Spencer Silver, delirious in a hospital, threatens to jump from a window. A nurse locks the doors and windows to stop him. The nurse faces no battery liability because the intervention prevents apparent self-harm under emergency circumstances.
Insurance Denial After Death
Sylvia Santos's son dies from a gunshot. The insurer refuses payment claiming suicide. The beneficiary sues in California court, testing whether the company's contacts support personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state policy.
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
In 1944, Lowell Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy from the Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation. In 1948, the respondent International Life Insurance Company agreed with Empire Mutual to assume its insurance obligations. Respondent then mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin in California offering to insure him in accordance with the terms of the policy he held with Empire Mutual. He accepted this offer and from that time until his death in 1950 paid premiums by mail from his California home to respondent’s Texas office.
Petitioner Lulu B. McGee, Franklin’s mother and the beneficiary under the policy, sent proofs of his death to the respondent, but it refused to pay, claiming that he had committed suicide. It appears that neither Empire Mutual nor respondent has ever had any office or agent in California, and respondent has never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart from the policy involved here. The California statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit on insurance contracts with residents became law in 1949, after respondent had entered into the agreement with Franklin.
Petitioner recovered a judgment in a California state court against respondent on the contract of insurance, with service of process by registered mail at respondent’s principal place of business in Texas pursuant to the state statute. Unable to collect the judgment in California, petitioner filed suit on the judgment in a Texas court.
The Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment, holding it void under the Fourteenth Amendment because service of process outside California could not give the courts of that State jurisdiction over respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Seth Shapiro challenges a state abortion ban. The litigation traces medical ethics back to ancient debates that treated suicide and abortion as linked moral questions under the Hippocratic tradition.
Roe v. Wade410 U.S. 113 (1973)
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code.
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions.
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
Sophia Singh defends Amish parents against compulsory schooling. The state cites survey data showing Amish suicide rates comparable to national averages to argue against religious exemption claims.
Wisconsin v. Yoder406 U.S. 205 (1972)
In Green County, Wisconsin, respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families reside in Green County. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16. The respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade.
The children involved were Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15, and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14. All had graduated from the eighth grade of public school. On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted in Green County Court of violating the compulsory-attendance law. They were each fined the sum of five dollars.
At trial, respondents defended on the ground that application of the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere.
Expert witnesses, including scholars on religion and education such as Dr. John Hostetler and Dr. Donald A. Erickson, testified regarding the relationship of Amish beliefs to school attendance and the impact of compulsory high school attendance on Amish communities. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the compulsory school-attendance law violated respondents' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
On petition of the State of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The record showed that the Amish have a history dating back to the 16th century Swiss Anabaptists and maintain a way of life emphasizing separation from the world, harmony with nature, and informal learning through doing on the family farm. Respondents presented evidence that an additional one or two years of formal high school education would do little to serve the state's interests in preparing citizens for political participation and self-sufficiency. The Amish have functioned effectively as a self-sufficient community for more than 200 years. There was no evidence in the record that any of the children in this case expressed a desire to attend high school against their parents' wishes.
Samuel Soto's closely held corporation objects to a federal mandate that would require coverage for procedures including assisted suicide. The owners argue the requirement substantially burdens their religious exercise.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.573 U.S. 682 (2014)
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials.
Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees. Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees. Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel. The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga.
Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing. The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods. The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith.
If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel. Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year. The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
Serena Soto seeks a physician's prescription to end her life. The state statute bans such assistance. The Court upholds the ban, finding no fundamental right and legitimate state interests in preserving life.
Washington v. Glucksberg521 U.S. 702 (1997)
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters.
The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General.
In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
When may a person use force to prevent suicide without consent?
A person may use reasonable force to prevent another from committing suicide when the circumstances reasonably indicate imminent self-harm, even without consent. This privilege arises independently of consent and is illustrated by locking doors to stop a delirious person from jumping.
Supporting sources
Does a suicide note qualify as a statement against interest?
A suicide note may qualify if the statements are genuinely self-inculpatory. Portions that merely shift blame to others are not admissible under the exception because they lack the required reliability guarantee.
Supporting sources
Is there a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide?
No fundamental right exists. States may prohibit the practice under rational basis review because they have legitimate interests in preserving life, protecting the vulnerable, and maintaining medical integrity.
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When is aiding suicide a crime under the Model Penal Code?
Purposely aiding or soliciting suicide is a second-degree felony if it causes suicide or an attempt, and otherwise a misdemeanor. Causing suicide by force, duress, or deception constitutes criminal homicide.
Supporting sources
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
…Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · Other protections, including the privileges and immunities clauses, the contracts clause, unconstitutional conditions, bills of attainder, and ex post facto lawsUBEIntermediate