Also known as: matrimonial homes · marital home · family home
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A family residence occupied by spouses during marriage. Special rules often govern its use, exclusion, or valuation in divorce proceedings and estate administration to protect spousal interests.
After Harold died, his surviving spouse Kevin already held a constitutional life estate in the family residence. When Kevin petitioned for the statutory homestead allowance from other estate assets, the court reduced the allowance by the value of that life estate interest because the residence qualified as the family home under the probate rules.
During Eli and Faith's separation proceedings, Eli alleged that Faith's nighttime manipulation of smart-home devices in their shared loft caused him emotional distress. The court considered whether to exclude Faith from the residence but denied the request because the evidence did not establish that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.
Sheri and Beth disputed custody of their sixteen-year-old daughter Felicity after Beth announced plans to relocate two hours away. Felicity had lived her entire life in the family home near her school and friends. The court appointed counsel for Felicity to investigate how any move would affect her stability in the matrimonial home.
In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.
View caseT transferred title to the family home to a spouse for life with remainder to the children. After T's death the life tenant remained in possession and became personally liable for annual easement payments because the matrimonial home enjoyed the benefit of the easement across neighboring land.
A spouse served with process while temporarily present in the forum state challenged the court's power to divide the matrimonial home. The court upheld jurisdiction because the spouse's presence supplied the minimum contacts needed to adjudicate interests in the family residence.
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
View caseAfter divorce Griffin received the older house requiring major repairs while Saul received the newer matrimonial home. Griffin petitioned for maintenance, arguing that the condition of the home and her lack of income left her unable to meet basic needs for herself and the children.
On June 2, 1980, Robert Thomas filed a complaint for divorce based upon indignities. On July 22, 1980, Ruth Thomas filed an application to proceed under the new Divorce Code, which the trial court granted. On December 19, 1980, she filed a petition for counseling, and the trial court ordered the parties to participate in counseling sessions, which they completed. Robert Thomas moved out of the marital residence on March 1, 1980. On May 6, 1983, he filed an amended complaint and affidavit pursuant to Section 201(d) alleging that the parties had lived separate and apart for three years and that their marriage was irretrievably broken. On May 20, 1983, Ruth Thomas filed a counter-affidavit denying that the parties had lived separate and apart for three years. A hearing was held before the trial court on August 15, 1983. At the hearing, Robert Thomas testified that he returned to the marital residence numerous times to visit his son and that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse approximately a dozen times during the separation period. He stated that his visits were prompted by suggestions of the marriage counselor and his wife's threats to curtail his visits with their son. Ruth Thomas testified that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse approximately 33 times during the separation and that it was her feeling that the sexual activities were attempts at making the marriage work. She stated that her husband told her that he was mixed up and that she initiated a few of his visits. Both parties testified that the last sexual encounter occurred in December of 1982. On August 22, 1983, the trial court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the divorce. Appellant's exceptions to the order were dismissed by the court en banc, and the order denying the divorce was approved on October 17, 1983. This appeal timely followed.
View caseThe value of any constitutional homestead interest in the family home is charged against the surviving spouse's statutory homestead allowance when the residence forms part of the decedent's estate or would have but for the constitutional protection.
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A court may exclude a party from the family home upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other party or a child.
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No. A spouse awarded the older matrimonial home that requires extensive repairs and carries assigned debt may still qualify for maintenance if the property leaves the recipient unable to meet reasonable needs and unable to support herself through employment.
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