Rule 12(b)(6)

In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.

In 2002 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a five-member entity appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Board oversees audits of public companies and possesses authority to inspect registered accounting firms, initiate investigations, and issue sanctions. Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the Board. The Board inspected the firm, released a report critical of its auditing procedures, and began a formal investigation. Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit organization of which the firm is a member, and Beckstead and Watts sued the Board and its members, the Commission, and the United States in federal district court. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Board's structure violated the Constitution. The district court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Petitioner Semtek International Inc. filed a complaint against respondent Lockheed Martin Corp. in California state court, alleging inducement of breach of contract and business torts. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district court dismissed petitioner’s claims as barred by California’s 2-year statute of limitations, adopting language suggested by respondent to dismiss the claims “in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s order. Petitioner subsequently brought suit against respondent in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. These claims were not time barred under Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations. Respondent removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on federal-question grounds, but that court remanded the case to state court. The Maryland state court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner returned to the California federal court and the Ninth Circuit, moving unsuccessfully to amend the earlier order to indicate that the dismissal was not “on the merits.” Petitioner appealed the Maryland trial court’s order to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. After the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review the case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.