supra, 436 U.S., at 94-95
Ezra Kulko married Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during a three-day stopover in California while en route from a military base in Texas to Korea.1 Both parties were New York domiciliaries who returned to New York after the marriage and Ezra's service.2 Their children Darwin and Ilsa were born in New York in 1961 and 1962.3 The family lived together in New York City until their separation in March 1972.4
Following the separation, Sharon moved to San Francisco, California.5 In September 1972, Sharon flew to New York to sign a separation agreement providing that the children would spend school years with their father and vacations with their mother in exchange for $3,000 annual child support payments during her custody periods.6 Sharon obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the agreement and returned to California, where she remarried.7
The children resided with their father during the school year until December 1973, when Ilsa remained in California after her father bought her a one-way ticket.8 In January 1976 Darwin flew to California using a ticket sent by his mother.
Less than one month after Darwin's arrival, Sharon commenced an action in California Superior Court to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, modify it to award her full custody, and increase the father's child-support obligations.9 Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service on the ground that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California.10 The trial court denied the motion.11 The Court of Appeal affirmed.12 The California Supreme Court sustained the rulings in a 4-2 decision before Ezra appealed to the United States Supreme Court.13
Whether, in this action for child support, the California state courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the State?14
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants.15
A defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.16
An essential criterion is whether the quality and nature of the defendant's activity is such that it is reasonable and fair to require him to conduct his defense in that State.17
The defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.18
No.19
The father's contacts with California were limited to two brief visits many years earlier.20
The purposeful availment requirement is not met by his acquiescence in Ilsa living in California.21
Any financial benefit argument fails because savings resulted from her absence from New York rather than her presence in California.22
The cause of action arises from a separation and agreement centered in New York.23
Basic considerations of fairness point to New York as the proper forum since the father remained in the state of the marital domicile while the mother moved to California.24
The exercise of jurisdiction would therefore violate the Due Process Clause.25
No.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented.26 The Court properly treats this case as presenting a single narrow question of whether the California Supreme Court correctly weighed the facts in applying the constitutional standard.27 He cannot say that the Court's determination against state-court in personam jurisdiction is implausible.28
However, his independent weighing of the facts leads him to conclude that appellant's connection with the State of California was not too attenuated to require him to conduct his defense in the California courts.29 He therefore dissents.30