scilicet

On February 1, 2001, Michelle McCottry placed a 911 call reporting that her former boyfriend Adrian Davis was beating her with his fists inside her house. The 911 operator asked a series of questions about the location, whether weapons were involved, whether Davis had been drinking, his full name and middle initial, and his current actions. McCottry answered that Davis had just run out the door and was leaving in a car. Police arrived within four minutes, observed fresh injuries on McCottry's face and forearm along with her shaken state, and noted her efforts to gather her belongings and children. Davis was charged with felony violation of a domestic no-contact order. At trial McCottry did not appear, and the court admitted the 911 recording over Davis's Confrontation Clause objection, leading to his conviction, which the Washington Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. On February 26, 2003, police responded late at night to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon. Upon arrival Amy Hammon appeared somewhat frightened on the front porch but initially stated nothing was the matter. After officers entered and separated the couple, one officer questioned Amy in the living room while the other stayed with Hershel in the kitchen. Amy described a verbal argument that became physical, including Hershel breaking the furnace, lamps, and phone, shoving her into broken glass, and punching her in the chest. Amy then completed and signed a battery affidavit stating those events. Hershel was charged with domestic battery and probation violation. At his bench trial Amy did not appear, and the court admitted the officer's recounting of her statements as excited utterances along with the affidavit over objection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Hershel's convictions, and the Indiana Supreme Court held Amy's oral statements nontestimonial while finding the affidavit testimonial but its admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Davis v. Washington and the consolidated Hammon v. Indiana cases to address the testimonial character of the statements. The evidence introduced at each trial consisted solely of the out-of-court statements, as neither victim appeared to testify and no other witnesses could identify the assailant or describe the cause of the injuries.

In 1935 Dora Browning Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust instrument in Delaware naming the Wilmington Trust Company as trustee. The corpus consisted of securities. Mrs. Donner reserved the income for life and retained a power of appointment over the remainder exercisable by inter vivos deed or will. She also retained the rights to amend, alter, or revoke the agreement, to change the trustee, and to require the consent of a trust advisor she appointed for sales of assets, investments, and participation in reorganizations. In 1944 Mrs. Donner became domiciled in Florida and remained there until her death in 1952. On December 3, 1949, while in Florida, she executed both her will and an inter vivos power of appointment. The appointment directed $200,000 to each of two trusts benefiting her grandchildren Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, with the balance appointed to her executrix. Mrs. Donner died on November 20, 1952. Her will was admitted to probate in Florida, naming Elizabeth Donner Hanson as executrix. Fourteen months after the death, residuary legatees Katherine N. R. Denckla and Dorothy B. R. Stewart petitioned a Florida chancery court for a declaratory judgment concerning property passing under the residuary clause. Personal service was made on the executrix and beneficiaries. Nonresident defendants including the Wilmington Trust Company and the Delaware Trust Company were served by ordinary mail and local publication under Florida statutes. The Delaware trustee did not appear. After the Florida suit began, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine rights to the trust assets held there. All trust companies and most beneficiaries appeared in the Delaware proceeding. The Florida chancellor initially ruled he lacked jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees because no personal service had been made and the trust corpus was outside Florida. He proceeded as to appearing parties and held the power of appointment testamentary and void under Florida law, so that the $400,000 passed under the residuary clause. The Delaware Chancellor ruled the trust and appointment valid under Delaware law and that the corpus had been properly paid to the appointees. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional ruling, held Florida law applied, and affirmed that the trust was invalid and the appointment ineffective. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its own judgment and refused to accord full faith and credit to the Florida decree. The United States Supreme Court postponed the question of jurisdiction in the Florida appeal and granted certiorari to the Delaware Supreme Court. Both state supreme court judgments are before the Court.

The plaintiff in error, a colored man, was indicted for murder in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia, on the 20th of October, 1874. Upon trial he was convicted and sentenced. The record was then removed to the Supreme Court of the State, and there the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. A writ of error brought the case before the United States Supreme Court. Before the trial of the indictment commenced in the state circuit court, the defendant presented a verified petition praying for removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States. The petition stated that by virtue of the laws of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the state. White men were so eligible. It further stated that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had reason to believe and did believe he could not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person. This benefit is as is enjoyed by white citizens. The state court denied the petition for removal and forced the cause to trial. Motions to quash the venire because the law under which it was issued was unconstitutional, to challenge the array of the panel, for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment were then made. All of these motions were overruled. The law of the State referenced in the petition and motions was enacted on the 12th of March, 1873. It provided that all white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of the state shall be liable to serve as jurors, except for state officials.

Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.