. They alleged that those provisions violated the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court conducted a thirteen-day trial on the request for a permanent injunction. In a 1980 opinion and order, the District Court rejected the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges. It held that the steep-slope provisions of the Act violated the Tenth Amendment by displacing the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions. The court also ruled that various provisions effected an uncompensated taking of private property. It found due process violations in certain enforcement mechanisms and permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing the invalidated provisions. In No. 79-1538 the Secretary appealed the portions of the judgment declaring provisions unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement. In No. 79-1596 the plaintiffs cross-appealed the rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals in 1980 and consolidated the cases.

On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Georgia, returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery. The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault. According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American. With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that neither Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The issue was certified for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts on the issue.