Also known as: sovereign immunities · state immunity · governmental immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine that protects nonconsenting states from private suits seeking damages in federal court and in their own courts on federal claims when Congress acts under Article I powers. The doctrine extends to suits in other states' courts and to certain federal administrative proceedings. Valid abrogation requires reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power rather than Article I authority.
Sophia Singh, a state employee, sued her home state in its own courts for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The state had not consented to the suit. The court dismissed the action because the federal statute rested on Article I authority and could not override the state's immunity from private damages actions in its own courts.
Seth Shapiro, a resident of State A, filed a tort damages action in State A courts against State B for injuries caused by a State B official. State B had not consented. The court dismissed the suit because the Constitution does not permit one state's courts to entertain private damages actions against another state without consent.
Sofia Stern, a citizen of State C, brought a contract damages action against State C in federal district court. The state had not consented and no abrogation applied. The court dismissed the case because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by a state's own citizens against that state in federal court absent consent or valid abrogation.
Selena Singh sued a state agency in federal court under a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. The statute purported to authorize private damages actions against states. The court dismissed the claim because Article I powers do not permit Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court.
Samuel Soto filed an administrative complaint against a state agency before a federal adjudicative body seeking damages under a federal statute. The state had not consented. The agency dismissed the proceeding because sovereign immunity bars sufficiently court-like federal administrative proceedings against nonconsenting states.
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
View caseScott Summers challenged a state land-use ordinance as violating religious exercise rights and sought damages against the state under a federal statute. The statute relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court examined whether the statute was a congruent and proportional response to constitutional violations before allowing the damages claim to proceed.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseYes. State sovereign immunity prevents private damages actions against nonconsenting states in their own courts when Congress acts under Article I powers, as with Fair Labor Standards Act claims.
No. States retain sovereign immunity from private suits in the courts of other states, and the Constitution does not permit one state's courts to entertain a private damages action against another state without its consent.
Yes. The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar extends to suits brought by a state's own citizens against that state in federal court absent consent or valid abrogation.
No. Congress's Article I powers, such as the Indian Commerce Clause, do not authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court. Valid abrogation must rest on the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power.
…§2000bb–1(b). The Act’s authorization of claims for money damages against the States is an attempt to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity. The question is whether Congress has the power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do so. Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends only to “enforc[ing]” the…