531 U.S. 288, 295-296 (2001)
In 1925, the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was incorporated as a not-for-profit membership corporation to regulate interscholastic sports among public and private high schools in Tennessee.1 Nearly all public high schools in the state, totaling about 290 or 84 percent of the Association's voting membership, belong to it, along with 55 private schools.2 The Association's legislative council and board of control consist of high school principals, assistant principals, and superintendents elected by member schools, with meetings often held during school hours.3 Revenue comes primarily from gate receipts at tournaments and some membership dues.4
The Tennessee State Board of Education long acknowledged the Association's role in regulating interscholastic athletics, designating it in 1972 as the organization to supervise and regulate athletic activities for public schools and approving its rules, including the recruiting rule at issue.5 In 1996, the State Board replaced the designation with a statement recognizing the value of interscholastic athletics and authorizing voluntary membership in the Association, though State Board members continued to serve in ex officio capacities and Association employees remained eligible for the state retirement system.6
In 1997, the Association's board of control, composed entirely of public school administrators at the time, found that Brentwood Academy, a private parochial high school member, violated the rule against undue influence in recruiting by writing to incoming students and their parents about spring football practice.7 The Association placed Brentwood's athletic program on probation for four years, declared its football and boys' basketball teams ineligible for playoffs for two years, and imposed a $3,000 fine.8
Brentwood Academy sued the Association and its executive director in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the enforcement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.9 The district court granted summary judgment for Brentwood, finding state action.10 The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.11
Whether a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?12
A nominally private entity engages in state action when there is such pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings. Its regulatory activity may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.13
Yes. The Association's membership is 84 percent public schools whose officials act in their official capacity to provide an integral element of secondary public schooling by adopting and enforcing rules that make interscholastic competition possible.14 Public school administrators dominate the legislative council and board of control, with meetings held during school hours and funding derived from member schools' gate receipts and dues.15 The State Board of Education previously designated the Association as regulator and approved its rules, including the recruiting rule, and even after the 1996 amendment the relationship persisted through ex officio participation and eligibility for the state retirement system.16
These facts establish the requisite entwinement from both the bottom up through public school control and from the top down through ongoing state involvement, making enforcement of the rule state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17
The Association's enforcement of its recruiting rule against Brentwood Academy constitutes state action subject to constitutional scrutiny.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia And Kennedy, Jj.
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Association's enforcement of its recruiting rule cannot fairly be attributed to the State under any established state-action test.19 He reasoned that the Association performs no traditional and exclusive public function, was not created or controlled by the government, received no coercive encouragement from the State, and lacked a symbiotic relationship with state officials.20 Thomas further contended that the majority's entwinement theory lacks precedent, rests on formalistic distinctions the Court has previously rejected, and risks sweeping numerous private organizations composed of or controlled by public officials into the reach of federal § 1983 liability.21