Also known as: non-Article III court · non Article III courts · legislative courts · Article I courts
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Tribunals established by Congress under its Article I powers that exercise adjudicative authority without the life tenure and salary protections required for Article III judges. Such courts may perform hybrid administrative and judicial functions when implementing legislative schemes but may not receive wholesale assignment of traditional private-rights disputes historically resolved by Article III courts.
Noah Nakamura, owner of a small electronics firm, sued a supplier in bankruptcy court over a prepetition state-law supply contract after the firm entered Chapter 11. The bankruptcy judge prepared to enter final judgment on the breach claim. The supplier objected that the forum lacked authority. The objection succeeded because the claim remained a classic private-rights action outside the permissible scope of non-Article III adjudication.
Nikhil Narayan challenged a coverage ruling issued by the Federal Insurance Claims Tribunal inside a national risk-management agency. The tribunal both set policy forms and decided bad-faith disputes under the federal program. Its judges served fixed terms. The challenge failed because the body operated as a permissible hybrid court implementing congressional legislative authority.
Naveen Nanda obtained a final district-court judgment against a farm in a securities dispute. Congress later enacted a statute directing non-Article III tribunals to reopen and reconsider such judgments. Nanda moved to dismiss the reopened proceeding. The motion succeeded because Congress may not use non-Article III bodies to override completed Article III adjudications.
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNorman Nash sought compensation from his employer before an administrative tribunal created under a federal maritime statute. The tribunal determined both the employment relationship and the amount of benefits. The employer contested the tribunal's authority. The tribunal's decision stood because the adjudication formed part of a valid administrative scheme tied to a federal regulatory program.
Knudsen filed a claim for compensation against Benson under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act with Deputy Commissioner Crowell of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. The evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner was directed largely to the employment issue and was conflicting. After considering the evidence the deputy commissioner found that Knudsen was in Benson's employ at the time of the injury and filed an order for compensation. Benson then brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award. Benson alleged that Knudsen was not his employee at the time of the injury and that the claim lay outside the deputy commissioner's jurisdiction. An amended complaint further challenged the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds. Those grounds included alleged violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and the judicial power provisions of Article III. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the law. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this Court granted writs of certiorari.
View caseNoelle North, a bankruptcy trustee, sued a foreign corporation in bankruptcy court to recover an alleged fraudulent conveyance under state law. The defendant demanded a jury trial. The demand was granted because the action constituted a private-rights claim that non-Article III courts could not finally adjudicate without a jury.
The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida then vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. In 1985 respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the bankruptcy petition without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value. The complaint sought to avoid the transfers and recover damages under 11 U. S. C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later respondent served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera. In their answer both petitioners requested a trial by jury on all issues so triable. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed, 835 F. 2d 1341 (1988), ruling that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial because the constructive fraud provision contains no mention of such a right and 28 U. S. C. § 1411 affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits, and that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right because fraudulent conveyance actions are equitable in nature and bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 486 U. S. 1054 (1988), and now reverses.
View caseNathan Nguyen, an independent counsel appointed by a special court, investigated executive-branch officials for possible criminal violations. The officials challenged the counsel's authority on separation-of-powers grounds. The challenge failed because the non-Article III mechanism remained narrowly tailored to a permissible congressional delegation within the executive branch.
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View caseCongress may assign disputes to non-Article III courts when the matters arise within a federal regulatory or benefits scheme that the tribunal helps implement. The assignment is impermissible when the dispute is a traditional private-rights claim between private parties that historically belonged in Article III courts.
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No. Structural protections of Article III cannot be waived by consent when the tribunal itself lacks life tenure and salary protection. The constitutional defect lies in the forum, not in the parties' agreement.
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A permissible hybrid court combines rulemaking and adjudication within a single legislative program and resolves matters closely tied to that program. An impermissible assignment occurs when Congress transfers wholesale traditional common-law actions between private parties into the non-Article III forum.
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No. A prepetition state-law contract claim between private parties remains a traditional Article III case even if its outcome affects the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court may at most submit proposed findings subject to de novo review by an Article III district judge.
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