Also known as: statute of descent and distribution · statutes of descent · statute of descent · descent and distribution statutes · intestate succession statutes
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory scheme directing the distribution of a decedent's estate to designated heirs when the decedent dies without a valid will. The scheme identifies the surviving spouse, children, and other next of kin as primary takers and fixes their shares according to the state's order of succession.
Elias died without a will while holding a rental house in his own name. Horizon Property Services continued collecting rents and signing leases after his death. Carla, Elias's niece and sole heir under the intestacy statute, claimed title in a quiet title action. Title passed to Carla by operation of law at the moment of death, vesting ownership in her even though no deed was ever executed.
After Scott Summers killed his father, the probate court applied the slayer rule to bar Summers from taking any share. The father's estate passed instead to Summers's siblings under the order of succession. The statutes of descent and distribution supplied the default distribution once the slayer was disqualified.
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland. Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow. The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband. In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
View caseSarah Whiton received land under a devise that limited inheritance to heirs on her father's side. Upon her death without issue, the property passed only to those heirs under the governing descent rules. The statutes of descent and distribution enforced the lineal restriction rather than allowing passage to heirs on her mother's side.
Johnson entered into an agreement to purchase land and paid a deposit toward the purchase price. The land had been devised under the will of Royal Whiton, specifically passing to his five grandchildren pursuant to the seventh clause of that will. Subsequently, the five grandchildren executed a deed conveying the property and tendered it to Johnson as the buyer. Johnson refused to accept the deed, asserting that Sarah A. Whiton, one of the grandchildren, lacked the ability to convey a fee simple absolute in the land due to the terms of the will. As a result, Johnson commenced this action to recover the deposit paid under the purchase agreement. The seventh clause of Royal Whiton's will contained the following language regarding the disposition to his granddaughter: “After the decease of all my children, I give, devise, and bequeath to my granddaughter, Sarah A. Whiton, and her heirs on her father’s side, one third part of all my estate, both real and personal, and to my other grandchildren and their heirs respectively the remainder, to be divided in equal parts between them.” This dispute over the quality of title offered by the tendered deed was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where Holmes, J., considered the matter and issued the court's opinion.
View caseNo. The statutes govern only property that is not effectively disposed of by will. When a will validly devises real property, title passes by devise rather than by intestate succession.
Supporting sources
Most states bar a slayer from taking by descent or distribution. The property then passes to the next eligible heirs under the statutory order of succession.
Supporting sources
Wrongful death statutes designate the same heirs identified by statutes of descent and distribution as the beneficiaries of the action, even when the decedent left a will that disposes of the probate estate differently.
Yes. Modern statutes of descent and distribution supply the surviving spouse with a share of the intestate estate as one of three layers of spousal protection that replaced common-law dower and curtesy.
…of Pearson-Maines , 70 Wn. App. 860, 865, 855 P.2d 1210 (1993) (invoking community property presumption in review of property distribution under the Lindsey standards). : See State ex rel. Marshall v. Superior Court , 119 Wash. 631, 637, 206 P. 362 (1922) (when time or manner of acquisition not established,…