Also known as: propensities · propensity evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A known dangerous characteristic of a domestic animal abnormal to its class. The possessor who knows or has reason to know of the propensity faces strict liability for harm the animal causes even when the possessor exercised utmost care to prevent the harm.
An inference that a person acted in conformity with a character trait on a particular occasion. Evidence offered solely to support this inference is generally inadmissible because it invites the jury to decide the case on the basis of general disposition rather than the specific facts at issue.
A known dangerous characteristic of a domestic animal abnormal to its class. The possessor who knows or has reason to know of the propensity faces strict liability for harm the animal causes even when the possessor exercised utmost care to prevent the harm.
An inference that a person acted in conformity with a character trait on a particular occasion. Evidence offered solely to support this inference is generally inadmissible because it invites the jury to decide the case on the basis of general disposition rather than the specific facts at issue.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Pilar Pena kept a large dog that had previously lunged at delivery workers on three occasions. After the fourth incident in which the dog bit a visiting neighbor, the neighbor sued. Because Pena knew of the dog's abnormal aggressive propensity, she is subject to strict liability for the bite even though she had installed a stronger fence and posted warning signs.
Prime Logistics kept a tiger on its warehouse grounds. The tiger escaped its enclosure and mauled a neighboring business owner. Because the injury resulted from the dangerous propensity characteristic of tigers, the company faces strict liability even though it had used the strongest available fencing.
Pedro Pacheco owned a bull that had repeatedly broken through fences to reach cows in heat. When the bull charged and injured a passing cyclist, the cyclist sued. Liability is confined to harm flowing from the known sexual propensity. The owner is not automatically liable for unrelated aggressive acts the bull might commit.
2 common questions
A possessor faces strict liability when the possessor knows or has reason to know the domestic animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class. The liability extends to harm caused by that propensity even if the possessor took every possible precaution.
Supporting sources
Recovery is limited to harm that results from the specific abnormally dangerous propensity of which the possessor knew or had reason to know. Harm caused by a different propensity does not trigger liability under the rule.
Supporting sources
Paul Peterson faced charges for selling narcotics. The government offered evidence that two years earlier Peterson had sold drugs from the same location. The court admitted the evidence after finding sufficient proof the prior sales occurred and determining that the probative value on intent and absence of mistake outweighed any unfair propensity prejudice.
Precision Tools shareholders sued after a merger vote, alleging the proxy statement omitted a key conflict of interest. The court held the omission material because there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would have viewed the information as significantly affecting the voting process.
In February 1969 National Industries, Inc. acquired 34% of TSC Industries, Inc.'s voting securities from Charles E. Schmidt and his family. Schmidt, TSC's founder and principal shareholder, resigned from the board along with his son. Five National nominees then joined TSC's board. Stanley R. Yarmuth, National's president and chief executive officer, became chairman of the TSC board. Charles F. Simonelli, National's executive vice president, became chairman of the TSC executive committee. On October 16, 1969, the TSC board, with the National nominees abstaining, approved a proposal to liquidate and sell all of TSC's assets to National in exchange for National Series B preferred stock and warrants. On November 12, 1969, TSC and National issued a joint proxy statement to their shareholders recommending approval of the proposal. The proxy solicitation succeeded. TSC entered liquidation and dissolution, and the share exchange was completed. Northway, Inc., a TSC shareholder, filed suit on December 4, 1969, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against TSC and National. The complaint alleged that the joint proxy statement violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. It claimed the statement failed to disclose that the Schmidt interests transfer had given National control of TSC. It also claimed the statement omitted material facts concerning the degree of National's control over TSC and the favorability of the transaction terms to TSC shareholders. The District Court denied Northway's motion for summary judgment on liability. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether National had acquired control through the Schmidt purchase. This precluded summary judgment on the Rule 14a-3 claim. But the court reversed on the Rule 14a-9 claims and ordered partial summary judgment for Northway. It held that certain omissions were material as a matter of law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the standard of materiality applied by the Court of Appeals.
View casePriscilla Parks received a life sentence without parole after her seventh felony conviction. The court considered her demonstrated propensity for repeated serious criminal conduct when deciding whether the sentence was proportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Jerry Helm was convicted in South Dakota of third-degree burglary. In 1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, in 1973 of grand larceny, and in 1975 of third-offense driving while intoxicated. All six offenses were nonviolent and alcohol contributed to each. In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a no-account check for $100. He told the trial court he had been drinking in Sioux Falls, ended up in Rapid City with more money than he started with, and did not remember the incident, then pleaded guilty. Because he had three prior felony convictions in addition to the principal felony, the South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the recidivist statute. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a 3-2 decision. After Helm served two years, he asked the Governor to commute the sentence so he could become eligible for parole after serving three-fourths of a fixed term; the Governor denied the request in May 1981. Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, which denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment question.
2 common questions
The evidence is admissible if there is sufficient proof from which a jury could find the prior act occurred and if the probative value on a proper purpose such as intent or absence of mistake is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Supporting sources
The inference invites the jury to convict on the basis of the defendant's general character rather than the evidence of the charged offense. The rule protects against the risk that the jury will overweigh character evidence and deny the defendant a fair opportunity to defend against the specific charge.