Also known as: property rights · proprietary right
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A legally enforceable interest in tangible or intangible property that is protected against interference by others. The interest may arise from ownership, possession, or a vested right to continue or complete a use of land. It supplies standing to sue for invasions such as private nuisance and limits government power to eliminate established uses without compensation or a reasonable phase-out period.
Philip Powell operated a small machine shop on land zoned industrial when the city later rezoned the area residential. The city ordered immediate closure. Powell continued operations because the shop was a lawful nonconforming use. The city could not eliminate the use without first satisfying the requirements for abandonment or a reasonable amortization period.
Perry Pratt leased farmland and a farmhouse from the owner. An adjacent hog operation released dust and odors that made living and working on the leased property unpleasant. Pratt sued the operator for private nuisance. The operator moved to dismiss on the ground that only the fee owner could sue. The court denied the motion because Pratt held a possessory property right in the land that nuisance law protects.
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Parker Phillips was a well-known local athlete. A beverage company used his name and likeness in an advertising campaign without permission. Phillips sued for misappropriation. The company argued that no property interest existed because the use was not defamatory. The court held that Phillips possessed a property right in the commercial value of his identity that the unauthorized exploitation violated.
Pedro Pacheco obtained a building permit and began constructing a commercial structure under the existing zoning. After substantial foundation work and material purchases, the city rezoned the parcel to prohibit the project. Pacheco sought to complete construction. The city could not revoke the permit because Pacheco had acquired a vested property right through good-faith reliance and substantial expenditures.
Pearl Porter owned a billboard that became nonconforming after a zoning change. The ordinance allowed five years to remove or convert the sign. Porter challenged the requirement as an immediate taking. The court upheld the ordinance because the five-year period was reasonable given the modest investment and the public interest in eliminating the use.
Prism Analytics owned Grand Central Terminal. New York City designated the building a landmark and denied permission to build a large office tower above it. The company claimed the restrictions destroyed valuable property rights. The Court examined whether the regulation went too far by analyzing the economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.
Only persons who hold property rights or privileges in the use and enjoyment of the affected land may sue. That category includes owners, tenants in possession, and holders of easements. A person who merely lives nearby without a possessory interest lacks standing.
A landowner acquires a vested right when, in good-faith reliance on a permit or existing zoning, the owner makes substantial expenditures or otherwise changes position so that denying the right would be inequitable. Jurisdictions differ on whether a valid permit plus substantial construction is required or whether a balancing test applies.
No. The owner generally holds a vested right to continue a use that was lawful when established. The right may be lost only through abandonment, discontinuance for the statutory period, or, in some jurisdictions, a reasonable amortization ordinance.
No. Under the Model Business Corporation Act a shareholder has no vested property right resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, including those concerning purpose, management, or capital structure.
…Assuming the premises, the existence and maintenance of the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present invasion of appellee’s property rights and a threat to continue it. Under these circumstances, the equitable jurisdiction is clear. See Terrace v. Thompson , 263 U. S. 197, 215; Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U. S. 510,…