694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)
In the mid-1960s through 1987, the plaintiffs worked as grinders at the General Dynamics Corporation Electric Boat facility in Groton, Connecticut, where their duties required them to use pneumatic hand tools manufactured by the defendants Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, Stanley Works, and Dresser Industries, Inc., to smooth welds and metal surfaces.1
During this employment the plaintiffs developed permanent vascular and neurological impairment of their hands, manifesting as blanching of the fingers, pain, numbness, tingling, reduction of grip strength, cold intolerance, and clumsiness, symptoms diagnosed as hand arm vibration syndrome.2
Ronald Guameri, an industrial hygienist at Electric Boat, performed extensive testing of tools used at the shipyard and found that a large number of the defendants' tools violated vibration exposure limits established by the American National Standards Institute and exceeded the threshold limit promulgated by the American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists.3 Richard Alexander, a mechanical engineering professor, testified that methods to reduce vibration through isolation, dampening, and balancing had been available to manufacturers for at least thirty-five years.4
Charles Suggs, a research engineer, testified that he had reduced vibration hazards in chain saws by inserting rubber mounts in the 1960s, reduced vibration by 70 percent in tools without handles in the 1970s by wrapping them with resilient foam rubber and a metal sleeve, and in 1988 reduced vibration levels in the defendants' die grinders by between 35 and 60 percent using similar techniques.5 After a six-week trial the jury returned verdicts awarding the plaintiffs compensatory damages on their design defect claims, found that the defendants had provided inadequate warnings but awarded no damages on that claim because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, and declined to award punitive damages.6
The defendants appealed from the judgment, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal and cross-appeal from the Appellate Court to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).7 Electric Boat followed a regular maintenance program involving daily inspection of tools.8 It purchased chucks and other replacement parts from outside vendors. It periodically removed certain safety features and used longer burr attachments on the tools.
Whether a plaintiff asserting a design defect claim in strict products liability must prove the existence of a feasible alternative design?9
Under Connecticut products liability law derived from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie design defect case by proving the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary consumer.10 There is no absolute requirement to prove a feasible alternative design.11 The consumer expectation test governs.12 It may incorporate risk-utility factors in complex cases but does not shift the burden to require such proof as a sine qua non.13
No. The plaintiffs presented evidence that a large number of the defendants' tools violated American National Standards Institute vibration limits and exceeded American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists thresholds.14 Expert testimony showed that isolation, dampening, and balancing methods had been available for thirty-five years.15 Specific modifications reduced vibration by up to sixty percent.16 This evidence allowed the jury to conclude the tools were unreasonably dangerous under the consumer expectation test without any showing of a particular alternative design the defendants should have adopted.17
A plaintiff need not prove a feasible alternative design to prevail on a design defect claim.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Berdon concurred in the result but wrote separately regarding the test for design defect liability.19 He would not depart from the longstanding consumer expectation test even by way of dicta for complex product designs.20 Berdon was concerned that adopting a risk-utility test for such designs could lead to requiring plaintiffs to prove a reasonable alternative design, a standard the majority properly rejected.21
He advocated adhering strictly to the consumer expectation test without introducing risk-utility balancing.22 Additionally, Berdon would incorporate a presumption that danger outweighs utility whenever a product fails under circumstances an ordinary purchaser would not have expected, thereby preserving the protective policies underlying strict tort liability.23
Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the defendants bore the burden of proving that alterations or modifications by the plaintiffs' employer were the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries?24
General Statutes § 52-572p provides that a manufacturer is not liable for harm that would not have occurred but for a third-party alteration or modification unless one of three statutory exceptions applies.25 The statute is not an affirmative defense but part of the plaintiff's prima facie case requiring proof that the product reached the user without substantial change.26 The defendant bears only the burden of production to identify a specific alteration that was the sole proximate cause.27
Yes. The trial court placed the entire alteration defense in the context of the defendants' special defenses. It instructed that the defendants had the duty to prove the allegations. This included that Electric Boat's removal of safety features or use of longer burrs was the sole proximate cause.28
The instruction thereby improperly shifted to the defendants the burden of disproving an essential element.29 The plaintiffs were required to establish as part of their case that the tools reached them without substantial change.30
The trial court's instruction on the alteration or modification defense constituted harmful error requiring reversal.31
Whether the trial court improperly limited the applicability of state-of-the-art evidence to the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims?32
State-of-the-art evidence is defined as the level of relevant scientific, technological, and safety knowledge existing and reasonably feasible at the time of design.33 It is admissible in design defect cases as a factor relevant to both the ordinary consumer expectation test and any risk-utility balancing.34 It helps determine what safety features an ordinary consumer would expect.35
State-of-the-art evidence is relevant to design defect claims and the trial court erred by limiting its use.39
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence, based on its interpretation of the parties' stipulation, of the number of other persons injured by the defendants' tools?40
Yes. The stipulation expressly permitted the plaintiffs to elicit testimony that treating physicians had examined or treated other individuals with similar symptoms.43 Yet the trial court interpreted it to bar any reference to numbers or percentages.44 This prevented the plaintiffs from presenting epidemiological evidence of a seventy percent incidence rate at Electric Boat.45 That evidence was directly relevant to their claim that the defendants acted with reckless disregard.46
The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence of other injured persons.47
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting videotapes depicting the defendants' manufacturing processes and safety practices?48
Evidence is relevant only if it tends to establish a material fact.49 Post-sale manufacturing processes and safety practices years after the relevant time period are irrelevant to a design defect claim.50 They are also irrelevant to rebutting reckless disregard in selling tools between 1976 and 1987.51 Such evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating distracting side issues.52
Yes. The videotapes, produced in 1992, depicted manufacturing and quality-control procedures long after the plaintiffs' exposure period.53 They focused on manufacturing rather than design.54 This rendered them irrelevant to whether the defendants acted with reckless disregard in selling the tools.55 It also rendered them irrelevant to the design defect claim.56 Their extensive narration on unrelated safety measures created side issues that distracted from the central questions.57
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the videotapes.58
Whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendants' tools were defectively designed?59
Evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict if, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it induces a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary consumer.60
Yes. Guameri's testing established that many tools exceeded recognized vibration limits.61 Alexander and Suggs described available and effective vibration-reduction techniques that had existed for decades.62 Expert testimony linked excessive vibration exposure directly to hand arm vibration syndrome.63 This permitted the jury to find that the tools failed to meet the safety expectations of the ordinary user.64
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of design defect.65
Whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendants' tools reached the plaintiffs without substantial change in condition?66
A plaintiff must prove that the product was expected to and did reach the user without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. Evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge that the purchaser routinely repaired tools with aftermarket parts and removed safety features may be considered.67
No. Because the erroneous burden-of-proof instruction on the alteration defense requires a new trial, the court did not evaluate whether the evidence of Electric Boat's maintenance program, use of outside-vendor parts, and periodic removal of guards was sufficient to support the jury's implicit finding that the tools reached the plaintiffs without substantial change.68
The sufficiency question is not reached in light of the instructional error requiring retrial.69