motion for modification

Sharon Brown and Sheldon Brown married in 1984 and had one child, who is still a minor. They were divorced in 1987, and Sheldon was required to pay 17% of his gross income for child support pursuant to the general percentage standards in § HSS 80. Sheldon remarried and has three minor children from his second marriage. His second marriage is still intact. Sheldon brought a motion under sec. 767.32, Stats., to modify his child support due to the fact that he has minor children in his second family. He requested that the court utilize § HSS 80.04(1), the "serial family payer" provisions of the percentage standards in resetting his child support obligation for his first child. The family court commissioner determined that the "serial family payer" provisions did not apply and refused to modify the existing support order. Sheldon appealed to the circuit court, which ruled that the "serial family payer" provisions applied to Sheldon. It therefore reduced his child support obligation from 17% to 12.1%. Sharon appeals that order.

Joseph A. Richardson and Ida Richardson divorced in December 1997. They executed a separation agreement providing that Joseph would pay Ida maintenance of $2,425.00 per month, terminating upon Ida’s remarriage or the death of either party. The agreement stated that its terms would not be subject to modification or change, regardless of the relative circumstances of the parties. The trial court incorporated the agreement into the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution and stated that maintenance was non-modifiable. In 2004 Joseph filed a motion to modify the judgment. In Count II he alleged that Ida sought out persons to burglarize his home, sought out persons to murder him, and attempted to hire a person to murder him. He further alleged that these acts breached the separation agreement, violated public policy, committed criminal acts, and waived any claim to maintenance. The trial court dismissed Count II with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal order was certified as a final judgment and order under Rule 74.01(b). Joseph appealed the dismissal. The Eastern District Court of Appeals transferred the matter to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

In 1965, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to provide remedial education services to disadvantaged children. The Board of Education of the City of New York first applied for Title I funds in 1966 and initially arranged to transport eligible private school students to public schools for after-school instruction. When that approach proved unsuccessful due to poor attendance and safety concerns, the Board implemented an on-site program in 1978 that sent public school teachers into parochial schools during regular school hours. In 1978, respondents, who are parents of parochial school children and federal taxpayers, sued the Board in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the on-site program as violating the Establishment Clause. The District Court enjoined the on-site services in 1981, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the following year. While the appeal was pending, the Board developed an off-premises program that required transporting students to neutral sites at an estimated additional cost of $6 million per year. In 1983, the parties entered into a consent decree requiring the Board to provide Title I services off the premises of sectarian schools and to establish a monitoring system. Following the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Aguilar v. Felton, which invalidated a similar program, the parties entered a second consent decree that required the Board to pay for the additional costs of the off-premises program. The Board complied with both decrees, spending over $100 million on computer-aided instruction, leased sites, and transportation between the 1986-1987 and 1993-1994 school years. In 1995, the Board and a group of parents of parochial school students moved in the District Court for relief from the consent decrees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), citing subsequent decisions including Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Aguilar remained good law and that no significant change in factual conditions had been shown. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1997.

On April 2, 1963, several Negro ministers including the petitioners filed with the Birmingham City Commission a request for a permit to picket and hold a parade on April 5 and 6. The request was denied. On April 3 the petitioners gave notice of their intention to demonstrate on April 4, 5, and 6, and the City Commission again denied a permit. On April 6 and 7 the petitioners and others marched in Birmingham without a permit and were arrested and charged with parading without a permit. On April 10, 1963, Birmingham officials filed a bill of complaint in state circuit court against 139 individuals and two organizations. The bill and affidavits alleged that during the preceding seven days the respondents had sponsored sit-in demonstrations, kneel-in demonstrations, mass street parades, trespasses on private property, and unlawful picketing, conduct calculated to provoke breaches of the peace and to place an undue burden on the police department. The circuit judge granted a temporary injunction enjoining the petitioners from participating in or encouraging mass street parades without a permit as required by the Birmingham ordinance. Five of the eight petitioners were served with copies of the writ early the next morning. Several hours after service the petitioners held a press conference at which a statement was distributed declaring their intention to disobey the injunction because it was raw tyranny under the guise of maintaining law and order. That night a meeting took place at which one petitioner announced that injunction or no injunction they were going to march the next day. On April 12, Good Friday, a group of about 50 or 60 proceeded to parade along the sidewalk while a crowd of 1,000 to 1,500 onlookers stood by; at least three petitioners participated. On April 14, Easter Sunday, another crowd of 1,500 to 2,000 gathered; one petitioner was seen organizing members of the crowd in formation, a group of about 50 headed by three other petitioners started down the sidewalk, and violence occurred when members of the crowd threw rocks. The next day city officials applied for an order to show cause why the petitioners should not be held in contempt. At the hearing the petitioners sought to attack the constitutionality of the injunction on the ground that it was vague and overbroad and restrained free speech, and to attack the Birmingham parade ordinance on similar grounds and on the further ground that it had been administered in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The circuit judge refused to consider these contentions, noting that there had been neither a motion to dissolve the injunction nor an effort to comply by applying for a permit. The court found against the petitioners on the issues of jurisdiction and knowing violation, and imposed upon each a sentence of five days in jail and a $50 fine. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider whether the contempt convictions are invalid because of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance or the injunction.