503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.1
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.2
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.3
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent.4 Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone.5 The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.6
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review.7 Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.8
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.9
Whether the Escondido rent control ordinance, considered together with California's Mobilehome Residency Law, effects a physical taking of petitioners' property?10
The government effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land. "This element of required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of occupation."11
No. The Escondido rent control ordinance, even when considered in conjunction with the California Mobilehome Residency Law, authorizes no physical occupation of petitioners' property.12 Petitioners voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners.13 The laws regulate rents and tenant relationships without forcing continued rental.14 The Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a park owner who wishes to change the use of his land may evict his tenants with notice.15
As in cases involving invited tenants remaining at regulated rents, the invitation to tenants rather than the rent regulation determines there is no physical taking.16
The Escondido rent control ordinance does not effect a physical taking of petitioners' property.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment.18 He agreed with the Court that the Escondido ordinance is not a taking under the analysis in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.19 Blackmun also concluded that the substantive due process and regulatory taking claims are not properly raised in this Court.20 For that reason, unlike the majority, he declined to decide whether the regulatory taking claim is ripe or which arguments would be relevant to such a claim.21
Whether petitioners' substantive due process claim is properly before the Court?22
In reviewing the judgments of state courts under the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Court has, with very rare exceptions, refused to consider petitioners' claims that were not raised or addressed below.
No. The Yees did not include a due process claim in their complaint filed in San Diego County Superior Court.23 They did not raise a substantive due process claim in the Court of Appeal.24 The claim was raised for the first time in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which denied discretionary review without expressing any view on the merits.25 Because the claim was not raised or addressed in the state courts, it is not properly before the Court under the established facts of the procedural history.26
Petitioners' substantive due process claim is not properly before the Court.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court that the Escondido ordinance is not a taking under the analysis in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. Blackmun also concluded that the substantive due process and regulatory taking claims are not properly raised in this Court. For that reason, unlike the majority, he declined to decide whether the regulatory taking claim is ripe or which arguments would be relevant to such a claim.
Whether petitioners' regulatory taking claim is fairly included in the question presented on which certiorari was granted?28
Under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a), only the questions set forth in the petition for certiorari or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court, creating a heavy presumption against consideration of unpresented questions.29
No. The question presented asked whether it was error for the state appellate court to hold there was no taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in disagreement with Third and Ninth Circuit decisions that had found physical takings from mobile home rent control ordinances.30 The regulatory taking argument is a separate and distinct argument from the physical taking claim presented.31 The two theories are not subsidiary to each other.32 Consideration of regulatory taking would not assist in resolving the physical taking question under the facts of the certiorari petition and the Court of Appeal decision.33
Petitioners' regulatory taking claim is not fairly included in the question presented and is not considered by the Court.34