Also known as: substantive laws
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties.
Simone Sanders, a citizen of State A, sues Silverline Industries, a State B corporation, in federal court in State A for breach of a supply contract negotiated and performed in State A. The court applies State A contract rules defining the parties' rights and duties rather than any independent federal standard. Silverline's motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated under those state-created obligations.
Selena Singh prevails on a state-law tort claim against Southland Foods in federal court. Because the governing substantive law treats reasonable attorney fees as an element of compensatory damages, the court requires Singh to prove the amount of fees at trial rather than by post-judgment motion. The jury returns a verdict that includes the fee component.
Sebastian Santos, a State A resident, sues Sterling Dynamics in federal court in State B over a contract formed in State A. The court first applies State B's choice-of-law rules, which are treated as substantive, to decide that State A law governs the parties' contractual rights and duties. The case then proceeds under those State A rules.
Sarah Sullivan obtains a final federal judgment dismissing a consumer class action against Sentinel Security. Congress later enacts a statute directing courts to reopen all such judgments and recalculate damages under new substantive standards. The court refuses to reopen the case, holding that the statute impermissibly interferes with the final adjudication of the parties' rights.
Santiago Sanchez challenges a state statute restricting reproductive services as violating protected liberty interests. The court analyzes whether the statute infringes substantive rights derived from the Due Process Clause rather than merely questioning the fairness of state procedures. The claim proceeds on the basis of those substantive protections.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseSteven Silva alleges that two telecommunications firms entered an agreement to allocate markets. The court examines whether the complaint states a plausible claim under the substantive antitrust rules governing conspiracies rather than merely parallel conduct. The action is dismissed because the pleaded facts fail to show the required substantive violation.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseSubstantive law creates and defines the rights and duties that determine the outcome of a claim. In diversity actions a federal court must apply the substantive law of the state where it sits, including that state's conflict-of-laws rules. Procedural rules, by contrast, govern the manner of enforcing those rights in federal court.
Choice-of-law rules are substantive for Erie purposes because they determine which state's body of rights and duties will govern the parties. A federal court sitting in diversity must therefore follow the forum state's conflict rules rather than fashioning its own.
When the substantive law of the claim makes reasonable fees an element of damages, the amount must be established as part of the plaintiff's case at trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(A) therefore directs that such fees be proved at trial instead of by post-judgment motion.
Congress may alter substantive rules for cases that have not yet reached final judgment. Once a final judgment has been entered, however, a statute directing courts to reopen the case and apply new substantive standards violates separation of powers.
…U. S. 518, 535. If the opinion commits this Court to the position that the Congress is without power to declare what rules of substantive law shall govern the federal courts, that conclusion also seems questionable. The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure. Wayman v.…