Also known as: manifestly wrong · clearly erroneous · clearly erroneous standard · manifest error
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A deferential standard of appellate review under which a trial court's factual findings receive strong deference and are upheld unless the record shows they lack substantial evidentiary support or rest on a plain mistake.
Monica Morgan sued Midwest Airlines after a bench trial on contract damages. The district court credited the airline's operations manager over Morgan's expert and found no breach. On appeal Morgan argued the findings were clearly erroneous because the expert's sampling data was more detailed. The appellate court affirmed because the trial judge had observed the witnesses and the record contained competing evidence that supported crediting the manager.
Maurice Marshall challenged a zoning denial that blocked low-income housing. The trial court found no discriminatory intent after weighing testimony from village officials. On appeal Marshall claimed the findings were manifestly wrong because statistical patterns showed disparate impact. The reviewing court upheld the findings because the trial judge had the best opportunity to assess credibility and the record supported a nondiscriminatory motive.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseMiguel Mendoza filed a federal suit seeking custody modification after a state divorce decree. The district court found the case fell within the domestic relations exception and dismissed. On appeal Mendoza argued the factual premise that the dispute involved core family issues was clearly erroneous. The appellate court affirmed because the trial court's characterization of the claims rested on a permissible reading of the pleadings and evidence.
In September 1989 Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, both citizens of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Richards, the divorced father of the children, and Kesler, his female companion, had committed acts of sexual and physical abuse against the daughters and sought monetary damages. Federal jurisdiction rested solely on the diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. One month earlier, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, had entered a judgment under state child-protection statutes that permanently terminated Richards' parental rights on account of the alleged abuse and permanently enjoined him from any contact with the children. On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. The court cited In re Burrus for the proposition that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the States and invoked the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. It also relied on the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to three questions concerning the existence and scope of any domestic relations exception and the propriety of Younger abstention in the case.
View caseMiranda Morales sued after hospital staff tested her urine for drugs under a city policy. The trial court found the testing was not a Fourth Amendment search because patients consented. On appeal Morales contended the consent finding was manifestly wrong given the coercive circumstances. The reviewing court upheld the finding because the trial judge had credited the hospital's testimony and the record contained evidence of voluntary participation.
In the fall of 1988, staff members at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), a state-operated public hospital in Charleston, became concerned about an apparent increase in cocaine use by patients receiving prenatal treatment. In response, as of April 1989, MUSC began ordering drug screens on urine samples from maternity patients suspected of using cocaine based on nine specific criteria such as no prenatal care, late prenatal care, abruptio placentae, and unexplained intrauterine growth retardation. Positive results initially led to referrals for counseling and treatment through the county substance abuse commission, yet the incidence of cocaine use among patients did not appear to change. After Nurse Shirley Brown heard a news report about police in Greenville arresting pregnant cocaine users on child abuse theories, she discussed the matter with MUSC general counsel Joseph C. Good, Jr., who contacted Solicitor Charles Condon to offer the hospital’s cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose newborns tested positive. Condon organized a task force that included representatives from MUSC, local police, the County Substance Abuse Commission, and the Department of Social Services; their work produced the 12-page Policy M-7 governing management of drug abuse during pregnancy. The policy required chain-of-custody procedures for samples, set forth education and referral steps, and incorporated the threat of law enforcement intervention, including immediate police notification and arrest for patients testing positive a second time or missing treatment appointments. Under the initial version of the policy, patients testing positive during labor were arrested without a treatment option, but a 1990 modification extended the opportunity to avoid arrest by consenting to substance abuse treatment and periodic testing. The policy prescribed precise criminal charges depending on gestational stage—simple possession if 27 weeks or less, possession and distribution to a person under 18 if 28 weeks or more, and unlawful neglect of a child upon delivery while testing positive—and directed police to interrogate arrestees to identify the drug supplier. Between 1989 and 1994, MUSC performed approximately 600 drug screens on pregnant women, yielding 27 positive results and 10 arrests. Petitioners are the ten women arrested after positive tests while receiving obstetrical care at MUSC. Four were arrested before the treatment option was available and the remainder after failing to comply with treatment or testing positive a second time. They brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against MUSC, the City of Charleston, and the solicitor, alleging that the urine tests violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment on the special needs issue, submitted the consent question to the jury, and entered judgment for respondents after the jury found consent. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the special needs ground without reaching consent, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMatrix Technologies sponsored a student newspaper that the principal censored. The trial court found the principal's actions reasonable under school-speech standards after hearing testimony from administrators and students. On appeal the sponsor argued the reasonableness finding was clearly erroneous. The appellate court affirmed because the trial judge had the opportunity to judge credibility and the record supported the principal's pedagogical concerns.
The Hazelwood School District operated Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri. During the 1982-1983 school year, students enrolled in the Journalism II class wrote, edited, and published the school newspaper Spectrum approximately every three weeks. More than 4,500 copies were distributed to students, school personnel, and community members each year. The Board of Education provided funding for printing, supplemented by newspaper sales. The journalism teacher selected editors, assigned stories, reviewed content, and determined grades for the course that awarded academic credit to students. On May 10, 1983, the journalism teacher submitted page proofs for the May 13 issue to Principal Robert Reynolds. The proofs included an article describing three students' experiences with pregnancy that discussed sexual activity and birth control. Another article on the impact of divorce quoted a student by name regarding her father's behavior. Reynolds objected to the pregnancy article because it might be inappropriate for younger students and could identify the students despite the use of false names. He also objected to the divorce article because the named student's parents had not been given an opportunity to respond to the comments. Reynolds ordered the deletion of the two pages containing these articles, resulting in the publication of a four-page newspaper rather than the planned six-page edition. The deleted material occupied approximately one full page. Three former student staff members of Spectrum then brought suit against the school district and officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. After a bench trial, the District Court denied injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseMing Ma challenged a state military institute's male-only admissions policy. The trial court found the policy served important governmental objectives after reviewing historical and expert evidence. On appeal Ma argued the findings were manifestly wrong because less restrictive alternatives existed. The reviewing court upheld the findings because the trial judge had weighed the evidence firsthand and the record supported the conclusion that the policy was substantially related to the objectives.
In 1839 the Commonwealth of Virginia established the Virginia Military Institute as one of the nation's first state military colleges. VMI has remained financially supported by the state and subject to the control of the Virginia General Assembly. The school enrolls approximately 1,300 male cadets and offers academic programs in the liberal arts, sciences, and engineering that are also available at other Virginia public institutions. Its distinctive mission is to produce citizen-soldiers through an adversative method featuring physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values. Cadets live in spartan barracks, participate in drills, endure the rat line, and operate under a strict honor code. VMI graduates have included military generals, members of Congress, and business executives, and the school maintains the largest per-student endowment of any public undergraduate institution in the nation. In 1990 a female high-school student filed a complaint with the Attorney General seeking admission to VMI. The United States then sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and VMI, alleging that the exclusively male admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Trial consumed six days and involved expert witnesses on each side. In the two years preceding the lawsuit VMI had received inquiries from 347 women but responded to none. The District Court ruled in VMI's favor in 1991, finding that single-gender education yields substantial benefits and that VMI's methods are inherently suited to men. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in 1992 and remanded the case for selection of a remedy. On remand Virginia proposed the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, a four-year state-sponsored undergraduate program located at the private Mary Baldwin College and open initially to twenty-five to thirty students. VWIL would share VMI's mission of producing citizen-soldiers but would employ a cooperative method rather than an adversative one, would not require barracks living or uniforms during the school day, and would offer a narrower range of academic programs. The average combined SAT score of Mary Baldwin entrants was about 100 points lower than VMI's, its faculty held significantly fewer Ph.D.s and received lower salaries, and its endowment was substantially smaller. The District Court approved the VWIL plan in 1994, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in 1995. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in 1995. Some women could meet VMI's physical standards. VMI's methodology could be used to educate women. VWIL students would not experience the rigorous military training, faculty, facilities, alumni network, or prestige associated with VMI.
View caseThe appellant must demonstrate that the findings lack substantial support in the record or rest on a plain mistake of fact. Mere disagreement with how the trial court weighed the evidence is insufficient. The reviewing court must give due regard to the trial judge's opportunity to assess witness credibility.
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No. A party may later question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings whether or not the party requested findings, objected to them, moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings.
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A district judge may modify or set aside any part of the magistrate's order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The same deferential review applies to factual determinations made by the magistrate.
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The findings may be insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard. The appellate court can remand for entry of proper findings rather than attempting to review an inadequate record.
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…have a negative effect on property values and the safety of the neighborhood. The Court of Appeals rejected this finding as clearly erroneous. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Case information - Court: Supreme Court of the United States - Docket No.: 84-468 - Argued: March 18,…