permanent abode

In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It struck down a District of Columbia law that banned handgun possession in the home. Chicago and the village of Oak Park maintained laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. Chicago's Municipal Code required a valid registration certificate for any firearm. It prohibited registration of most handguns. Oak Park made it unlawful to possess any firearm, including pistols, revolvers, and other handguns. Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson were Chicago residents. Along with the National Rifle Association and two Oak Park residents, they filed federal suits challenging these ordinances after the Heller decision. Chicago enacted its handgun ban in 1982 to protect residents from loss of property and injury or death from firearms. The petitioners argued that the bans left them vulnerable to criminals. They pointed to Chicago Police Department statistics showing that the city's handgun murder rate had increased since the ban. Chicago residents faced one of the highest murder rates in the country along with elevated rates of other violent crimes. Several petitioners had personal experiences with threats and violence. Otis McDonald, in his late seventies and living in a high-crime neighborhood, faced violent threats from drug dealers because of his community activism with alternative policing strategies. Colleen Lawson's home had been targeted by burglars. She believed possessing a handgun would decrease her chances of serious injury or death if threatened again. The Chicago petitioners and two groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sought a declaration that the handgun ban and related ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. A separate action challenged the Oak Park law. A third action also challenged the Chicago ordinances. All three cases were assigned to the same district judge. The District Court rejected the claims. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld a handgun ban a quarter century earlier. It also noted that Heller had refrained from addressing whether the Second Amendment applied to the States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It relied on three nineteenth-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and Miller v. Texas—that had been decided after the Slaughter-House Cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.

Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley lived together intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children. Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley’s death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and placed with court-appointed guardians. Stanley appealed. He claimed that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent. Since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley’s own unfitness had not been established, but rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married. Stanley’s actual fitness as a father was irrelevant. The decision is reported at In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N. E. 2d 814 (1970). Stanley presses his equal protection claim in the United States Supreme Court. The State responds that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1020 (1971), to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers — whether divorced, widowed, or separated — and mothers — even if unwed — the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children.

Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.