symbiotic relationship

Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave, when a Leesville Concrete Company employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson, who is himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors, but the District Court denied the request on the ground that Batson does not apply in civil proceedings. As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000, but attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence and awarded him the sum of $18,000. Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials. The full court then ordered rehearing en banc and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.

In 1925, the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was incorporated as a not-for-profit membership corporation to regulate interscholastic sports among public and private high schools in Tennessee. Nearly all public high schools in the state, totaling about 290 or 84 percent of the Association's voting membership, belong to it, along with 55 private schools. The Association's legislative council and board of control consist of high school principals, assistant principals, and superintendents elected by member schools, with meetings often held during school hours. Revenue comes primarily from gate receipts at tournaments and some membership dues. The Tennessee State Board of Education long acknowledged the Association's role in regulating interscholastic athletics, designating it in 1972 as the organization to supervise and regulate athletic activities for public schools and approving its rules, including the recruiting rule at issue. In 1996, the State Board replaced the designation with a statement recognizing the value of interscholastic athletics and authorizing voluntary membership in the Association, though State Board members continued to serve in ex officio capacities and Association employees remained eligible for the state retirement system. In 1997, the Association's board of control, composed entirely of public school administrators at the time, found that Brentwood Academy, a private parochial high school member, violated the rule against undue influence in recruiting by writing to incoming students and their parents about spring football practice. The Association placed Brentwood's athletic program on probation for four years, declared its football and boys' basketball teams ineligible for playoffs for two years, and imposed a $3,000 fine. Brentwood Academy sued the Association and its executive director in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the enforcement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for Brentwood, finding state action. The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

Appellee Irvis, a Negro, was refused service by appellant Moose Lodge No. 107. The lodge is a local branch of the national fraternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. A Caucasian member in good standing brought plaintiff Irvis to the Lodge's dining room and bar as his guest. The member requested service of food and beverages. The Lodge through its employees refused service to plaintiff solely because he is a Negro. Irvis then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief. He filed the suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Irvis named both Moose Lodge and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority as defendants. He sought an order that would require the liquor board to revoke the license so long as discriminatory practices continued. Irvis sought no damages. The District Court found that each local Moose Lodge is bound by the constitution and general bylaws of the Supreme Lodge. Those bylaws contain a provision limiting membership to white male Caucasians. The lodges maintain a policy and practice of restricting membership to the Caucasian race. They permit members to bring only Caucasian guests on lodge premises, particularly to the dining room and bar. A three-judge district court upheld his contention on the merits. It entered a decree declaring invalid the liquor license issued to Moose Lodge as long as it follows a policy of racial discrimination in its membership or operating policies or practices. Following its loss on the merits, Moose Lodge moved to modify the final decree by limiting its effect to discriminatory policies with respect to the service of guests. Appellee opposed the proposed modification, and the court denied the motion. Moose Lodge alone appealed from the decree. The Supreme Court postponed decision as to jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board regulations require every club licensee to adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws. Since the lower court decision, the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge have been altered to make applicable to guests the same sort of racial restrictions as are presently applicable to members. In Harrisburg, where Moose Lodge No. 107 is located, the quota for club licenses has been full for many years, and no more club licenses may be issued.

Catherine Jackson, a resident of York, Pennsylvania, received electric service from Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately owned Pennsylvania corporation that held a certificate of public convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission authorizing it to deliver electricity in the York area. The company operated under an agreement and a general tariff filed with the Commission that reserved the right to discontinue service on reasonable notice for nonpayment of bills. Until September 1970 Jackson maintained an account in her own name; after that account was terminated for asserted delinquency, a new account was opened in the name of James Dodson, another occupant of the residence, and service resumed. In August 1971 Dodson left the residence and no further payments were made. On October 6, 1971, Metropolitan employees visited the home to inquire about Dodson's address. The next day another employee informed Jackson that the meter had been tampered with and she disclaimed knowledge of the tampering while requesting that the account be transferred to the name of her twelve-year-old son, Robert Jackson. Four days later, on October 11, 1971, without additional notice, Metropolitan employees disconnected service to the residence. Jackson filed suit against Metropolitan in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought damages and an injunction requiring continued service until she received notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due, alleging that the termination without those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted Metropolitan's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the termination did not constitute state action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed began living together in New York City in September 1968. They continued until the end of 1973. During this time they held themselves out as husband and wife even though Caban remained married to another woman until 1974. Mohammed gave birth to two children during this period: David Andrew Caban on July 16, 1969, and Denise Caban on March 12, 1971. Caban was named as the father on both birth certificates. The couple jointly supported the children while living together as a family. In December 1973, Mohammed left Caban with the children and began residing with Kazin Mohammed, whom she married on January 30, 1974. For the following nine months, the children visited their maternal grandmother weekly, allowing Caban to see them regularly. In September 1974, the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico and took the children with her at the Mohammeds' request. Caban maintained contact through his parents in Puerto Rico. In November 1975, he traveled there to retrieve the children, returning with them to New York. Upon learning of the children's location, Maria Mohammed attempted to recover them with police assistance. The Mohammeds then initiated custody proceedings in New York Family Court. That court awarded temporary custody to the Mohammeds and granted visiting rights to Caban and his new wife, Nina. In January 1976, the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the children under section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law. The Cabans responded with a cross-petition for adoption in March 1976. A hearing occurred before a Law Assistant to the Surrogate in Kings County, where both parties presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses. The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' adoption petition. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision, relying on the Court of Appeals' ruling in In re Malpica-Orsini. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, leading to review by the United States Supreme Court.