Also known as: practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship · practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship · practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship · unnecessary hardship · practical difficulties
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An administrative standard for granting zoning variances from literal compliance with bulk or use restrictions. The standard is satisfied when strict application of the ordinance would impose practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship on the owner of the affected parcel because of its unique characteristics.
Lina Farms seeks to add seasonal worker housing that exceeds the agricultural district density limit of one dwelling per ten acres. The County Board of Adjustment reviews the application and finds that the farm's isolated location and the need to house workers on site create practical difficulties that strict enforcement would impose. The board grants a use variance allowing the housing.
Forest City Enterprises obtains site-plan approval for a multifamily project after satisfying all ordinance criteria. City voters then pass a charter amendment requiring popular approval of any zoning change. The company challenges the referendum as an improper delegation that creates unnecessary hardship by subjecting an otherwise compliant project to an unpredictable political process.
The city of Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, has a comprehensive zoning plan codified in a municipal ordinance. Respondent, a real estate developer, acquired an eight-acre parcel of real estate in Eastlake zoned for light industrial uses at the time of purchase. In May 1971, respondent applied to the City Planning Commission for a zoning change to permit construction of a multifamily, high-rise apartment building. The Planning Commission recommended the proposed change to the City Council. By popular vote, the voters of Eastlake amended the city charter to require that any changes in land use agreed to by the Council be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum. The City Council approved the Planning Commission's recommendation for reclassification of respondent's property to permit the proposed project. Respondent then applied to the Planning Commission for parking and yard approval for the proposed building. The Commission rejected the application on the ground that the City Council's rezoning action had not yet been submitted to the voters for ratification. Respondent filed an action in state court seeking a judgment declaring the charter provision invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people. While the case was pending, the City Council's action was submitted to a referendum, but the proposed zoning change was not approved by the requisite 55% margin. Following the election, the Court of Common Pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the charter provision. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed.
View caseChevron operates lessee-dealer stations subject to a state rent cap that reduces its aggregate income. The company demonstrates that the cap produces no legitimate public benefit while imposing practical difficulties on its investment returns. The court evaluates whether the regulation effects a taking by asking whether it substantially advances a state interest rather than merely imposing hardship.
In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers. Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership. Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years. The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.
View caseA grandmother in East Cleveland wishes to live with her grandson and his children in a single-family zone that defines family narrowly. Strict enforcement would force her to sell or relocate, creating unnecessary hardship because the property cannot be used for its intended family purpose. She seeks a variance to avoid the ordinance's disproportionate burden on her living arrangement.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseAmbler Realty owns land in Euclid that the village zones for residential use only. The classification prevents any industrial development and reduces the land's value. The owner argues that the restriction imposes unnecessary hardship because the parcel's location next to rail lines makes residential use impractical and that a variance or rezoning is required to permit a reasonable economic return.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseThe applicant must show that the property possesses unique characteristics that do not apply generally to the zone, that strict compliance would cause practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship, and that the variance will not harm the public welfare or neighboring properties. The standard focuses on the disproportionate burden on the particular parcel rather than on general dissatisfaction with the zoning classification.
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A variance requires proof of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship arising from unique property conditions and is discretionary. A special exception is available as of right if the ordinance lists the use as conditionally permitted and the applicant meets specified, objective criteria without needing to show hardship.
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No. Hardship that affects an entire area or class of properties is addressed by legislative rezoning or amendment, not by administrative variance. The variance standard requires that the property have exceptional or extraordinary circumstances not shared generally within the zone.
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