Also known as: prosecutors case in chief · prosecutor case-in-chief · case-in-chief · case in chief
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The segment of a criminal trial during which the prosecution presents its affirmative evidence to prove the elements of the charged offense.
After police questioned Pierce Patterson without warnings, they obtained a confession. The prosecution refrained from offering the statement during its presentation of evidence to prove the elements of the crime. The court excluded it from that portion of the trial because of the Miranda violation.
Police interviewed Paul Peterson after his right to counsel had attached and without counsel present. The prosecution presented other witnesses and documents during its affirmative presentation but did not introduce the uncounseled statement to establish guilt. The court ruled the statement inadmissible for that purpose.
After arrest, Phoebe Park remained silent when advised of her rights. The prosecution called its witnesses and introduced physical evidence during its main presentation but did not reference her silence to prove the offense. The court prevented any such use in that phase of trial.
Petitioners Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood were arrested together in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, and charged with selling ten pounds of marijuana to William Bonnell, an informant working with the local narcotics unit. The evidence presented at their separate trials, held about one week apart in the Common Pleas Court, was identical in all material respects. Narcotics agents had arranged with Bonnell to set up a purchase using $1,320 collected from the unit, which Bonnell took to a bar in Dover, Ohio, where he met the petitioners. Subsequently, Doyle obtained the marijuana and met Bonnell and Wood at a parking lot in New Philadelphia, Ohio, where the transaction occurred under surveillance by four agents. After discovering they had been paid $430 less than agreed, Doyle and Wood chased Bonnell but were stopped by local police acting on instructions from the agents. Agent Kenneth Beamer arrived, arrested both petitioners, and administered Miranda warnings before a search of the car uncovered the $1,320. At trial, each petitioner testified that Bonnell had framed them by attempting to sell the marijuana to Doyle, who had changed his mind about the quantity, leading Bonnell to throw the money into the car and take the drugs back. During cross-examination, the prosecutor in each trial asked why the petitioner had not told this story to Agent Beamer at the time of arrest, and the trial court overruled defense objections to these questions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe prosecution introduced a statement obtained without proper warnings during its presentation of evidence. On appeal the court examined whether the error affected the outcome of that portion of the trial and concluded the remaining evidence independently established the elements.
Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were convicted in a California state court upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender. Chapman was sentenced to life imprisonment and Teale to death. At trial both petitioners chose not to testify. The prosecutor took full advantage of a provision in the California Constitution allowing comment on a defendant's failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of guilt. The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify. The trial took place before this Court decided Griffin v. California. On appeal the California Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence but affirmed applying the State's harmless-error provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to these questions: where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, can the error be held to be harmless, and if so, was the error harmless in this case.
View caseThe prosecution sought to introduce prior bad acts of Pedro Pacheco during its affirmative case. The court restricted the evidence to matters directly relevant to the charged offense and excluded broader character proof from that segment of trial.
In 1947 Solomon Michelson stood trial in federal court on a charge of bribing a revenue agent. The government introduced evidence that Michelson had made a substantial cash payment to the agent. Michelson testified in his own defense, admitting the payment but claiming the agent had demanded, threatened, and induced it. On direct examination Michelson's counsel brought out that he had been convicted in 1927 of a misdemeanor involving counterfeit watch dials. Cross-examination further showed that in 1930, when applying for a license to deal in second-hand jewelry, Michelson had answered "No" to a question asking whether he had ever been arrested or summoned for any offense. Michelson called five character witnesses who had known him for fifteen to thirty years. Each witness testified on direct examination that Michelson's reputation for honesty, truthfulness, and being a law-abiding citizen was very good, based on conversations with others in the community. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked four of the witnesses whether they had ever heard that Michelson had been arrested on October 11, 1920, for receiving stolen goods. None of the witnesses had heard of the incident. Outside the presence of the jury the prosecutor assured the trial judge that the arrest had occurred and produced a supporting record that defense counsel did not challenge. The trial judge gave the jury limiting instructions on three separate occasions concerning the purpose of the questions. Michelson was convicted on the bribery count. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
View caseOfficers obtained a statement from Portia Price without fresh warnings after she had invoked her rights. The prosecution presented its other evidence to prove the crime but did not offer the statement during that portion of the trial. The court enforced the exclusion from the case-in-chief.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe prosecution may introduce evidence that establishes the elements of the offense, including witness testimony, documents, and physical items that are properly disclosed and admissible under the rules of evidence.
No. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda, even if voluntary, are inadmissible during the prosecution's presentation of its affirmative evidence to prove guilt.
The government must disclose items it intends to use in its case-in-chief, including expert opinions and certain documents, so the defense receives notice before trial.
No. Evidence obtained from an illegal search is inadmissible during the prosecution's affirmative presentation of proof, although it may be available for other limited purposes such as impeachment.