Also known as:neutral, generally applicable · neutrality and general applicability · Smith standard · free exercise neutrality test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard for evaluating laws under the Free Exercise Clause under which a regulation is neutral when it regulates conduct without reference to religion and generally applicable when it applies uniformly to all comparable activities. Laws meeting this standard are subject only to rational basis review even if they incidentally burden religious exercise.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Peyote Use and Unemployment Benefits
Noah Nakamura, a member of a Native American church, was fired after ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony. The state denied his unemployment claim under a criminal prohibition on controlled substances that applied to all employees regardless of motivation. Because the prohibition regulated conduct without reference to religion and reached every user equally, it remained neutral and generally applicable.
Animal Sacrifice Ordinances
Nolan Nunez's religious group performed ritual animal sacrifices in private homes. City ordinances banned such killings only when tied to religious ceremonies while permitting secular slaughter for food and pest control. The selective prohibition on religious conduct showed the rules were neither neutral nor generally applicable.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria.
Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.
After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations.
The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Nestor Navarro's Christian student organization required members to affirm its statement of faith. The law school enforced an all-comers policy requiring every registered group to accept any student regardless of belief. The policy applied uniformly to all student groups and made no reference to religion, rendering it neutral and generally applicable.
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez561 U.S. 661 (*2010*)
Hastings College of the Law is a public law school within the University of California system. It maintains a Registered Student Organization program that grants official recognition to student groups. Recognized groups receive benefits including eligibility for school funds drawn from mandatory student activity fees. They also receive use of school facilities and channels of communication such as bulletin boards and email lists. Finally, they receive permission to use the school's name and logo. In exchange, all RSOs must comply with Hastings' Nondiscrimination Policy. Hastings interprets this policy to require every recognized group to accept any student as a member or leader regardless of status or beliefs.
At the beginning of the 2004-2005 academic year, Hastings students formed the Christian Legal Society chapter by affiliating with the national Christian Legal Society. The chapter adopted bylaws requiring members and officers to sign a Statement of Faith. The bylaws also required members to conduct their lives in accordance with prescribed principles. One such principle is the belief that sexual activity should occur only within marriage between a man and a woman. CLS interpreted its bylaws to exclude students who engage in unrepentant homosexual conduct. It also excluded students who hold religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith. On September 17, 2004, CLS submitted an application for RSO status together with the required bylaws.
Hastings rejected the application because the bylaws excluded students on the basis of religion and sexual orientation. CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondiscrimination Policy. Hastings declined the request. CLS then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Hastings officials. The suit alleged violations of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion.
The parties later stipulated that Hastings requires all RSOs to allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions regardless of status or beliefs. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Northern District of California ruled for Hastings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a brief opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
After the denial of RSO status, CLS operated independently during the 2004-2005 academic year. It held weekly Bible studies, social events, lectures, and banquets. The number of students attending its meetings doubled the following year. Hastings offered CLS access to school facilities for meetings. It also offered generally available bulletin boards and chalkboards for announcements. However, CLS did not receive RSO-specific benefits.
Nina Nielsen's church sought to expand its building in a historic district. The city applied its neutral landmark rules to every property owner and denied the permit on secular preservation grounds. Because the ordinance regulated all structures without targeting religious use, it qualified as neutral and generally applicable.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
Nia Nkosi, a baker, declined to create a cake for a same-sex wedding on religious grounds. The state civil rights commission enforced its public-accommodations law against all businesses offering goods to the public. The law's uniform application to every vendor without religious reference kept it neutral and generally applicable.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple planning to marry legally in Massachusetts and host a reception in Denver, visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, owned and operated by Jack Phillips. Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian who had owned the shop for twenty-four years, informed the couple that he would not create a wedding cake for their same-sex wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. He offered to sell them other baked goods such as birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, and brownies. Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division alleging that they had been denied full and equal service because of their sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
The Division investigated the complaint. It found probable cause that Phillips had violated the Act. The Division determined that on multiple occasions he had turned away potential customers on the basis of sexual orientation. Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples. The matter was referred to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission sent the case to a state Administrative Law Judge for a formal hearing.
The ALJ granted summary judgment in favor of Craig and Mullins after rejecting Phillips' constitutional claims. The Commission affirmed the decision in full. It ordered Phillips to cease and desist from discriminating against same-sex couples. The Commission also required comprehensive staff training on the public accommodations provisions of the Act. Phillips had to submit quarterly compliance reports for two years documenting patrons denied service.
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's legal determinations and remedial order in 2016. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. During public hearings before the Commission in May and July 2014, some commissioners stated that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain. They described Phillips' invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs as one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use. They compared it to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. In three separate cases decided while Phillips' proceedings were pending, the Civil Rights Division concluded that other bakers had acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations or messages that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages.
Phillips petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted in 2017.
Nikhil Narayan, a public-school football coach, knelt and prayed silently after games. The district disciplined him under a policy barring all employees from visible religious conduct while on duty. The policy reached every form of religious expression equally and contained no religious reference, making it neutral and generally applicable.
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022)
Joseph Kennedy began working as a football coach at Bremerton High School in 2008 after nearly two decades of service in the Marine Corps.
Mr. Kennedy made it a practice to give thanks through prayer on the playing field at the conclusion of each game he coaches. He offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying quietly for approximately 30 seconds. Initially Kennedy prayed on his own. Over time some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. The number of players who joined him eventually grew to include most of the team after some games.
In September 2015 the District's superintendent first learned of these practices after an employee from another school commented positively on them to Bremerton's principal. On September 17 the superintendent sent Kennedy a letter identifying two problematic practices in which Kennedy had engaged. These included providing inspirational talks with overtly religious references likely constituting prayer with students at midfield following games. They also included leading students and coaching staff in a prayer in the locker-room tradition that predated his involvement. The District instructed Kennedy to avoid any motivational talks with students that included religious expression including prayer. It also instructed him to avoid suggesting encouraging or discouraging or supervising any prayers of students.
After receiving the letter Kennedy ended the tradition of offering locker-room prayers. He ended his practice of incorporating religious references or prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the field. On October 14 through counsel Kennedy sent a letter to school officials informing them that because of his sincerely-held religious beliefs he felt compelled to offer a post-game personal prayer of thanks at midfield. He asked the District to allow him to continue that private religious expression alone. He emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to wait until the game is over and the players have left the field and then walk to mid-field to say a short private personal prayer.
On October 16 shortly before the game that day the District responded with another letter. It acknowledged that Kennedy had complied with the directives in its September 17 letter. Yet it forbade him from engaging in any overt actions that could appear to a reasonable observer to endorse prayer while he is on duty as a District-paid coach. After receiving this letter Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game when most Bremerton players were engaged in the traditional singing of the school fight song to the audience. Though Kennedy was alone when he began to pray players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished.
After the October 23 game ended Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line where no one joined him and bowed his head for a brief quiet prayer. After the final relevant football game on October 26 Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions while other adults gathered around him on the field. Shortly after the October 26 game the District placed Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from participating in any capacity in football program activities. In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action the superintendent criticized Kennedy for engaging in public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach by offering a prayer following the games on October 16 23 and 26.
While Kennedy received uniformly positive evaluations every other year of his coaching career after the 2015 season ended in November the District gave him a poor performance evaluation advising against rehiring him on the grounds that he failed to follow district policy regarding religious expression and failed to supervise student-athletes after games. Kennedy did not return for the next season. After these events Kennedy sued in federal court alleging that the District's actions violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses and moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties engaged in discovery they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the District and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
When does a law fail to qualify as neutral and generally applicable?
A law fails this standard when it singles out religious conduct for unfavorable treatment or grants secular exemptions while denying comparable religious ones. Selective enforcement or underinclusive coverage that burdens only religious practice removes the law from rational-basis review.
Does the presence of a medical exemption destroy general applicability?
No. A narrow medical exemption tied to objective physical constraints does not render a rule non-neutral or non-general when the rule otherwise applies uniformly to all persons regardless of belief. Courts distinguish such categorical health carveouts from individualized secular exemptions that invite religious discrimination.
What level of scrutiny applies once a law is deemed neutral and generally applicable?
Rational basis review applies. The government need only show a legitimate interest rationally related to the rule. No compelling interest or narrow tailoring is required even when the law incidentally burdens sincere religious practice.
How does targeting of religion affect the analysis?
When a rule is gerrymandered to cover only religious conduct while leaving analogous secular activity unregulated, it is neither neutral nor generally applicable. Strict scrutiny then applies and the government must prove a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.
494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990)
…freeexercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds. Our most recent decision involving a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual’s religion was United States v. Lee , 455 U. S., at 258-261. There, an Amish employer, on behalf of himself and his…