500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991)
In August 1985 the Riverside County Sheriff's Department arrested Donald Lee McLaughlin on a warrant for driving under the influence of alcohol and arraigned him the next day.1 On the same day the department arrested Florine Heard on charges of possession of narcotics for sale and arraigned her on August 6.2
The following day the department arrested Michael Scott McLaughlin on a similar warrant and arraigned him on August 7.3 On August 7, 1985, the three arrestees filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the County of Riverside and certain of its officers.4
The certified class included all persons arrested without a warrant in Riverside County who did not receive a probable cause determination within 36 hours of arrest.5 The complaint alleged that the county's policy of combining probable cause determinations with arraignment proceedings, which under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 825 had to occur without unnecessary delay and within two days excluding weekends and holidays, violated the Fourth Amendment.6
The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the county to provide probable cause determinations within 36 hours of arrest.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting a flexible standard under which the determination must be made as soon as reasonably feasible after arrest and concluding that the county's policy did not satisfy that standard.8
The Ninth Circuit consolidated the case with a parallel challenge to an identical injunction issued against San Bernardino County.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10 At the time the second amended complaint was filed the named plaintiffs remained in custody without probable cause determinations, though their individual claims later became moot after they received determinations or were released.11 Class certification preserved the controversy for review.12 The county represented that its policy provided probable cause determinations at arraignment for all warrantless arrestees regardless of charge.13
Whether a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest generally complies with the promptness requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh?14
In Gerstein v. Pugh, this Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.15 A jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.16
Yes. The County of Riverside combines its probable cause determinations with arraignment proceedings that must occur within two days excluding weekends and holidays under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 825. This policy generally provides the determination within 48 hours for arrests early in the week. The Supreme Court held that such a policy satisfies the promptness requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh because a jurisdiction providing determinations within 48 hours complies as a general matter with the Fourth Amendment.
A jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest generally complies with the promptness requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Marshall, Stevens, Souter
Justice Scalia dissented from the 48-hour rule.18 He argued that the Fourth Amendment requires the probable cause determination to be made as soon as is reasonably practicable and in no event more than 24 hours after arrest.19 Scalia grounded his position in the common-law tradition that an arresting officer must deliver the arrestee to a magistrate as soon as he reasonably can.20
He viewed the majority's approach as improperly expanding that rule by allowing delays for administrative convenience such as combining proceedings.21 He concluded that the Court's approach permits presumptively innocent persons to remain in jail for up to two days without any judicial oversight, contrary to the Fourth Amendment's core guarantee against unreasonable seizures.22
Justice Marshall dissented and joined Justice Scalia's view that a probable-cause hearing is sufficiently prompt under Gerstein only when provided immediately upon completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest.23 He would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment requiring Riverside County to provide probable-cause hearings as soon as it completes those steps.24 Marshall rejected the majority's allowance for delays up to 48 hours by combining the hearing with arraignment proceedings.25
He concluded that the county must provide the hearings without the extended delay permitted by the majority opinion.26
Whether a jurisdiction that does not provide such determinations within 48 hours must demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance to justify the delay?27
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.28 The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance, nor do intervening weekends.29
Yes. The established facts show that the county's policy of providing arraignments within two days excluding weekends and holidays could produce delays exceeding 48 hours, particularly over holidays.30 Therefore the county would bear the burden of proving a bona fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance to justify any such delay under the rule announced in this case.31
A jurisdiction that does not provide such determinations within 48 hours must demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance to justify the delay.32
Whether the lower courts on remand should limit their consideration of the section 1983 claims to the question whether the county's policy is unconstitutional?33
The fact that the county's policy is unconstitutional does not necessarily mean that respondents are entitled to money damages.34 The county may be able to establish that respondents' detention without a probable cause determination was not unconstitutional, or it may be able to establish an affirmative defense.
No. The lower courts on remand should not limit their consideration of respondents' section 1983 claims to the question whether the county's policy is unconstitutional.3536 Additional issues such as whether any constitutional violation caused compensable injury and whether affirmative defenses apply must also be addressed before determining entitlement to damages.37
The lower courts on remand should not limit their consideration of the section 1983 claims to the question whether the county's policy is unconstitutional.38