Also known as: no contest plea · no-contest pleas · nolo contendere · nolo plea
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal defendant's plea by which the defendant neither admits nor disputes the charges but accepts conviction and punishment. The plea produces the same sentencing consequences as a guilty plea yet prevents the plea itself from serving as an admission usable against the defendant in later civil or criminal proceedings.
Natalie Norris faces federal fraud charges and enters a nolo contendere plea after the court consents. In a later civil enforcement action brought by regulators, the government attempts to introduce the plea to prove the underlying misconduct. The court excludes the evidence because the nolo plea supplies no admissible admission against Norris.
Nicole Navarro and three co-defendants face related misdemeanor charges. Their shared lawyer presents a package offer requiring each to enter a nolo contendere plea or the deal collapses for all. The lawyer obtains signed written consents only after separately explaining how one client's refusal would bind the others and detailing the distinct immigration consequences for Navarro.
Neville Norton is indicted in one district and arrested in another. He files a written statement requesting to plead nolo contendere and waiving trial in the original district. Both United States attorneys provide written approval, allowing the clerk to transmit the file so Norton can enter the plea and receive sentence in the district of arrest.
Neil Nair is convicted after a nolo contendere plea to a felony securities violation. In a later civil suit, the plaintiff offers the conviction to prove essential facts under the judgment-of-conviction hearsay exception. The court excludes the evidence because the exception expressly excludes judgments entered on nolo pleas.
Nestor Navarro enters a nolo contendere plea in federal court after the judge conducts the required colloquy and finds the plea voluntary. The court accepts the plea and imposes sentence. Navarro later challenges the conviction on appeal, but the plea stands as a final judgment equivalent to a guilty plea for sentencing purposes.
In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it. Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty. He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years. In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty. The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.
Nolan Nunez tells the court he maintains factual innocence yet wishes to resolve the case without trial. The judge rejects an Alford-style guilty plea and instead permits a nolo contendere plea after confirming the public interest supports acceptance. The resulting conviction carries the same penalties as a guilty plea but avoids any formal admission of guilt.
On December 2, 1963, Henry C. Alford was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder. The court appointed counsel who interviewed witnesses identified by Alford, but those witnesses provided statements indicating Alford's guilt rather than supporting his claim of innocence. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge. Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State's case. Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing. After the summary presentation of the State's case, Alford took the stand. He testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial. After eliciting information about Alford's prior criminal record, which was a long one, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree murder. Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court. Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion. After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was "willingly, knowingly, and understandingly" made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case. Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Both courts denied the writ on the basis of the state court's findings that Alford voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford's guilty plea was made involuntarily. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere with the court's consent. The court must consider the parties' views and the public interest before accepting a nolo contendere plea. If the defendant refuses to plead, the court enters a not guilty plea on the defendant's behalf.
Supporting sources
…the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const., Art. 1, § 3a. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere , were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a-110a. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal…
…and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere
…pleaded guilty, Rule 11 read as follows: “A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere . The court may refuse to accept a plea
…by death"); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp.2007) ("If the [defendant] has previously been convicted of, pled guilty or nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor who is less than eleven years of age . . . he must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life");…
…see Pet. for Cert. 10-11), approximately 92.2% of the convictions in the Ninth Circuit were secured through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
A lawyer may not participate unless each client gives informed consent in a signed writing. The disclosure must cover the existence and nature of all pleas and each person's participation. Separate meetings and individualized explanations are required when clients face materially different collateral consequences.
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A nolo contendere plea is inadmissible against the defendant who entered it in subsequent civil or criminal cases. The same exclusion applies to statements made during plea discussions that do not result in a guilty plea. The rule protects the policy of encouraging resolution without formal admissions of guilt.
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No. The judgment-of-conviction exception under Rule 803(22) expressly excludes judgments entered after a nolo contendere plea. The conviction may still be offered for impeachment or other non-hearsay purposes if otherwise admissible.
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The defendant must file a written statement requesting the plea and waiving trial in the original district. Both United States attorneys must approve the transfer in writing. Only after these steps may the clerk transmit the file to the transferee district.
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