218 S.W.3d 426 (Mo. 2007)
Joseph A. Richardson and Ida Richardson divorced in December 1997.1 They executed a separation agreement providing that Joseph would pay Ida maintenance of $2,425.00 per month, terminating upon Ida’s remarriage or the death of either party.2 The agreement stated that its terms would not be subject to modification or change, regardless of the relative circumstances of the parties.3 The trial court incorporated the agreement into the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution and stated that maintenance was non-modifiable.4
In 2004 Joseph filed a motion to modify the judgment.5 In Count II he alleged that Ida sought out persons to burglarize his home, sought out persons to murder him, and attempted to hire a person to murder him.6 He further alleged that these acts breached the separation agreement, violated public policy, committed criminal acts, and waived any claim to maintenance.7
The trial court dismissed Count II with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.8 The dismissal order was certified as a final judgment and order under Rule 74.01(b).9 Joseph appealed the dismissal.10 The Eastern District Court of Appeals transferred the matter to the Supreme Court of Missouri.11
Whether the trial court misinterpreted Section 452.325 RSMo when it concluded that the statute does not give it discretion to terminate or modify a non-modifiable separation agreement post-dissolution based on a finding that the terms are unconscionable due to the payee spouse's immoral criminal acts?12
Section 452.325 RSMo permits parties to a dissolution to execute a separation agreement containing non-modifiable maintenance terms, and the resulting decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of those terms.13 Unconscionability is assessed only at the time the agreement is made and incorporated into the decree, not on the basis of later events.14
No. Joseph A. Richardson and Ida Richardson executed a separation agreement in 1997 that expressly barred modification regardless of changed circumstances.15 The trial court incorporated those terms into the dissolution decree after determining they were not unconscionable and declaring maintenance non-modifiable.16 Joseph's 2004 motion alleged that Ida later sought to burglarize his home and to murder him.17
Yet the statute supplies no authority for a court to revisit the agreement or decree on account of such post-dissolution conduct.18 The doctrines of unconscionability, waiver, and public policy against profiting from crime likewise furnish no basis for modification. This is because Ida's entitlement to maintenance was fixed at the time of the decree and her alleged acts would not have produced a profit upon Joseph's death.19
The trial court correctly interpreted Section 452.325 RSMo and properly dismissed Count II for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.20