400 U.S. 25 (1970)
On December 2, 1963, Henry C. Alford was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder.1 The court appointed counsel who interviewed witnesses identified by Alford, but those witnesses provided statements indicating Alford's guilt rather than supporting his claim of innocence.2 The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge.3
Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State's case.4 Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing.5 After the summary presentation of the State's case, Alford took the stand.6 He testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so.7 In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial.8 After eliciting information about Alford's prior criminal record, which was a long one, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree murder.9
Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court. Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion.10 After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was "willingly, knowingly, and understandingly" made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case.11 Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.12 Both courts denied the writ on the basis of the state court's findings that Alford voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty.13 On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford's guilty plea was made involuntarily.14
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.15
Whether a guilty plea accompanied by a contemporaneous assertion of innocence is constitutionally invalid?16
The Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.17 An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.18
No. The established facts show that before accepting the plea the trial court heard sworn testimony from a police officer summarizing the state's evidence.19 This evidence included statements from Alford's acquaintances that he had left his home with a gun declaring his intent to kill the victim and later returned stating he had done so.20 Alford took the stand and denied committing the murder but confirmed that his counsel had explained the differences between first- and second-degree murder and his rights if he proceeded to trial.21 The state court later found after a hearing that the plea had been made willingly, knowingly, and understandingly on the advice of competent counsel in the face of a strong prosecution case.22
When the plea is viewed in light of the strong factual basis demonstrated by the state, the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it. Alford had clearly expressed his desire to enter the plea despite his professed belief in his innocence.
A guilty plea accompanied by a contemporaneous assertion of innocence is not constitutionally invalid when the record contains strong evidence of actual guilt and the defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of the plea.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan adheres to the view that in any given case the influence of an unconstitutional threat must necessarily be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea.24 He believes that at the very least a contemporaneous denial of guilt is also a relevant factor in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.25
With these factors in mind, the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that Alford was so gripped by fear of the death penalty that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary.26 It was the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint.27 Accordingly, he would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.28
Whether a guilty plea is involuntary when motivated principally by the desire to avoid a possible death sentence?29
A plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for the defendant's desire to avoid a possible death penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years was not for that reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.30 The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.31
No. The established facts show that the prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder.32 Alford's attorney recommended that he plead guilty but left the ultimate decision to Alford himself.33 Alford entered the plea on December 10, 1963, after confirming that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial.34 Although Alford stated he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was willingly, knowingly, and understandingly made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case.35
That he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice. This is especially true where the defendant was represented by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would be to the defendant's advantage.
A guilty plea is not involuntary when motivated principally by the desire to avoid a possible death sentence if the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan adheres to the view that in any given case the influence of an unconstitutional threat must necessarily be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea. He believes that at the very least a contemporaneous denial of guilt is also a relevant factor in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.
With these factors in mind, the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that Alford was so gripped by fear of the death penalty that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary. It was the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint. Accordingly, he would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.