Also known as: real estate agent · real-estate agents · real estate agents · realtor · real estate broker
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person authorized to represent a principal in negotiating the purchase, sale, or lease of real property.
Ralph Richardson listed his waterfront warehouse with Crown Ocean under an exclusive agreement. Crown Ocean presented River Naval as a buyer that signed a purchase contract at the full listed price with no financing contingency. When National Naval later refused to close and withheld the commission, the court awarded Crown Ocean its fee because the broker had fulfilled its role by securing a qualifying purchaser.
Rhea Reynolds, a real estate agent, listed homes in Willingboro for several owners. When the township banned For Sale signs, Reynolds advised clients that the restriction limited their ability to reach buyers and coordinated alternative marketing. The owners later challenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional limit on commercial speech.
In March 1974, petitioner Linmark Associates, a New Jersey corporation, owned real property in the Township of Willingboro, New Jersey, and listed it for sale with petitioner Mellman, a real estate agent. To market the property, the petitioners sought to post a “For Sale” sign on the lawn. On March 18, 1974, the Township Council enacted Ordinance 5-1974, which repealed prior authorization for “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on all but model homes. Petitioners then brought suit against the township and the building inspector responsible for enforcing the sign ban, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The township of Willingboro is a residential community in southern New Jersey developed in the late 1950s by Levitt & Sons as a middle-income area. During the 1960s, its white population grew by nearly 350 percent while the nonwhite population increased from 60 to over 5,000, reaching 11.7 percent of the total. By 1970, the population stood at almost 44,000. From 1970 to 1973, the white population declined by nearly 2,000, or over 5 percent, while the nonwhite population grew by more than 3,000, or about 60 percent, making nonwhites 18.2 percent of residents by 1973. Respondents presented testimony at trial from real estate agents, council members, and Human Relations Commission members attributing the white population decline to “panic selling” driven by fears that the township would become all black and property values would fall. One agent estimated that 80 percent of sellers cited concerns that “the whole town was for sale.” Mayor William Kearns testified that community meetings in 1973 led to proposals to ban signs, prompting the council to study ordinances from other communities like Shaker Heights, Ohio, and to hold public hearings in February and March 1974 before unanimously approving the measure. At the hearings, the council learned that the 1973 home sales turnover rate was roughly 11 percent, that 230 “For Sale” signs stood among 11,000 houses in February 1974, and that property values had risen faster than in comparable communities. Real estate agents reported that 30 to 35 percent of their clients came from seeing signs, and one estimated that sales without signs would take twice as long. Surveys showed strong public support for the ban, though speakers emphasized aesthetics and property values more than racial changes. After nine months under the ordinance, witnesses noted fewer panic sales but no drop in overall sales volume, with agents reporting 25 percent business growth. The District Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. A divided Court of Appeals reversed that judgment in 1976. The Supreme Court granted certiorari later that year.
View caseRoger Ramirez, a real estate agent, listed a single-family house for an owner who intended to sell to Oxford House for use as a group home for recovering addicts. When the city enforced a zoning rule limiting unrelated occupants, Ramirez helped the buyer obtain a variance by showing that the sale itself did not violate the code definition of family.
In the summer of 1990, respondent Oxford House opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washington, for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction. The group home, called Oxford House-Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences. Upon learning that Oxford House had leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of the house. The citations charged violation of the zoning code rule that defines who may live in single-family dwelling units. The occupants of such units must compose a "family," and family, under the City's defining rule, "means an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." Oxford House-Edmonds houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore does not conform to the code. Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing Act. The parties have stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the residents of Oxford House-Edmonds "are recovering alcoholics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within the meaning" of the Act. Oxford House asked Edmonds to make a "reasonable accommodation" by allowing it to remain in the single-family dwelling it had leased. Edmonds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily and general commercial zones. Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with failure to make a "reasonable accommodation" permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. The United States filed a separate action on the same FHA "reasonable accommodation" ground, and the two cases were consolidated. Edmonds suspended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolution of the federal litigation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that the defining provision is exempt from the FHA under § 3607(b)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the absolute exemption inapplicable, and remanded the cases for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh Circuit decision declaring exempt a similar family definition provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
View caseRita Russell, a real estate agent, received an offer on a listed home from a qualified Black buyer. After the seller instructed her to reject the offer because of race, Russell declined to participate and referred the matter to counsel, prompting the seller to claim the state constitution protected private racial preferences in real estate transactions.
In 1963, the Mulkeys filed an action in California superior court against Reitman and other property owners under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. They alleged that the owners had refused to rent them an apartment solely because of their race and sought an injunction and damages. After the filing of the complaint, California voters approved Proposition 14 in the November 1964 statewide election, which added section 26 to Article I of the California Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the new provision had rendered the statutory claims invalid. The trial court granted the motion, and the Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court. In December 1964, the Prendergasts filed a separate suit in superior court against Snyder to enjoin their eviction from an apartment. They alleged that the eviction was motivated by racial prejudice and would violate sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Snyder filed a cross-complaint seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to terminate the month-to-month tenancy even if his action was based on racial considerations. The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint with prejudice after concluding that judicial enforcement of a racially motivated eviction would violate the Equal Protection Clause, without addressing the validity of Proposition 14. Snyder appealed to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court heard the two cases together. In the Mulkey appeal it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In the Prendergast appeal it affirmed the dismissal of the cross-complaint. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments because the cases presented an important issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the adoption of Proposition 14, the California Legislature had enacted several statutes addressing racial discrimination in housing. The Unruh Act of 1959 prohibited certain discriminations in business establishments. The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 prohibited racial discriminations in the sale or rental of private dwellings containing more than four units and was enforceable by the State Fair Employment Practice Commission. Proposition 14 provided that neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge the right of any person to decline to sell, lease or rent residential real property to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses. The two cases arose after the passage of Proposition 14 and presented challenges to its effect on prior antidiscrimination legislation and on claims of racial discrimination in housing.
View caseRuby Rivera, a real estate agent, was directed by a seller to refuse offers from Black purchasers on a suburban lot. When the buyer sued under federal civil rights law, Rivera testified that the seller's instruction violated the statute prohibiting racial discrimination in property sales.
In September 1965 Joseph Lee Jones and his wife, who are Negroes, sought to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision of St. Louis County, Missouri, from the Alfred H. Mayer Company and one of its officers. The company refused to sell them a house solely because the Joneses are Negroes. Subsequently, on September 2, 1965, the Joneses filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint alleged the refusal to sell and sought injunctive relief together with damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the questions presented. While the case was pending, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containing a Fair Housing Title, but that statute did not cover the respondents' development until January 1, 1969, and had no effect on the pending litigation. The provision invoked by the petitioners originated as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was re-enacted in 1870.
View caseRowan Russell listed a house for sale without telling buyers that multiple murders had occurred inside. After the sale closed, the buyers sued the agent for nondisclosure of the property's reputation, claiming the omission affected market value and their decision to purchase.
Dorris Reed purchased a house from Robert King. Neither King nor his real estate agents told Reed that a woman and her four children were murdered there 10 years earlier. However, King and his real estate agent knew about the murders and knew the event materially affected the market value of the house when they listed it for sale. They represented to Reed the premises were in good condition and fit for an “elderly lady” living alone but did not disclose the fact of the murders. At some point King asked a neighbor not to inform Reed of that event. Nonetheless, after Reed moved in neighbors informed her no one was interested in purchasing the house because of the stigma. Reed paid $76,000, but the house is only worth $65,000 because of its past. Reed sues seeking rescission and damages. King and the real estate agent defendants successfully demurred to her first amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Reed appeals the ensuing judgment of dismissal.
View caseA real estate agent earns a commission by producing a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase on the seller's terms or upon execution of a contract of sale, depending on the listing agreement. The seller cannot in bad faith refuse to complete the transaction and then deny the commission.
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Many states require a written memorandum for a real estate broker's commission contract. An oral agreement is unenforceable, and restitution is unavailable when it would frustrate the statute's purpose by awarding the exact amount promised under the unenforceable contract.
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A statement introduced by phrases such as "in my view" and addressing overall soundness or market value is characterized as opinion or puffing rather than a factual assertion. A buyer cannot avoid the contract based solely on such a statement.
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Restitution is denied when the statute expressly bars recovery of a commission without a writing and allowing restitution would award the same amount promised under the contract, thereby frustrating the statute's purpose.
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…that it include at least three architects, one historian qualified in the field, one city planner or landscape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident of each of the city’s five boroughs. N. Y. C. Charter § 534 (1976). In addition to the ordinance’s requirements concerning the composition of the Commission,…