Also known as: mere expectancy · expectancy · mere expectancy interest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An interest in property that lacks the attributes of a presently existing right and instead carries only the characteristics of an heir's expectancy.
Ming Ma's uncle executed a will leaving the family farm to a charity. Ming, as the sole surviving blood relative, asserted standing to challenge the will's validity. The court held that Ming possessed only a mere expectancy and therefore lacked the present interest required to contest the estate before the uncle's death.
Mariam Mansour received a one-year teaching contract at a state college with no renewal guarantee. When the college declined to rehire her, she claimed a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause. The court ruled that her hope of continued employment remained a mere expectancy and did not trigger constitutional protections.
In 1968 the Board of Regents of State Colleges hired David Roth as an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term running from September 1, 1968, to June 30, 1969. The formal notice of appointment stated that the employment basis was the academic year. It provided that regulations governing tenure followed Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 37.31. Roth was informed before he began teaching that he had no tenure rights and would be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year only if the University chose to retain him. Under Wisconsin law a teacher could acquire tenure as a permanent employee only after four years of continuous service. The Board of Regents' rules established February 1 as the deadline for written notification of non-retention for nontenured faculty. No reason for non-retention need be given and no review or appeal is provided in such case. In conformance with these rules the University president notified Roth before February 1, 1969, that he would not be rehired. Roth received no statement of reasons and no opportunity to challenge the decision. Roth brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. He alleged that the failure to provide reasons and a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. He also alleged that the non-renewal decision was actually retaliation for statements critical of the University administration that violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment for Roth on the procedural due process claim. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board of Regents petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseMaria Morales sought to classify her husband's unmatured pension as marital property subject to equitable distribution. The court determined that the pension constituted a presently existing right rather than a mere expectancy because the employee held a contractual entitlement to future payments upon reaching retirement age.
Oscar M. Miller, a minority shareholder of Miller Waste Mills, Inc., initiated a shareholder's derivative action against his brothers Rudolph W. Miller and Benjamin A. Miller and several corporations they owned and controlled. The suit sought to recover assets and profits of the defendant corporations, which the plaintiff alleged had been wrongfully diverted from Miller Waste. The defendant corporations included Unit Manufacturing Company, Filter Supply Corporation, Miller-Felpax Corporation, Miller Lubricator Company, Fiberite Corporation, and Melamine Plastics Corporation. Following a lengthy trial by the court without a jury and the denial of post-trial motions, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the complaint, from which Oscar appealed. The Miller family business originated in the 1890s when Joseph Miller established a general scrap business in Winona, Minnesota, dealing in metals, hides, paper, rags, and other reclaimable materials. In 1923, Joseph purchased a waste puller machine to enter the waste business, which involved buying rags and waste threads from brokers and textile mills for processing into packing waste and wiping waste sold mainly to railroads. The business was incorporated in 1927 as Miller Waste Mills, Inc., with initial shareholders including Joseph, Jennie, Oscar, and Rudolph. Oscar terminated his relationship with the corporation in 1932 and moved to New York City to work as a securities analyst, while Benjamin joined the business around that time. In 1940, Joseph retired at age 75 due to ill health, leading to an extensive reorganization of Miller Waste. Rudolph and Benjamin acquired majority ownership and active management of the corporation. Joseph and Jennie executed a joint will providing for the distribution of shares to their other children, including a remainderman's interest for Oscar in 34 shares. Agreements were executed assigning a 45-percent interest in felpax lubricator patents to Joseph in exchange for payment of Rudolph's debt and obligating Rudolph and Benjamin to make weekly payments to their parents. After the reorganization, Rudolph and Benjamin controlled Miller Waste as officers and directors. During World War II, Miller Waste encountered difficulties fulfilling government contracts that required small 5- to 7-pound packages of waste, as its operations were geared toward high-volume baled waste. In 1943, Rudolph, Benjamin, and their wives formed Unit Manufacturing Company to handle the small packaging business, which was transferred from Miller Waste along with wiper cloth packaging, mop manufacturing, and a welding business. Unit expanded into manufacturing filter element socks and cartridges. The partnership was later transferred to Filter Supply Corporation, incorporated in 1951. Rudolph also pursued development of the felpax lubricator through Miller-Felpax Company, incorporated in 1947, and the Miller lubricator through Miller Lubricator Company, incorporated in 1953. In 1948 and 1952, Rudolph and Benjamin formed Fiberite Corporation and Melamine Plastics Corporation to manufacture plastic molding compounds, with Miller Waste supplying cotton cuttings as filler material. A plastic trading division was added to Miller Waste in 1960. All transactions between Miller Waste and the defendant corporations were conducted at prices equal to or higher than those with unrelated customers, providing Miller Waste with a captive market for its products. The purposes and operations of the defendant corporations were disclosed to family members, including Jennie Miller, who served on the board of Fiberite until 1956. The trial occurred in 1971, resulting in dismissal of the complaint and this appeal.
View caseMason McCarthy, a state police officer facing mandatory retirement at age fifty, argued that continued employment constituted a protected property interest. The court concluded that his expectation of working beyond the statutory age limit was a mere expectancy insufficient to support a due process claim.
This case presents the question whether the provision of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a) (1966), that a uniformed state police officer "shall be retired . . . upon his attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robert Murgia served as an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police until the Board of Retirement retired him on his fiftieth birthday. Murgia filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging that the retirement statute denied him equal protection and requesting a three-judge court. The district judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to present a substantial constitutional question. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the dismissal and remanded with directions to convene a three-judge court. On a record consisting of depositions, affidavits, and other documentary material, the three-judge court declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument. The primary duties of the Uniformed Branch include controlling prison and civil disorders, responding to emergencies and natural disasters, patrolling highways, investigating crime, apprehending suspects, and supporting local law enforcement. Officers undergo comprehensive physical examinations every two years until age forty and more rigorous annual examinations thereafter that include electrocardiograms and tests for gastrointestinal bleeding. Murgia passed such an examination four months before his retirement and remained capable of performing all required duties. Three physicians testified on the relationship between aging and the capacity to perform under stress. The testimony established that the risk of physical failure increases with age and that the proportion of individuals unable to perform stress functions grows with each age cohort. A 1938 special legislative commission report observed that the division requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique because the duties are arduous in all weathers.
View caseMeredith Maxwell filed a tort claim in federal court alleging interference with an expected inheritance. The court dismissed the action, holding that an anticipated bequest under a will remained a mere expectancy until the testator's death and therefore did not create a present property interest cognizable outside probate proceedings.
Vickie Lynn Marshall, also known as Anna Nicole Smith, met J. Howard Marshall II in October 1991 and married him on June 27, 1994. J. Howard died on August 4, 1995. Although he had given Vickie substantial gifts and money during their relationship, his will made no provision for her. Vickie maintained that J. Howard had intended to secure her future through a catchall trust. Respondent E. Pierce Marshall, one of J. Howard’s sons, stood as the sole ultimate beneficiary under his father’s estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a pourover will directing all remaining assets into the trust. In January 1996, while J. Howard’s estate remained subject to probate proceedings in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. In June 1996 Pierce filed a proof of claim in that bankruptcy case asserting that Vickie had defamed him through statements made to the press shortly after J. Howard’s death. Vickie answered and asserted a counterclaim alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with her expected gift by imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes, surrounding him with hired guards, making misrepresentations to him, and transferring property contrary to his expressed intentions. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to Vickie on Pierce’s defamation claim. After a trial on the merits it entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference counterclaim and awarded her more than $449 million in compensatory damages, less any amount recovered in the Texas probate action, plus $25 million in punitive damages. Pierce then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim belonged exclusively in the Texas probate proceedings. In the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the living trust and will were valid. Vickie initially challenged the instruments and asserted her own tortious interference claim there but voluntarily dismissed both claims after the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Following a jury trial the Probate Court declared the trust and will valid. On review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment the District Court rejected the probate-exception argument. The court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s findings with supplements. It awarded Vickie approximately $44.3 million in compensatory damages together with an equal amount in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the probate exception barred federal jurisdiction because the claim raised questions ordinarily decided by a probate court and because the Texas Probate Court had asserted exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005.
View caseMalcolm McKinley challenged a statute denying public funding for certain abortions. He asserted a property interest in continued government benefits. The court held that the expectation of future funding constituted a mere expectancy rather than a protected entitlement under the Due Process Clause.
The Medicaid program was created in 1965 when Congress added Title XIX to the Social Security Act to provide federal financial assistance to states that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Participation in the program is voluntary, but once a state elects to participate, it must comply with federal requirements including coverage of five general categories of medical services for the categorically needy. From the program's inception, federal funding was available for medically necessary abortions. In September 1976, Congress enacted the first version of the Hyde Amendment as part of the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This prohibited the use of federal funds to pay for abortions except when the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Subsequent versions applicable to fiscal years 1977 through 1980 varied in scope. The 1980 version added exceptions for rape and incest reported promptly to law enforcement or a public health service. Earlier versions included or excluded an exception for severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother. On September 30, 1976, the day the initial Hyde Amendment was enacted, Cora McRae, a New York Medicaid recipient in the first trimester of a pregnancy she wished to terminate, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, which operates hospitals providing abortion services, and other plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare seeking to enjoin enforcement of the funding restriction. The District Court certified the case as a class action on behalf of all pregnant or potentially pregnant women in New York eligible for Medicaid who decide to have an abortion within the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy and all authorized providers of abortion services to such women. It entered a preliminary injunction. After this Court decided Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe, the District Court vacated the injunction and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, additional plaintiffs intervened, including four individual Medicaid recipients seeking medically necessary abortions, several physicians who perform abortions for Medicaid recipients, and the Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church along with two of its officers. An amended complaint challenged multiple versions of the Hyde Amendment on statutory and constitutional grounds. Following a lengthy trial that produced a record exceeding five thousand pages of transcript and more than four hundred exhibits, the District Court rejected the plaintiffs' statutory claim but held that the Hyde Amendment violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court recertified the case as a nationwide class action on behalf of all pregnant and potentially pregnant women eligible for Medicaid who wish to have medically necessary abortions and all authorized providers of such abortions. It then ordered the Secretary to cease giving effect to the Hyde Amendment and to continue authorizing federal matching funds for medically necessary abortions. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA pension becomes a presently existing property interest once the employee acquires a contractual right to future payments upon satisfying age or service conditions. Courts distinguish this vested right from a mere expectancy because the employee can enforce the entitlement in the future even if payments have not yet matured.
An heir's interest before the testator's death carries only the characteristics of an expectancy of an heir. That status ordinarily denies the heir standing to litigate the validity of the estate or to assert present rights in the property.
Supporting sources
A public employee holds no property interest in future employment absent an independent source such as a statute, rule, or contract creating a legitimate claim of entitlement. A mere hope of renewal therefore receives no due process protection.
…poisoning. Nancy cannot feel surgical pain. See n. 2, supra. Nor would removal of one kidney be expected to shorten her life expectancy. See The American Medical Association Family Medical Guide 506 (J. Kunz ed. 1982). Patches of her skin could also be removed to provide grafts for burn victims and scrapings of bone marrow…