Also known as: purposefully avails himself · purposeful availment · purposefully availed · purposeful availment test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct by which a nonresident defendant deliberately directs activities toward the forum state in a manner that invokes the benefits and protections of its laws. Such conduct creates the minimum contacts required for specific personal jurisdiction when the claim arises out of or relates to those activities.
Pilar Pena manufactures tires in State X and sells them exclusively to a distributor there. A consumer buys one and drives the car to State Y, where an accident occurs. Pilar moves to dismiss the State Y suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because Pilar took no steps to serve the State Y market, the court finds no purposeful availment and grants the motion.
Pablo Perez negotiates a long-term franchise agreement with a Florida corporation. The contract requires payments and reports to Miami headquarters and subjects the deal to Florida law. When a dispute arises, Pablo contests jurisdiction in Florida. The court holds that his deliberate outreach to the Florida company constitutes purposeful availment of Florida law.
In 1978 John Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident and senior partner in a Detroit accounting firm, was approached by Brian MacShara about jointly applying for a Burger King franchise in the Detroit area. They submitted their application to Burger King’s Birmingham, Michigan district office, which forwarded it to the company’s Miami headquarters. During the ensuing four months Rudzewicz and MacShara negotiated with both the Birmingham district office and Miami headquarters over site-development fees, building design, computation of monthly rent, and assignment of liabilities. With some misgivings they obtained limited concessions from the Miami headquarters, signed the final agreements, and commenced operations in June 1979 for the Drayton Plains facility. The agreements stated that the franchise relationship was established in Miami and governed by Florida law, required all royalty, advertising, and rent payments to be sent to Miami, and obligated Rudzewicz to attend training in Miami. MacShara completed the training course there and the franchisees purchased $165,000 in equipment from Burger King’s Miami division. The Drayton Plains restaurant enjoyed steady business during the summer of 1979 but patronage declined after a recession began later that year. Rudzewicz and MacShara fell far behind on their monthly payments to Miami. Burger King headquarters sent notices of default and conducted prolonged negotiations by mail and telephone with the franchisees, but the negotiations failed and headquarters terminated the franchise. Rudzewicz and MacShara refused to vacate and continued to operate the facility as a Burger King restaurant. Burger King commenced suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in May 1981. It invoked diversity and federal trademark jurisdiction. Burger King alleged breach of the franchise agreements by failure to make required payments in Miami together with trademark infringement. The district court denied Rudzewicz’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, conducted a three-day bench trial, entered judgment against Rudzewicz and MacShara jointly and severally for $228,875 in contract damages, ordered them to close the restaurant or surrender possession, and awarded costs and attorney’s fees. Rudzewicz appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed on the ground that the circumstances left Rudzewicz without reasonable notice of suit in Florida. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional ruling.
View casePenelope Price agrees that her daughter may spend extra time with the mother in California. The father lives in New York and never visits or conducts business in California. When the mother sues for increased support in California, the father moves to dismiss. The court rules that his consent to the child's travel does not amount to purposeful availment of California law.
Ezra Kulko married Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during a three-day stopover in California while en route from a military base in Texas to Korea. Both parties were New York domiciliaries who returned to New York after the marriage and Ezra's service. Their children Darwin and Ilsa were born in New York in 1961 and 1962. The family lived together in New York City until their separation in March 1972. Following the separation, Sharon moved to San Francisco, California. In September 1972, Sharon flew to New York to sign a separation agreement providing that the children would spend school years with their father and vacations with their mother in exchange for $3,000 annual child support payments during her custody periods. Sharon obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the agreement and returned to California, where she remarried. The children resided with their father during the school year until December 1973, when Ilsa remained in California after her father bought her a one-way ticket. In January 1976 Darwin flew to California using a ticket sent by his mother. Less than one month after Darwin's arrival, Sharon commenced an action in California Superior Court to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, modify it to award her full custody, and increase the father's child-support obligations. Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service on the ground that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court sustained the rulings in a 4-2 decision before Ezra appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
View casePriscilla Parks visits California for a week to attend a conference and is served with process there. She has no other ties to the state. When she challenges jurisdiction, the court notes that her voluntary decision to enter the state and conduct activities there does not establish purposeful availment for specific jurisdiction.
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
View casePatrick Phan owns shares in a Delaware corporation but never attends meetings or directs corporate affairs in Delaware. A shareholder sues him in Delaware over corporate mismanagement. The court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction because mere stock ownership does not constitute purposeful availment of Delaware's corporate laws.
On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there. Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars. All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976). The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.
View caseParker Phillips operates a website that accepts orders, processes payments, and ships goods directly to residents of Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania buyer sues over a defective product. The court finds that the site's interactive commercial features directed at forum residents establish purposeful availment supporting specific jurisdiction.
Zippo Manufacturing Company is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Bradford, Pennsylvania, where it manufactures Zippo tobacco lighters. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Sunnyvale, California. Dot Com operates an Internet website and news service and holds the domain names zippo.com, zippo.net, and zipponews.com. Dot Com's website provides information about the company, advertisements, and an online application for its Internet news service. The service offers three membership levels, with paid subscribers receiving passwords to access newsgroup messages stored on servers in California after submitting personal information and paying by credit card. Approximately 3,000 of Dot Com's 140,000 paying subscribers reside in Pennsylvania. Dot Com has also entered into agreements with seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania, two of which are in the Western District, allowing their subscribers to access the news service. These contacts occurred through the Internet, as Dot Com maintains no offices, employees, or agents in Pennsylvania. Manufacturing filed a five-count complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging trademark dilution, infringement, and false designation under federal law, as well as state law claims, based on Dot Com's use of the word "Zippo" in its domain names, website, and newsgroup message headers. Dot Com moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case.
View caseNo. A contract alone is insufficient. The defendant must have deliberately reached out to the forum through additional contacts such as payment obligations, choice-of-law clauses, or ongoing performance directed at the forum.
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No. Mere foreseeability that a product will enter the forum through the unilateral act of a consumer does not constitute purposeful availment. The defendant must have targeted the forum market or invoked its protections.
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Yes, when the communications are repeated, directed at the forum party, and accompanied by other indicia of targeting such as customized reports or forum-specific performance adjustments.
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No. A parent's consent to a child's residence in another state for family reasons does not by itself invoke the benefits and protections of that state's laws for jurisdictional purposes.
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…emphasize that the decision does not preclude a state from exercising jurisdiction in appropriate cases where the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the state’s laws. Concurring — Justice Stevens I concur in the judgment and in most of the Court’s opinion. The Delaware sequestration statute, as…