Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court's authority to hear and decide a case in the first instance rather than on appeal from another tribunal. The Constitution assigns this authority to the Supreme Court in a narrow set of cases involving ambassadors and states. Federal statutes extend it to the district courts for actions arising under federal law and for certain other enumerated matters.
Odette Orozco, the attorney general of State A, files suit directly against State B in the Supreme Court to settle a long-standing boundary dispute along their shared river. The Court accepts the case because the Constitution places controversies between two states within its original jurisdiction. The parties present evidence and the Court issues a decree fixing the boundary line.
Optima Health sues Oceanview Properties in federal district court alleging that the defendant infringed a federally registered software program used to manage patient records. The complaint asserts that the claim arises under the Copyright Act. The district court exercises original jurisdiction because the action is created by federal law.
Odilia Okamura brings a federal trademark claim against Osprey Aviation in district court and joins a state-law breach-of-contract count arising from the same licensing agreement. The court already possesses original jurisdiction over the trademark claim. It therefore exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim because both counts share a common nucleus of operative facts.
Oliver Okeke files a federal-question employment claim in state court against Odyssey Logistics. The defendant removes the action to the federal district court for the district where the state court sits. Removal is proper because the district courts would have possessed original jurisdiction over the federal claim had it been filed there initially.
Orson Ochoa petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing a federal officer to deliver a commission. The Court declines to issue the writ because the petition seeks an exercise of original jurisdiction outside the narrow categories listed in Article III. The case must therefore begin in a lower court.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseOakley Osei, a voter, sues state officials in federal district court alleging that legislative districts violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court recognizes that the claim arises under the Constitution and therefore falls within its original jurisdiction. The suit proceeds to trial on the merits.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseArticle III limits the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to cases affecting ambassadors and those in which a state is a party. Congress may grant concurrent jurisdiction to lower courts in most of these matters but cannot expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction beyond the constitutional categories.
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Yes. Section 1331 grants district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The well-pleaded complaint rule determines whether the claim arises under federal law.
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Once a district court has original jurisdiction over one claim, section 1367(a) authorizes it to hear all other claims that form part of the same constitutional case or controversy. The added claims must share a common nucleus of operative facts with the anchor claim.
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A defendant may remove a state-court action only if the district courts would have possessed original jurisdiction over the case had the plaintiff filed it in federal court. The notice of removal must be filed in the district embracing the state court where the action is pending.
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…of the United States has not power to issue a mandamus to a Secretary of State of the United States, it being an exercise of original jurisdiction not warranted by the Constitution. Congress have not power to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in other cases than those described in the Constitution. An act of Congress…