normal wear and tear

In the mid-1960s through 1987, the plaintiffs worked as grinders at the General Dynamics Corporation Electric Boat facility in Groton, Connecticut, where their duties required them to use pneumatic hand tools manufactured by the defendants Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, Stanley Works, and Dresser Industries, Inc., to smooth welds and metal surfaces. During this employment the plaintiffs developed permanent vascular and neurological impairment of their hands, manifesting as blanching of the fingers, pain, numbness, tingling, reduction of grip strength, cold intolerance, and clumsiness, symptoms diagnosed as hand arm vibration syndrome. Ronald Guameri, an industrial hygienist at Electric Boat, performed extensive testing of tools used at the shipyard and found that a large number of the defendants' tools violated vibration exposure limits established by the American National Standards Institute and exceeded the threshold limit promulgated by the American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists. Richard Alexander, a mechanical engineering professor, testified that methods to reduce vibration through isolation, dampening, and balancing had been available to manufacturers for at least thirty-five years. Charles Suggs, a research engineer, testified that he had reduced vibration hazards in chain saws by inserting rubber mounts in the 1960s, reduced vibration by 70 percent in tools without handles in the 1970s by wrapping them with resilient foam rubber and a metal sleeve, and in 1988 reduced vibration levels in the defendants' die grinders by between 35 and 60 percent using similar techniques. After a six-week trial the jury returned verdicts awarding the plaintiffs compensatory damages on their design defect claims, found that the defendants had provided inadequate warnings but awarded no damages on that claim because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, and declined to award punitive damages. The defendants appealed from the judgment, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal and cross-appeal from the Appellate Court to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). Electric Boat followed a regular maintenance program involving daily inspection of tools. It purchased chucks and other replacement parts from outside vendors. It periodically removed certain safety features and used longer burr attachments on the tools.

Crane was the sole beneficiary and the executrix of the will of her husband, who died January 11, 1932. He then owned an apartment building and lot subject to a mortgage which secured a principal debt of $255,000.00 and interest in default of $7,042.50. As of that date, the property was appraised for federal estate tax purposes at a value exactly equal to the total amount of this encumbrance. Shortly after her husband's death, Crane entered into an agreement with the mortgagee whereby she was to continue to operate the property, collecting the rents, paying for necessary repairs, labor, and other operating expenses, and reserving $200.00 monthly for taxes, and was to remit the net rentals to the mortgagee. This plan was followed for nearly seven years, during which period Crane reported the gross rentals as income and claimed and was allowed deductions for taxes and operating expenses paid on the property, for interest paid on the mortgage, and for the physical exhaustion of the building. Meanwhile, the arrearage of interest increased to $15,857.71. On November 29, 1938, with the mortgagee threatening foreclosure, Crane sold to a third party for $3,000.00 cash, subject to the mortgage, and paid $500.00 expenses of sale. Crane reported a taxable gain of $1,250.00 on the theory that the property acquired and sold was only the equity with a zero basis, so that the amount realized was the net cash of $2,500.00. The Commissioner determined that Crane realized a net taxable gain of $23,767.03 on the theory that the property was the physical property itself with an original basis of $262,042.50, adjusted for $28,045.10 in depreciation, and that the amount realized included the $255,000.00 mortgage principal. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that the building was not a capital asset but otherwise adopted Crane's contentions and expunged the deficiency. On the Commissioner's appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions raised as to the proper construction of the gain and loss provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

In 1928 General Motors Corporation leased a one-story warehouse building in Chicago for a term of twenty years for the storage and distribution of automobile parts and fitted the premises for this use. In 1942 the United States became subtenants of a portion of the floor space, leaving General Motors in possession of some 93,000 square feet. On June 8, 1942 the United States filed a petition in the District Court seeking condemnation of the temporary use of the remaining space for a term ending June 30, 1943 pursuant to the Second War Powers Act. The court entered an order declaring the property condemned and granting the United States immediate possession, use, and improvement. General Motors removed its personal property from the area and dismantled bins and fixtures so that the space was available for government use by June 19. At the trial for compensation the Government called a real estate expert who testified that the fair rental value of the space was 35 cents per square foot per year. General Motors called expert witnesses who testified that the fair rental value was 43 cents per square foot. It also introduced evidence that the rent it paid its landlord had varied from 41.9 to 43.24 cents per square foot during 1940 to 1942. General Motors then offered to prove items of cost caused by removal of the contents, including salaries of employees engaged in the work, compensation due employees put out of work, wages of janitors and watchmen, shipping costs, freight and haulage charges, rental of storage space, the value of bin equipment destroyed, and the estimated original cost of installation of fixed equipment lost, but the court sustained an objection to the offer. The jury awarded compensation in a lump sum at a rate of approximately 40 cents per square foot for the term of one year. General Motors appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment by a vote of 2 to 1. The Supreme Court granted review of the ruling on the elements that may be considered in arriving at just compensation.

John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California. In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses. A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction. The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases. The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.