445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980)
In 1973 the United States Parole Board adopted explicit Parole Release Guidelines that established a customary range of confinement by combining a parole prognosis score with an offense severity rating.1
On January 25, 1974, respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the Northern District of Illinois of conspiracy to commit extortion and making false material declarations to a grand jury and was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years and one year.2 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions.3 Geraghty later obtained a reduction of his sentence to 30 months through a Rule 35 motion.4
Geraghty applied for parole in January 1976 and again in June 1976.5 Both applications were denied because his offense behavior was rated very high severity, his salient factor score was 11, and the guidelines indicated a range of 26-36 months.6 He then instituted this civil suit as a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his case.7
The case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania where Geraghty was incarcerated.8 The district court denied class certification as neither necessary nor appropriate and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. Geraghty appealed to the Third Circuit individually and on behalf of the proposed class.9 Another prisoner represented by the same counsel moved to intervene.10
On June 30, 1977, before any briefs were filed, Geraghty was mandatorily released after serving 22 months of his sentence.11 The Parole Commission moved to dismiss the appeals as moot.12 The Third Circuit held the litigation was not moot, reversed the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceedings including evaluation of subclasses.13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals on whether a class action challenging parole guidelines becomes moot when the named plaintiff is released from prison while the appeal from denial of class certification is pending.14
Whether a named plaintiff whose individual claim has become moot may continue to seek appellate review of the denial of class certification in a class action challenging parole guidelines?15
A named plaintiff in a class action may continue to seek review of the denial of class certification after his claim has become moot.16 The class certification issue is ancillary to the merits of the underlying claim.17 The named plaintiff's interest in the class certification issue is sufficient to create a live controversy even after his personal claim has expired.18
Yes. Geraghty filed the class action while still incarcerated and the district court denied certification before his mandatory release after serving 22 months.19 The guidelines controversy remained live for other prisoners who moved to intervene.20 Geraghty's interest in obtaining class certification therefore satisfied the personal stake requirement for the ancillary procedural claim even though his individual parole claim expired upon release.21 The Court of Appeals properly allowed the appeal to proceed on the certification question alone.22
The named plaintiff may continue to seek appellate review of the denial of class certification.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissents on the ground that the named plaintiff's release from custody moots both his individual claim and the class action.24 He emphasizes that Article III requires a personal stake in the outcome at all stages of the litigation.25 Once Geraghty was released, he no longer had any personal interest in the length of his sentence or the parole guidelines.26
The majority's extension of the capable of repetition yet evading review doctrine to the class certification issue itself is unwarranted because it allows former class representatives to litigate indefinitely without any live case or controversy.27 Such a result is inconsistent with the constitutional limitation on federal judicial power.28 Powell would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the action as moot.29
Whether the expiration of the named plaintiff's personal stake in the merits of the litigation moots the entire controversy when class certification has been denied by the district court?30
The expiration of the named plaintiff's personal stake in the merits does not moot the entire controversy when class certification has been denied.31 The proposed representative retains a personal stake in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Article III values are not undermined.32
Yes. The district court denied certification and granted summary judgment while Geraghty remained in custody.33 His subsequent mandatory release extinguished only the individual claim on the merits.34 The separate claim that he is entitled to represent the class of prisoners eligible for parole remained a concrete sharply presented issue capable of judicial resolution.35 The interest in the procedural right to class treatment survived the loss of the substantive parole claim.
The expiration of the named plaintiff's personal stake in the merits does not moot the entire controversy.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell contends that because no class had been certified and the lone plaintiff no longer had any personal stake after release the action must be dismissed as moot under Article III precedents requiring an actual case or controversy at all stages of review. He argues that the personal stake requirement is not flexible and cannot be satisfied by an interest in class certification alone when the named plaintiff has no continuing concrete injury.37 The absence of a certified class leaves no party with a live claim before the court.38
Allowing the litigation to continue would permit a lawyer without a client to pursue abstract questions, contrary to the case or controversy limitation.39 Powell would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss.40
Whether a class action challenging the validity of parole release guidelines becomes moot upon the named plaintiff's release from prison while the appeal from denial of class certification remains pending?41
A class action challenging the validity of parole release guidelines does not become moot upon the named plaintiff's release from prison while the appeal from denial of class certification remains pending.42 The interest of the named plaintiff in the class certification issue is sufficient to satisfy Article III even after the individual claim expires.43
Yes. Geraghty was released on June 30, 1977 before any briefs were filed in the Third Circuit.44 The guidelines remained in force and affected other prisoners who sought to intervene.45 The certification question therefore continued as a live controversy ancillary to the merits.46 Reversal of the denial of certification would relate back and preserve jurisdiction over the class claims.
The class action does not become moot upon the named plaintiff's release from prison.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell concludes that the action became moot upon release because the named plaintiff could obtain no additional personal relief and the absence of a certified class left no party with a live claim before the court.48 He stresses that the constitutional minimum of a personal stake must be satisfied throughout the action and that practical considerations or the presence of a vigorous advocate cannot substitute for that requirement.49 The majority's approach redefines the personal stake doctrine in a manner that would permit public actions by concerned bystanders.50
Powell maintains that the precedents cited by the majority do not support dispensing with the personal stake requirement when no class has been certified.51
Whether the district court's denial of class certification was erroneous because the court failed to consider certification of subclasses or issue-specific classes?52
A district court errs in denying class certification without considering the possibility of certifying subclasses or issue-specific classes when the proposed class is overbroad or presents individual issues that can be addressed through subclasses.53
Yes. The district court denied certification of the broad class of all federal prisoners eligible for parole at the same time it granted summary judgment finding the claims not typical and class treatment unnecessary.54 The Third Circuit correctly held that the district court should have considered subclasses on remand because Geraghty had no opportunity to propose them after the adverse merits ruling.55 The failure to exercise discretion in this manner constituted reversible error.
The district court's denial of class certification was erroneous for failing to consider subclasses.56