74 Wash. App. 306, 872 P.2d 1150 (1994)
Shannon Connell met Richard Francisco in June 1983 at a Toronto hotel where Connell was performing as a dancer in a show produced by Francisco.1 At the time, Connell lived in New York City as a waitress with a degree in dance education and held a leasehold interest in a New York apartment.2 Francisco resided in Las Vegas and owned Prince Productions, Inc., a Nevada corporation that produced stage shows, along with significant real property in the Las Vegas area, with a net worth exceeding $1,300,000 as of February 1984.3 A relationship developed, and in October 1983 Connell visited Francisco in Las Vegas for two weeks before moving there to live with him in November 1983.4
From November 1983 through June 1986, the parties cohabited in Francisco's Las Vegas home.5 Connell worked as a paid dancer in stage shows, some produced by Francisco, and provided intermittent services to his business enterprises, receiving payment for some but not all of her work.6 Francisco made all payments related to the Las Vegas home and business assets acquired during this period, with titles taken in the name of Prince Productions or Francisco individually.7 Connell contributed no monetary funds to any property purchases.8
In 1986, Prince Productions purchased a bed and breakfast on Whidbey Island, Washington, known as the Whidbey Inn.9 Connell moved there to manage the business, and Francisco later joined her.10 From June 1986 through March 1990, the parties resided and cohabited on Whidbey Island, where they were viewed by many in the community as married.11 Connell used the name Francisco for business purposes with Francisco's knowledge and acquiescence, received an engagement ring, and both parties underwent fertility-improving surgeries.12 Connell managed the inn without salary from 1986 to 1988.13
During the Whidbey Island period, Prince Productions and Francisco acquired additional properties, including residences on Whidbey Island, a Las Vegas condominium, and a restaurant business, while Francisco produced another profitable show in the Bahamas.14 Connell provided uncompensated services to these enterprises and was involved in real property purchases but contributed no monetary funds, with all acquisitions titled in Francisco's or the corporation's name.15 The parties separated in March 1990.16 At that time, Connell possessed $10,000 in savings, clothing, an automobile, $10,000 in jewelry from Francisco, and her New York leasehold, while Francisco received a $5,000 weekly salary from Prince Productions and held assets with a net worth over $2,700,000, reflecting a $1,400,000 increase during the relationship.17
In December 1990, Connell filed suit against Francisco seeking division of property acquired during the relationship.18 The case was tried to the bench in the Superior Court, resulting in a judgment that characterized the property acquired during the relationship and distributed it, after which Connell appealed and Francisco cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.19
Whether the trial court misapplied the precedent of In re Marriage of Lindsey when distributing property acquired during the parties' relationship?20
Under the rule established in In re Marriage of Lindsey, courts must examine the meretricious relationship and the property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the property, drawing by analogy on the flexible guidelines of RCW 26.09.080 that direct consideration of the nature and extent of community and separate property, the duration of the relationship, and the economic circumstances of each party at the time of division.21
Yes. The trial court misapplied the Lindsey precedent by limiting its distribution solely to assets that would qualify as community property and by refusing to consider Francisco's separate property or the parties' economic circumstances despite the undisputed facts that Francisco's net worth grew from over $1,300,000 to over $2,700,000 during the six-year relationship while Connell left with only modest savings, clothing, an automobile, jewelry, and a leasehold interest.22 The court further erred by treating the character of property as controlling rather than treating the economic condition in which the decree would leave the parties as the paramount concern, thereby exercising discretion on untenable legal grounds.23
The trial court abused its discretion, and the case must be remanded for a just and equitable division that fully applies the Lindsey rule and the principles of RCW 26.09.080.24
Whether the principles of RCW 26.09.080 apply to the disposition of property following termination of a meretricious relationship?25
The principles of RCW 26.09.080 apply to the disposition of property following termination of a qualifying meretricious relationship. Lindsey and subsequent decisions incorporated those statutory factors into a common-law rule requiring a just and equitable distribution. Even though the statute itself governs only marital dissolutions, it does not statutorily equate meretricious relationships with marriage.26
Yes. The principles of RCW 26.09.080 apply because the Court of Appeals has consistently invoked the statute as the touchstone for property division at the end of long-term meretricious relationships, as confirmed by the facts that the parties cohabited for more than six years, were viewed by the community as married, and accumulated substantial assets through their joint efforts, thereby triggering the common-law rule that assimilates the statute's flexible guidelines without extending marital status for other statutory purposes such as intestate succession or unemployment benefits.27
The principles of RCW 26.09.080 govern the property division in this case and must be applied in full on remand.28
Whether the community property presumption applies when characterizing assets subject to division after a meretricious relationship ends?29
The community property presumption applies when characterizing assets subject to division after a meretricious relationship ends. The presumption is an inherent characteristic of community property law in Washington. It cannot be severed from the obligation to divide property justly and equitably under the Lindsey rule without reviving the overruled Creasman presumption that placed the burden on the non-title-holding partner.30
Yes. The community property presumption applies because the trial court placed the burden on Connell to prove by a preponderance that assets acquired in Francisco's name or through Prince Productions would have been community property. This is precisely the result the Lindsey decision sought to avoid.31 The facts show that Connell contributed uncompensated labor to the business enterprises that generated profits used for acquisitions while title remained in Francisco's name or the corporation's name.
This created the very uncertainty in tracing that the presumption resolves in favor of community character.32
The trial court erred by refusing to apply the community property presumption, and the case must be remanded for proper characterization and division under that presumption together with the principles of RCW 26.09.080.33