Also known as: rigorously scrutinized · strict scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review requiring the government to prove that a challenged law is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. The standard applies to laws that discriminate on the basis of race, burden fundamental rights, or target religious practice through non-neutral means.
Renee Rogers, a Santeria priestess, faces prosecution under a city ban on ritual animal sacrifice. She argues the ordinance singles out her religion's practices while permitting other forms of animal slaughter. The court applies rigorous scrutiny because the law is not neutral or generally applicable and was enacted to suppress religious conduct. The ordinance fails because the city cannot show it is necessary to a compelling interest in public health.
Ralph Richardson, owner of a non-minority construction firm, challenges a city ordinance reserving 30 percent of public contracts for minority-owned businesses. The program rests only on general assertions of past societal discrimination rather than specific evidence of discrimination in the local industry. The court subjects the racial classification to rigorous scrutiny and invalidates the set-aside because it is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest supported by particularized findings.
Rajesh Rao operates a religiously affiliated foster agency that declines to certify same-sex couples on faith-based grounds. A city rule bars agencies from rejecting applicants but allows officials to grant individualized exemptions for secular reasons. Because the policy permits discretionary waivers, the court applies rigorous scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. The city cannot demonstrate that enforcing the rule against the religious agency is necessary to a compelling interest.
Ravi Reddy seeks to register a trademark containing a term some view as derogatory. The Patent and Trademark Office refuses registration under a statutory bar on disparaging marks. The court treats the refusal as a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech and applies rigorous scrutiny. The government cannot justify the ban as narrowly tailored to any compelling interest in preventing offense.
Ryan Roberts and his wife challenge a state law limiting contraceptive sales to pharmacies and requiring physician approval for minors. The restriction burdens the fundamental right to make decisions about contraception. The court applies rigorous scrutiny because the law substantially interferes with a protected liberty interest. The state cannot show the measure is narrowly tailored to any compelling interest in health or morality.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseRonald Reed and his partner face criminal charges under a state law prohibiting same-sex intimate conduct. The statute targets private, consensual adult behavior without any showing of harm to others. The court applies rigorous scrutiny because the law burdens a fundamental liberty interest in personal autonomy. The state cannot demonstrate that criminalizing the conduct is necessary to any compelling governmental interest.
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
View caseRigorous scrutiny applies when a law is not neutral or generally applicable and targets religious practice. The government must then prove the law is necessary to a compelling interest and narrowly tailored. Laws that permit individualized exemptions for secular reasons but deny them for religious reasons trigger this standard.
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The government must present a strong basis in evidence of specific past discrimination in the relevant industry and jurisdiction. General assertions of societal discrimination are insufficient. The program must also be narrowly tailored to remedy that identified discrimination.
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Yes. Content-based regulations of protected speech are subject to rigorous scrutiny and are presumptively invalid. The government must demonstrate that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn.
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Rigorous scrutiny requires the government to prove the law is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. Intermediate scrutiny requires only that the regulation advance an important interest and burden no more speech than necessary. Content-neutral regulations receive intermediate scrutiny while content-based rules receive rigorous scrutiny.
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