Also known as: Supremacy Clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The constitutional command that the Constitution itself, federal statutes enacted pursuant to it, and treaties made under the authority of the United States constitute the highest law binding on all judges in every state. State constitutions or laws yield when they conflict with valid federal law under this command. State officials and judges must apply federal law in preference to inconsistent state measures.
Highland Renewable sought grid access in Mississippi under a federal program requiring nondiscriminatory treatment for qualifying generators. The state commission had ordered priority for in-state projects, blocking Highland. The federal requirement controlled because it formed part of the supreme law of the land and displaced the conflicting state order.
Gretchen sued in state court to enforce labor protections from an international digital trade pact. The President issued a memorandum directing state agencies to apply the pact directly. The Department of Labor correctly declined because the pact lacked implementing legislation and therefore carried no domestic force as supreme law.
Stephen Shaw sued Maine in state court for overtime pay under a federal statute. Maine asserted sovereign immunity. The state court correctly dismissed the claim because the federal statute did not validly abrogate state immunity and therefore could not override state law under the supreme law of the land.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseSydney Santos challenged Tennessee's legislative apportionment in federal court as violating equal protection. Tennessee argued the claim presented a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court reached the merits because the federal constitutional guarantee operated as supreme law of the land and required judicial enforcement.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseThe Bank of the United States refused to pay a Maryland tax imposed only on the federal bank. Maryland argued its tax power was undiminished. The Court held the state tax invalid because federal law creating the bank was supreme law of the land and could not be obstructed by state taxation.
In April 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The Bank organized in Philadelphia pursuant to the act and in 1817 established a branch in the City of Baltimore that from that time until May 1, 1818, transacted business by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other customary operations under the authority of the corporate body established at Philadelphia. On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled "An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." The Maryland statute provided that any such branch could not lawfully issue notes except upon stamped paper of specified denominations furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, or could relieve itself from that requirement by paying annually in advance to the Treasurer the sum of $15,000. Officers offending against the provisions forfeited $500 for each offense, and persons circulating unstamped notes forfeited up to $100, with penalties recoverable by indictment or action of debt. James W. McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, on the days set forth in the declaration issued bank notes to George Williams in Baltimore in part payment of a promissory note discounted by the branch, and those notes were not issued on stamped paper as prescribed by the Maryland act; neither the bank nor its branch had paid the $15,000 in advance before or since the issuance of those notes. John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of Maryland, brought an action of debt against McCulloch in the County Court of Baltimore County to recover the penalties. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts to the court, which rendered judgment against McCulloch; the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed that judgment, and McCulloch brought the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error.
View caseThe President directed the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate private steel mills to avert a strike during the Korean War. Youngstown Sheet & Tube challenged the order. The Court held the seizure exceeded presidential authority because no statute or constitutional provision supplied the necessary power under the supreme law of the land.
In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and their employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., over terms and conditions to be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the union gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened without success. On December 22, 1951, President Truman referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. The Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the union gave notice of a nationwide strike to begin at 12:01 a.m. on April 9. The President believed that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize national defense because steel is an indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war materials. A few hours before the strike was to begin, on April 8, 1952, the President issued Executive Order 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued possessory orders calling upon the presidents of the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision and asked the court to declare the orders invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions. The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the President had inherent power supported by the Constitution, historical precedent, and court decisions. On April 30, 1952, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. Deeming it best that the issues be promptly decided by the Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari on May 3, 1952, and set the cause for argument on May 12.
View caseA valid federal statute prevails whenever it directly conflicts with a state measure. The Supremacy Clause requires state officials and courts to follow the federal rule. Conflict preemption applies even without an express statement of congressional intent once inconsistency exists.
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No. A non-self-executing treaty has no domestic legal effect until Congress enacts implementing legislation. The President cannot compel state compliance through a memorandum. State agencies therefore have no obligation to enforce such a treaty in their proceedings.
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No. The Supremacy Clause protects federal instrumentalities from state laws that single them out for discriminatory treatment. A state statute imposing a tripled fee only on entities chartered by the federal government violates this structural immunity.
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