Also known as: public acts · public statute
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legislative enactment of a state that creates rights or duties. Sister states must recognize the enactment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause when it supplies the governing rule for a dispute.
Pilar Pena, a Wisconsin resident, died in an Illinois accident. Her estate sued in Wisconsin under the Illinois wrongful death statute. The Wisconsin court applied the Illinois statute as the governing public act rather than dismissing the claim under local law.
Philip Powell obtained a default judgment in Oregon against a nonresident defendant. When he sought enforcement in California, the California court examined whether the Oregon statute authorizing the judgment qualified as a public act entitled to full faith and credit.
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
View casePiper Patel sued in federal court in Maryland after a prior state-court dismissal in Virginia. The federal court determined whether the Virginia dismissal statute operated as a public act that controlled the preclusive effect of the judgment in the new proceeding.
Petitioner Semtek International Inc. filed a complaint against respondent Lockheed Martin Corp. in California state court, alleging inducement of breach of contract and business torts. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district court dismissed petitioner’s claims as barred by California’s 2-year statute of limitations, adopting language suggested by respondent to dismiss the claims “in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s order. Petitioner subsequently brought suit against respondent in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. These claims were not time barred under Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations. Respondent removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on federal-question grounds, but that court remanded the case to state court. The Maryland state court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner returned to the California federal court and the Ninth Circuit, moving unsuccessfully to amend the earlier order to indicate that the dismissal was not “on the merits.” Petitioner appealed the Maryland trial court’s order to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. After the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review the case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseParker Phillips, a Kansas royalty owner, challenged Phillips Petroleum's interest calculations under multiple state statutes. The Supreme Court considered whether Kansas could apply its own public act to out-of-state claims without violating full faith and credit obligations to other states' laws.
Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, produced or purchased natural gas from leased land in 11 states during the 1970s. It sold most of the gas in interstate commerce at prices regulated by the Federal Power Commission, later the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Beginning in the mid-1970s Phillips proposed price increases. It collected higher amounts subject to refund with interest if disapproved. Phillips suspended royalty payments to lessors until final Commission approval. It paid the suspended royalties of $3.7 million in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9 million in 1978 without interest after the increases were approved. In 1979 the Commission began investigating overcharges. In 1983 it issued an opinion ordering refunds. Royalty owners Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty Anderson, Oklahoma residents owning leases in Oklahoma and Texas, filed suit in Kansas state court seeking interest on the suspended royalties. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 royalty owners later reduced to 28,100 members after 3,400 opted out and 1,500 could not be notified. Fewer than 1,000 class members resided in Kansas and only about one-quarter of one percent of the leases were located there. The Kansas trial court certified the class under a state statute modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on an opt-out basis. It sent first-class mail notice describing the action and the right to opt out. The court applied Kansas law to award interest at Commission rates followed by the Kansas post-judgment rate of 15 percent. After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1984.
View casePatricia Patel, a Tennessee voter, sued over malapportioned legislative districts created by a 1901 statute. The Court assessed whether the Tennessee public act governing district lines raised a justiciable federal question.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View casePortia Price, injured while working in Vermont for a New Hampshire employer, sought benefits under New Hampshire's workers' compensation statute. The Court evaluated whether the New Hampshire public act controlled the claim despite Vermont's competing statute.
In 1932 Jennie M. Clapper, a New Hampshire citizen serving as administratrix, filed suit in a New Hampshire court against Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc., a Vermont corporation. She sought damages for the death of Leon J. Clapper under the employers’ liability provisions of the New Hampshire Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Company maintained its principal place of business in Vermont and operated lines extending into New Hampshire. Leon Clapper, a Vermont resident, was hired by the Company in Vermont as a lineman for emergency service in either state. While performing his duties in New Hampshire by restoring burned-out fuses at a substation, he was killed. The case was removed to federal district court on diversity of citizenship. The Company raised a special defense that the Vermont Workmen’s Compensation Act barred the action because the employment contract had been made in Vermont, both parties resided there, and both had accepted the Vermont Act as a term of the contract. The district court rejected the special defense and denied a motion to dismiss. After three jury trials the third resulted in a $4,000 verdict for the plaintiff. The Circuit Court of Appeals first reversed the judgment but on rehearing affirmed it, one judge dissenting. The Company sought review in the Supreme Court by appeal and petition for certiorari. The appeal was denied and certiorari was granted. The Vermont Act provided that every contract of employment made in the state was presumed subject to its provisions unless expressly declined in writing. Acceptance made its remedies exclusive for injuries inside or outside the state. The New Hampshire Act required an employer to file a declaration to become subject to its compensation provisions yet still permitted an employee to elect after injury to sue at common law. The Company had filed the required declaration in New Hampshire.
View caseA public act is a state legislative enactment that creates substantive rights or duties. A judicial proceeding is a court judgment or order. The Constitution requires recognition of both, but the analysis for statutes focuses on whether the forum may apply its own law instead of the sister-state statute.
No. Full faith and credit generally requires recognition of a sister-state statute even if the forum disagrees with its policy, provided the statute creates enforceable rights and the forum has a sufficient connection to the dispute.
No. A forum may decline enforcement when it lacks jurisdiction over the claim, but it cannot close its courts to a cause of action created by another state's public act solely to avoid the constitutional obligation.
…were rendered, under the provision of the Constitution requiring that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State;" and the act of Congress providing for the mode of authenticating such acts, records, and proceedings, and declaring that, when thus…