407 U.S. 163 (1972)
Appellee Irvis, a Negro, was refused service by appellant Moose Lodge No. 107.1 The lodge is a local branch of the national fraternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.2 A Caucasian member in good standing brought plaintiff Irvis to the Lodge's dining room and bar as his guest.3 The member requested service of food and beverages.4 The Lodge through its employees refused service to plaintiff solely because he is a Negro.5
Irvis then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief.6 He filed the suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.7 Irvis named both Moose Lodge and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority as defendants.8 He sought an order that would require the liquor board to revoke the license so long as discriminatory practices continued.9 Irvis sought no damages.10
The District Court found that each local Moose Lodge is bound by the constitution and general bylaws of the Supreme Lodge.11 Those bylaws contain a provision limiting membership to white male Caucasians.12 The lodges maintain a policy and practice of restricting membership to the Caucasian race.13 They permit members to bring only Caucasian guests on lodge premises, particularly to the dining room and bar.14 A three-judge district court upheld his contention on the merits.15 It entered a decree declaring invalid the liquor license issued to Moose Lodge as long as it follows a policy of racial discrimination in its membership or operating policies or practices.16
Following its loss on the merits, Moose Lodge moved to modify the final decree by limiting its effect to discriminatory policies with respect to the service of guests.17 Appellee opposed the proposed modification, and the court denied the motion.18 Moose Lodge alone appealed from the decree.19 The Supreme Court postponed decision as to jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits.20 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board regulations require every club licensee to adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws.21 Since the lower court decision, the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge have been altered to make applicable to guests the same sort of racial restrictions as are presently applicable to members.22 In Harrisburg, where Moose Lodge No. 107 is located, the quota for club licenses has been full for many years, and no more club licenses may be issued.23
Whether appellee Irvis had standing to litigate the constitutional validity of Moose Lodge's membership policies?24
No. Appellee Irvis was refused service solely because he is a Negro when brought as a guest by a Caucasian member.27 His injury stemmed from Moose Lodge's policies with respect to the serving of guests of members rather than from its membership requirements limiting membership to white male Caucasians.28 Irvis never sought membership in Moose Lodge and therefore was not injured by the membership policy.29 The District Court erred in reaching the merits of the membership issue on the basis of the record before it.30
Appellee Irvis lacked standing to litigate the constitutional validity of Moose Lodge's membership policies.31
Whether Moose Lodge's refusal to serve a guest because of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment when the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board had issued the lodge a private club license to sell alcoholic beverages?32
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discriminatory action by the State but erects no shield against private conduct however discriminatory or wrongful.33 The state must have significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations.34 Such involvement may occur through a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private entity or by enforcing privately originated discrimination.35
No. Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of that term.36 It conducts all activities in a building owned by it without public funding.37 Only members and guests are permitted on the premises.38 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board plays no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club except through the neutral regulation addressed separately.39
There is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship present in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, where the private lessee obtained the benefit of locating in a building owned by a state-created parking authority.40 The limited effect of the quota system and the detailed regulations do not foster or encourage racial discrimination or make the state a partner or joint venturer in the club's enterprise.41
Moose Lodge's refusal to serve Irvis as a guest because of race did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Whether Regulation 113.09 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, requiring every club licensee to adhere to its constitution and bylaws, invoked state sanctions to enforce racially discriminatory provisions?43
Yes. The regulations of the Liquor Control Board adopted pursuant to statute affirmatively require that every club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws.46 Since the lower court decision the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge have been altered to make applicable to guests the same sort of racial restrictions as are presently applicable to members.47 The regulation therefore places state sanctions behind the discriminatory rules.48
This result invokes the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule and therefore constitutes state action within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.49
Regulation 113.09 constituted state action, and Irvis was entitled to a decree enjoining its enforcement insofar as it requires compliance with racially discriminatory provisions.50
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that Regulation 113.09 is an invidious form of state action.51 The regulation requires the lodge to adhere to the racially discriminatory provision of the Supreme Lodge constitution.52 He further observed that the quota system has left Harrisburg with no additional club licenses available for many years.53
This arrangement puts the weight of the state's liquor license behind racial discrimination.54 It restricts the ability of blacks to obtain liquor at private clubs for a significant portion of each week.55
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that Pennsylvania's liquor licensing scheme is a pervasive regulatory system.56 Under the scheme the state dictates and continually supervises virtually every detail of the licensee's business.57 The scheme intertwines the state with the operation of the lodge bar in a significant way.58
It lends state authority to racial discrimination.59 He concluded that the state has used its great and untrammeled power over liquor traffic in a manner that permits it to be exploited in the pursuit of a discriminatory practice.60