The body of law that governs relations between private individuals and the government together with the structure and operation of government itself.
2
statutory
A statute enacted for general application to the public at large rather than for the benefit of particular persons.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
The body of law that governs relations between private individuals and the government together with the structure and operation of government itself.
Examples5
Entrapment by Undercover Officer
Perry Pratt taught an online course while facing financial strain. An undercover officer posing as a student repeatedly assured him that selling exam answers constituted permitted tutoring under university rules. After weeks of persuasion Perry accepted payment for the answers. The court applied public law principles governing official inducement to decide whether the government conduct created a substantial risk that a person not ready to offend would commit the crime.
State Employee Wage Rules
Sense 2
2
statutory
A statute enacted for general application to the public at large rather than for the benefit of particular persons.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What makes a statute a public law rather than a private law?
A public law applies generally to the public at large. A private law benefits only a specific individual or small group. Congress designates each enacted bill accordingly.
Piper Patel worked as a driver for a city transit authority. Federal wage and hour statutes required overtime pay. The authority claimed immunity as a traditional state function. The court applied public law principles to determine whether Congress could regulate the wages of employees performing governmental services.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority469 U.S. 528 (1985)
The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System.
In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers.
San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years.
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees.
Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA.
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.
Paula Pierce sued state officials alleging that legislative districts diluted her vote. The complaint asserted that the apportionment violated equal protection. The court examined whether the claim presented a justiciable controversy under public law standards governing the political process.
Baker v. Carr369 U.S. 186, 211
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties.
The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass.
Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties.
Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment.
A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
Patricia Patel sought to intervene in an employment discrimination suit settled by consent decree. The decree altered hiring practices that affected her promotion prospects. The court considered whether public law rules on intervention permitted her to challenge the decree after entry.
Martin v. Wilkes490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989)
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law.
After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department.
The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981.
Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983.
A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
Pilar Pena operated a municipal sanitation department subject to federal minimum wage requirements. The city argued that the mandate invaded traditional state functions. The court applied public law analysis to decide whether the federal statute could displace state control over core governmental operations.
National League of Cities v. Usery426 U.S. 833 (1976)
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political sub-divisions from its coverage. Amendments in 1961 extended coverage to employees of enterprises engaged in commerce, and 1966 amendments removed the exemption for employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. The Supreme Court upheld the 1966 amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz in 1968.
In 1974, Congress amended the Act to include a public agency within the definition of employer and to deem employees of public agencies as engaged in commerce. These amendments applied the Act's requirements to almost all public employees of the States and their subdivisions, subject only to the general exemption for executive, administrative, or professional personnel and certain officeholders. Appellants consisting of the National League of Cities, numerous States, and municipalities challenged these amendments.
The appellants alleged in their complaint that compliance would impose significant additional costs, including $938,000 per year for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for police and fire protection, $2.5 million annually for Arizona, and between $8 million and $16 million for California. They further claimed that the overtime provisions would force reductions in training programs, such as shortening the California Highway Patrol academy from 2,080 to 960 hours, and curtail affirmative action and internship programs in cities like Inglewood and Clovis.
A three-judge district court was convened and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, stating that it was bound by Maryland v. Wirtz despite finding the contentions substantial. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard initial argument in 1975, reargued the case in March 1976, and issued its decision on June 24, 1976.
Public law addresses relations between individuals and the government and the structure of government itself. Private law governs relations among private parties. The distinction determines whether enforcement proceeds through public officials or private litigants.
When may a public law school condition recognition of student groups?
A public law school may require recognized groups to accept all students under a viewpoint neutral all comers policy reasonably related to its educational mission.
369 U.S. 186, 211
…State of Tennessee, with his office in Nashville, Tennessee, and as such official, is charged with the duties set forth in the public law enacted by the 1959 General Assembly of Tennessee creating said office. "Defendant, Dr. Sam Coward, James Alexander , and Hubert Brooks are the duly appointed and qualified members…