relate back

Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in New York. Robert’s mother, who died in 1968, was never married to Mario. After Mario’s widow, Rosamond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of the estate, Robert and his sister Maureen petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for Westchester County for a compulsory accounting, asserting their entitlement to inherit as Mario’s children. Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that Robert and Maureen had not obtained an order of filiation during Mario’s lifetime as required by New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 4-1.2. Robert conceded the absence of such an order. He presented evidence. This included a notarized document in which Mario referred to him as “my son” when consenting to his marriage. There were also affidavits from individuals stating that Mario had openly acknowledged Robert and Maureen as his children. The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Robert and Maureen were excluded as distributees. On direct appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. While the case was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon and vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its prior disposition. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.

In 1973 the United States Parole Board adopted explicit Parole Release Guidelines that established a customary range of confinement by combining a parole prognosis score with an offense severity rating. On January 25, 1974, respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the Northern District of Illinois of conspiracy to commit extortion and making false material declarations to a grand jury and was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years and one year. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Geraghty later obtained a reduction of his sentence to 30 months through a Rule 35 motion. Geraghty applied for parole in January 1976 and again in June 1976. Both applications were denied because his offense behavior was rated very high severity, his salient factor score was 11, and the guidelines indicated a range of 26-36 months. He then instituted this civil suit as a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his case. The case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania where Geraghty was incarcerated. The district court denied class certification as neither necessary nor appropriate and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. Geraghty appealed to the Third Circuit individually and on behalf of the proposed class. Another prisoner represented by the same counsel moved to intervene. On June 30, 1977, before any briefs were filed, Geraghty was mandatorily released after serving 22 months of his sentence. The Parole Commission moved to dismiss the appeals as moot. The Third Circuit held the litigation was not moot, reversed the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceedings including evaluation of subclasses. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals on whether a class action challenging parole guidelines becomes moot when the named plaintiff is released from prison while the appeal from denial of class certification is pending.

In March 1988, John F. DiGiovanni submitted an application to the Connecticut Superior Court for a prejudgment attachment in the amount of $75,000 on Brian K. Doehr's home in Meriden, Connecticut, in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr. DiGiovanni had no pre-existing interest in Doehr's real estate, and the suit did not involve the property. Connecticut law authorized prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing upon verification by oath that there was probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim. DiGiovanni accompanied the application with an affidavit stating that the facts set forth in his complaint were true, that he had been willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted by Doehr resulting in a broken left wrist, an ecchymosis to his right eye, and other injuries, and that he had expended sums for medical care and treatment. The affidavit concluded that these facts were sufficient to show probable cause that judgment would be rendered for the plaintiff. On March 17, 1988, the Superior Court judge found probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim and ordered the attachment on Doehr's home to the value of $75,000. The sheriff attached the property on March 21, 1988. Doehr first learned of the attachment after it had been recorded on the land records. He had not yet been served with the complaint. The attachment notice informed Doehr of his right to a hearing to claim that no probable cause existed, to request that the attachment be vacated or modified or a bond substituted, or to claim that some portion of the property was exempt. Doehr filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut claiming that the Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment upholding the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of authority regarding the statute's constitutionality.

On the morning of January 14, 1988, James Scanlon was discovered dead in a bar he ran in Allentown, Pennsylvania, his body having been stabbed repeatedly and set on fire. Ronald Rompilla was indicted for the murder and related offenses, and the Commonwealth gave notice of intent to ask for the death penalty. Two public defenders were assigned to the case. The jury at the guilt phase of trial found Rompilla guilty on all counts. During the ensuing penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to prove three aggravating factors, including that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence based on his 1974 conviction for rape, burglary, and theft. The Commonwealth presented evidence on all three aggravators and introduced testimony from the victim of the prior rape. Rompilla's evidence in mitigation consisted of relatively brief testimony from five family members who argued for residual doubt and beseeched the jury for mercy, along with testimony from his 14-year-old son. Rompilla's trial counsel interviewed him extensively about his upbringing and background, arranged for him to be examined by three mental health professionals, and questioned five members of his family in search of mitigating information. Counsel did not examine the court file on Rompilla's 1974 prior conviction even though they knew the Commonwealth intended to use that conviction as an aggravating circumstance and to introduce the transcript of the rape victim's testimony. The prior conviction file was a public document readily available at the courthouse where Rompilla was tried. After the jury sentenced Rompilla to death, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed both conviction and sentence on direct appeal. In December 1995 Rompilla filed claims under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel in failing to present significant mitigating evidence. The postconviction court denied relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Rompilla then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in federal district court. The District Court granted relief. A divided Third Circuit panel reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.