public trust

Brookfield, Wisconsin, is a residential suburb of Milwaukee with a population of approximately 4,300. Appellees Sandra C. Schultz and Robert C. Braun, who opposed abortion, picketed on a public street outside the residence of a doctor who performed abortions at clinics in neighboring towns. Between April 20, 1985, and May 20, 1985, they and others assembled outside the doctor's home on at least six occasions for periods ranging from one to one and a half hours, with groups varying in size from 11 to more than 40 people, and the picketing remained generally orderly and peaceful. The picketing generated substantial controversy and numerous complaints, prompting the Town Board to enact an ordinance on May 7, 1985, that prohibited all picketing in residential neighborhoods except for labor picketing. After the town attorney advised that the labor exception likely rendered the ordinance unconstitutional under Carey v. Brown, the town repealed it on May 15, 1985, and replaced it with a flat ban stating that it is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield. The new ordinance recited its purpose as the protection and preservation of the home through assurance that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy, and noted concerns about emotional disturbance, distress, harassment, and obstruction of public sidewalks. On May 18, 1985, appellees were informed that enforcement would begin on May 21, leading them to cease picketing and file suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the town and its officials. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed by an equally divided en banc vote after initial panel proceedings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case after postponing consideration of its appellate jurisdiction.

The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet. The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.

In September 1967 Marinette County adopted shoreland zoning ordinance number 24, which became effective the following month. The ordinance followed a model published by the Wisconsin Department of Resource Development and implemented standards required by state statutes sections 59.971 and 144.26, enacted in 1965 as part of the Water Quality Act. It established conservancy districts covering all shorelands designated as swamps or marshes on United States Geological Survey maps. The ordinance defined wetlands as areas where groundwater is at or near the surface much of the year or where any segment of plant cover is deemed an aquatic according to N. C. Fassett's Manual of Aquatic Plants. It required a conditional use permit and a fee of twenty dollars before any person could fill more than five hundred square feet of wetlands contiguous to navigable water. It also required a permit for filling more than two thousand square feet on slopes of twelve percent or less within three hundred feet of such water. In April 1961 the Justs purchased 36.4 acres of land with 1,266.7 feet of frontage on the south shore of Lake Noquebay, a navigable lake in Marinette County. Between 1964 and 1967 they sold five parcels and retained the southernmost lot, which has 366.7 feet of lake frontage. The northern half of the retained parcel lies within one thousand feet of the lake's normal high-water elevation, appears as swamp or marsh on the USGS map, contains plants classified as aquatic by N. C. Fassett's Manual of Aquatic Plants, and therefore qualifies as wetlands under the ordinance. In February and March 1968 Ronald Just, without obtaining a conditional-use permit, hauled 1,040 square yards of sand onto the retained parcel and created a fill strip approximately twenty feet wide that ran nearly six hundred feet along the western boundary and then eastward along the shoreline. The fill covered more than five hundred square feet of wetlands with surface drainage toward the lake. It also covered more than two thousand square feet on a slope of less than twelve percent within three hundred feet of the lake. The Justs filed a declaratory-judgment action asserting that the ordinance's conservancy-district and filling restrictions were unconstitutional. After trial the circuit court dismissed the Justs' declaratory action and entered judgment against them in the forfeiture proceeding, after which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin granted review.

This case arises out of a plan by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to acquire, by condemnation if necessary, a large tract of land to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant. The plaintiffs, a neighborhood association and several individual residents of the affected area, brought suit in Wayne Circuit Court to challenge the project on several grounds. In the spring of 1980, General Motors informed the City of Detroit that it would close its Cadillac and Fisher Body plants located within the city in 1983. General Motors offered to build an assembly complex in the city if a suitable site could be found meeting four criteria: an area of between 450 and 500 acres, a rectangular shape, access to a long-haul railroad line, and access to the freeway system. The city evaluated nine potential sites and selected a parcel of approximately 465 acres straddling the Detroit-Hamtramck border known as Central Industrial Park. In July 1980 the Detroit Common Council approved the boundaries of the project. On September 30, 1980, the completed project plan was approved by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation. On October 31, 1980, the Common Council passed a resolution approving the project plan with minor modifications and declaring that the project constituted a public purpose. General Motors required that title to the entire site and the rail marshalling yard must be vested in the City of Detroit by May 1, 1981. The projected public cost of preparing a site agreeable to the board of directors of General Motors is over $200 million. The site was to be sold to General Motors for little more than $8 million. The trial court conducted a ten-day trial on defendants’ motion to dismiss from November 17 to December 2, 1980, limited to the question whether the city abused its discretion in determining that condemnation of plaintiffs’ property was necessary under 1980 PA 87. On December 9, 1980, the court entered judgment for defendants and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1980, and an application for bypass with the Michigan Supreme Court on December 15, 1980, which the Court granted along with a motion for immediate consideration.