Also known as: sincerely-held · sincere belief · sincerely held belief
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A religious or moral conviction that an individual maintains with honesty and the force of traditional religious faith. Courts assess sincerity by examining whether the belief occupies a central place in the person's life rather than by evaluating its theological validity.
Sean Steele directs a nonprofit youth group whose charter requires members to affirm traditional moral standards on sexuality. After a state agency orders reinstatement of an expelled member whose conduct contradicts those standards, the group resists on the ground that inclusion would undermine its sincerely held beliefs. The court holds that the organization's expressive autonomy prevails because the beliefs are central to its mission.
Sebastian Santos seeks exemption from military service on the basis of ethical convictions that function like religious beliefs in his life. The draft board questions whether those convictions are sincerely held. The court finds the beliefs qualify because they occupy a place parallel to orthodox religious faith and are maintained with equivalent conviction.
Daniel Andrew Seeger was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board. This classification changed in 1955 to 2-S student status, which continued until reclassification as 1-A in 1958. In 1957 Seeger filed a conscientious-objector claim. He declared conscientious opposition to war in any form by reason of religious belief. He left open the question of belief in a Supreme Being. He described a belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes as a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. He cited Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza. The local board denied the claim solely because it was not based upon a belief in a relation to a Supreme Being as required by § 6(j). Arlo Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953 and held intermittent student classifications until 1956. In April 1958 he claimed noncombatant classification as a conscientious objector. He stated belief in a Supreme Being as Creator of Man ultimately responsible for the existence of man and as the Supreme Reality. In December 1958 he requested full 1-O classification. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A without indicating whether the decision rested on insincerity or on a finding that his belief was only a personal moral code. Forest Britt Peter was classified 1-A in 1959. He attached a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life. He quoted Reverend John Haynes Holmes's definition of religion as the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life. He noted that his convictions derived from reading and meditation in American democratic culture. He stated that one could call his belief a belief in the Supreme Being or God. Each registrant refused induction and was convicted in federal district court. Seeger and Jakobson were convicted in the Southern District of New York. Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Seeger and Jakobson but affirmed Peter's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the cases' importance in the administration of the Act.
View caseStephen Shaw resigns from a factory after it begins producing military equipment that conflicts with his religious convictions. When the state denies unemployment benefits, Shaw shows that his objection rests on sincerely held beliefs. The court orders benefits because the Free Exercise Clause protects employment decisions motivated by such beliefs.
Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, was hired by Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co. to work in its roll foundry fabricating sheet steel for industrial uses. On his employment application, Thomas listed his membership in the Jehovah’s Witnesses and noted his hobbies of Bible study and Bible reading, though he placed no conditions on his employment. Approximately one year later, the roll foundry closed and Thomas was transferred to a department fabricating turrets for military tanks. On his first day there, Thomas realized the work was weapons related, checked the bulletin board, and found that all remaining departments at Blaw-Knox were engaged in weapons production. After his request for a layoff was denied, Thomas quit his job on November 6, 1975, because he believed his religious convictions prevented him from participating in the production of armaments. Thomas then applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act. At an administrative hearing, Thomas testified that he had consulted a fellow Jehovah’s Witness at the plant who advised that working on weapons parts was not unscriptural, but Thomas could not accept that view and concluded his own stricter interpretation of his faith precluded such work. The hearing referee found that Thomas had terminated his employment due to his religious convictions but determined that this did not constitute good cause in connection with his work. The Review Board adopted the referee’s findings and denied benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and ordered benefits, but the Indiana Supreme Court vacated that decision and denied benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented.
View caseSasha Stone, a member of a recognized church, ingests peyote during a sacrament and is denied unemployment benefits after discharge. The state concedes that Stone's beliefs are sincerely held. The court nevertheless upholds denial because a neutral criminal prohibition may be applied even to sincerely held religious conduct.
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church employed at a private drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon. They ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church ceremony. Their employer fired them for this conduct, treating it as work-related misconduct. Smith and Black applied to the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources for unemployment compensation benefits, but the Division denied the claims on the ground that the firings constituted misconduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the denials, holding that they violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a determination whether Oregon law prohibited the sacramental use of peyote. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute made no exception for sacramental use and reaffirmed its conclusion that denying benefits violated the respondents' constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time. Oregon law prohibits knowing or intentional possession of peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance, making it a Class B felony. The respondents' peyote use occurred at a Native American Church ceremony and formed the sole basis for their terminations and benefit denials.
View caseSophia Singh teaches at a religious school and leads students in prayer and doctrinal instruction. When the school terminates her for conduct inconsistent with its faith, she claims discrimination. The court finds that her role involves important religious functions and that the school's sincerely held expectations control the employment decision.
Agnes Morrissey-Berru taught fifth and sixth grade at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, a Roman Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, for many years under annual employment agreements that set out the school's mission to develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community. She held a B.A. in English Language Arts with a minor in secondary education and a California teaching credential, and at the school's request she took religious education courses while on the faculty. Her agreements required her to perform all duties within that overriding commitment, to model and promote Catholic faith and morals, to participate in school liturgical activities as requested, and to comply with the faculty handbook; the pastor of the parish had to approve her hiring each year. She taught religion daily using a textbook designed for Catholic students, prepared students for Mass, communion, and confession, selected students to read at Mass, took students to Mass weekly and on feast days, prayed with students daily including the Hail Mary, Apostle's Creed, and Nicene Creed, directed an annual passion play, and was evaluated on whether Catholic values were infused through all subject areas. In 2014 Our Lady of Guadalupe School asked Morrissey-Berru to move from full-time to part-time status and the following year declined to renew her contract. She filed a charge with the EEOC, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, alleging the decisions were made to replace her with a younger teacher. The school maintained that its decisions rested on classroom performance difficulties with a new reading and writing program introduced to maintain accreditation. Kristen Biel worked at St. James School, another Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, first as a long-term substitute first-grade teacher and then as a full-time fifth-grade teacher under an employment agreement nearly identical to Morrissey-Berru's. She held a B.A. in liberal studies and a teaching credential, and during her employment she attended a religious conference on incorporating God into lesson plans. Her agreement and the faculty handbook required her to serve the school's religious mission, model the faith, integrate Catholic thought into secular subjects, prepare students to receive the sacraments, and comply with similar expectations; she taught religion two hundred minutes each week using a textbook selected by the principal, administered weekly religion tests, prayed with students daily, taught students about Catholic practices such as the Eucharist and confession, prepared students to participate at Mass, attended monthly Masses with her students, and was evaluated on whether she infused Catholic values in all teaching. After Biel requested a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer, St. James School declined to renew her contract. She filed charges with the EEOC, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, alleging the nonrenewal was because of her request for medical leave. The school maintained that the decision rested on poor performance, including failure to observe the planned curriculum and maintain an orderly classroom. Both schools moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suits were barred by the ministerial exception. The district courts granted summary judgment to the schools in both cases, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in both cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.
View caseSierra Santos owns a closely held corporation whose religious principles prohibit certain contraceptive coverage. When federal regulations require the coverage, the owners assert that compliance would violate their sincerely held beliefs. The court holds that the owners may assert those beliefs on behalf of the corporation and grants an exemption.
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials. Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees. Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees. Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel. The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga. Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing. The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods. The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith. If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel. Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year. The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
View caseCourts focus on whether the belief is genuinely maintained by the individual rather than on its theological correctness. They examine the role the belief plays in the person's life and may treat sincerity as a factual question for the factfinder.
No. Protection extends to beliefs that are personal and not formally mandated by any organized faith, provided they are held with the strength of traditional religious conviction.
Yes. When forced inclusion would significantly burden an expressive association's ability to convey its message, the organization's sincerely held moral values may prevail over a state's nondiscrimination interest.
No. Courts do not assess the truth or popularity of the belief. They ask only whether it is truly held by the claimant in his or her own scheme of things.
…Native American Church is a recognized religion, that peyote is a sacrament of that church, and that respondent’s beliefs were sincerely held.” 485 U. S., at 667. Under Oregon law, as construed by that State’s highest court, members of the Native American Church must choose between carrying out the ritual embodying their…