220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966)
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds.1 His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962.2 She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland.3
Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother.4 His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89.5 After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent.6 An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow.7
The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court.8 Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney.9 The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband.10
In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.11 The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.12
Whether a widow convicted of manslaughter in connection with the death of her husband may inherit from his estate?13
In the absence of a statute, a court applying common law techniques can reach a sensible solution by charging the spouse as a constructive trustee where equity and justice demand it.14 However, the principle that one should not profit by his own wrong must not be extended to every case.15 The slayer should not be permitted to improve his position by the killing but should not be compelled to surrender property to which he would have been entitled if there had been no killing.16 The line is drawn between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter because voluntary manslaughter is an intentional and unlawful killing with a real design and purpose to kill.17
No. The established facts show that Charlotte Mahoney was convicted of manslaughter after Howard Mahoney died intestate of gunshot wounds on May 6, 1961, leaving an estate of $3,885.89 with no issue and survived by his wife and parents.18 Under 14 V.S.A. §551(2) the surviving spouse would normally take the whole estate not exceeding $8,000, yet the conviction record was used by the Probate Court to find a felonious killing.19 Because Vermont draws no statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the constructive trust doctrine applies only upon proof that the killing was voluntary and intentional.20 The mere manslaughter conviction does not automatically bar inheritance without that equitable determination in the proper forum.21
A widow convicted of manslaughter is not automatically barred from inheriting but may be charged as a constructive trustee if the killing is proven to have been voluntary and intentional.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Shangraw concurred in the result.23 It must be acknowledged that it would be inequitable and unjust for a person who has intentionally killed another to inherit from the person whose life he has so taken.24 He expressed concern with the impractical aspects of the constructive trust doctrine applied in this case.25
In its application the burden and expense of again litigating the criminal issue must be borne by the parties interested.26 Here, the expense of carrying the burden of proof on this issue by the parents might well be prohibitive.27 The amount involved is relatively small.28
To continue this litigation, even though the parents should ultimately prevail, may well be, at least money-wise, like digging a hole to get the dirt to fill another hole.29 Suitable legislation providing for an exception to the usual operation of the statutes of descent and distribution might well eliminate extended and expensive litigation, should similar or like circumstances again be present.30
Whether the Probate Court for the District of Franklin may decree the residue of the estate directly to the decedent's parents?31
The Probate Court is bound to follow the statutes of descent and distribution.32 Its decree was in error when it decreed the estate directly to the parents in contravention of those statutes.33 Probate courts are courts of special and limited jurisdiction given by statute and do not proceed according to common law.34
No. The established facts establish that after due notice and hearing the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the $3,885.89 estate in equal shares to the father and mother, based on a finding of felonious killing drawn from the manslaughter conviction record.35 The statutes of descent under 14 V.S.A. §551(2) and (3) direct the estate first to the surviving spouse when there is no issue.36 The probate court lacked authority to bypass that statutory order by directly awarding the estate to the parents.37
The Probate Court may not decree the residue directly to the decedent's parents in contravention of the statutes of descent and distribution.38
Whether the Probate Court has jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on the estate in the hands of the widow?39
No. The established facts show that the Probate Court for the District of Franklin used the manslaughter conviction record to decree the estate directly to the parents rather than to the widow.43 Even if the probate court had attempted to impose a constructive trust, it was without jurisdiction.44 Its equity powers do not extend to purely equitable claims such as the parents' request to charge the widow as constructive trustee for their benefit.45
The Probate Court lacks jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on the estate in the hands of the widow.46
Whether the record of the manslaughter conviction alone permits the Probate Court to determine the distribution of the estate without further proceedings in chancery?47
The fact that a person is convicted of manslaughter in a criminal case does not dispense with the necessity of proof of the intentional killing in a proceeding in equity to charge him as a constructive trustee.48 The jurisdiction of the court of chancery may be invoked in probate matters when the powers of the probate court are inadequate.49
No. The established facts demonstrate that the Probate Court relied solely on the record of Charlotte Mahoney's manslaughter conviction to find a felonious killing and decree the estate to the parents.50 Because an indictment for murder can result in conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.51 The legislature provides no statutory distinction.52 Further proof in chancery is required to determine whether the killing was wilful and intentional before any constructive trust may be imposed.53
The record of the manslaughter conviction alone does not permit the Probate Court to determine the distribution of the estate without further proceedings in chancery.54