376 U.S. 612 (1964)
On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport.1 This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority.2 More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.3
More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.4 The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash.5 These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents.6
The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts.7 The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district.8 The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions.9
The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.10 The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order.11 The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a).13 Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.14
Whether the phrase 'where it might have been brought' in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) refers only to federal venue statutes or also incorporates state-law rules such as capacity to sue in the transferee forum?15
Section 1404(a) authorizes transfer of a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought when convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice so require.16 The limiting phrase refers exclusively to federal venue statutes that define permissible districts.17 The phrase does not incorporate state-law capacity rules that would have applied had the action originated in the transferee court.18
No. The phrase limits transfer solely by reference to federal venue statutes.19 The District of Massachusetts possessed both venue and jurisdiction over the defendants.20 The statutory phrase therefore does not bar transfer merely because the plaintiffs lacked capacity under the law of the proposed transferee state.21
The statutory phrase therefore does not bar transfer merely because the plaintiffs lacked capacity under the law of the proposed transferee state.
Whether a district court may transfer actions under § 1404(a) when the plaintiffs lacked capacity to sue under the law of the proposed transferee state at the time the suits were commenced?22
Yes. The District of Massachusetts possessed both venue and jurisdiction over the defendants.25 More than one hundred related actions were already pending in Massachusetts.26 These facts confirm that the transferee district was a place where the actions might have been brought within the meaning of the federal statute.27
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the absence of Massachusetts appointments at the time of filing precluded transfer.28
Whether a change of venue under § 1404(a) results in application of the state law of the transferee district rather than the transferor district?29
No. Transfer does not alter the state law that would have been applied by the transferor court.32 The established facts demonstrate that the actions were filed in Pennsylvania by Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing Pennsylvania decedents.33 Therefore the transferee court in Massachusetts must apply Pennsylvania law and Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules to the transferred actions.34 This approach preserves the legal rights the plaintiffs acquired by filing in the original forum.35
The assumption that transfer would produce a change in governing state law was therefore incorrect and the motion must be reassessed on that basis.36
Whether the District Court adequately considered factors of convenience and fairness when ordering transfer without determining which state's law would apply after transfer?43
No. The District Court assumed it could transfer regardless of which state's law would apply.46 Therefore the court did not evaluate how Pennsylvania law would affect the desirability of consolidation with the Massachusetts actions or assess the relative convenience of damage witnesses.47 The established facts show that the crash occurred near Boston, over one hundred actions were already pending in Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania and Massachusetts wrongful-death rules differ materially on damages.48 These differences required explicit consideration before transfer could be ordered.49
The case must be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of the transfer motion with proper attention to the governing state law.50
Related opinions on this issue
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the reversal substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court, but he believes that, under the circumstances shown in the opinion, this Court should now hold it was error to order these actions transferred to the District of Massachusetts.51