Also known as:majority-minority district · majority minority districts · majority minority district
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A congressional or legislative district in which a racial minority group constitutes a numerical majority of the voting population. Such districts are drawn to enhance the group's opportunity to elect its preferred candidates. When race is the predominant factor used to draw the lines and traditional districting principles are subordinated, the plan triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
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Cases
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Common Examples
6
Race Target Produces Irregular District
After federal officials warned that its old districts underrepresented minority voters, the State Redistricting Office instructed staff to maintain a fixed number of majority-minority congressional districts. The resulting map created District 7, which snakes around the capital region, splitting counties and cities to connect distant minority neighborhoods. Mason McCarthy and other voters in District 7 sue, alleging that race predominated over compactness and respect for political subdivisions.
Term Limits Challenge Touches Districting
State legislators propose adding term limits that would bar candidates from running in newly created majority-minority districts. Meredith Maxwell, a long-serving incumbent in one such district, argues the limits interfere with voters' ability to choose representatives in districts drawn to comply with federal voting guidelines. The court must decide whether the term-limit rule interacts with the race-conscious district boundaries.
Bizarre Shape Prompts Gerrymander Suit
The legislature draws a congressional district that winds through scattered minority neighborhoods to create a majority-minority seat. Melanie Morris and fellow residents challenge the map, claiming the serpentine boundaries can be explained only by racial considerations rather than traditional criteria. The complaint alleges that race was the predominant factor in the line drawing.
Shaw v. Reno509 U.S. 630 (1993)
Upon the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives.
The General Assembly passed an initial reapportionment plan that included only one majority-black district. The Attorney General interposed an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The objection stated that the plan could have included a second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern area with boundary lines no more irregular than those elsewhere in the proposal.
Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted a revised plan creating District 12 as the second majority-black district along the Interstate 85 corridor in the north-central region. The district extends roughly 160 miles, often no wider than the highway itself, snaking through diverse areas and incorporating sufficient black population enclaves to achieve a majority. It splits multiple counties into three districts each, divides towns, and maintains contiguity at one location only by intersecting other districts at a single point.
Appellants are five residents of Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under the plan, two plaintiffs vote in District 12 and three in District 2. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately created the districts along racial lines, arbitrarily concentrating black voters without regard to compactness, contiguity, or political subdivisions.
The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds related to the Voting Rights Act and dismissed the claims against the state appellees by a 2-1 vote. The majority held that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim because the plan did not dilute white voting strength and was adopted to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The dissenting judge concluded that the irregular shape supported an inference of unlawful intent sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Political Motive Defense Fails
Malcolm McKinley sues after the state map packs minority voters into one irregularly shaped district while splitting several counties. The legislature claims the lines were drawn to protect a safe Democratic seat. Internal documents reveal that staff were directed to hit a precise minority-population target, subordinating compactness and municipal boundaries.
Racial Target Triggers Strict Scrutiny
Mustafa Mahmoud challenges a congressional district drawn to reach a 55 percent minority population by zigzagging through minority neighborhoods and splitting established cities. The legislature defends the map as necessary to comply with federal voting guidelines. The complaint shows that the fixed racial percentage overrode contiguity and respect for political subdivisions.
Cooper v. Harris137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017)
In 2010 the census showed that North Carolina’s population had grown by nearly 1.5 million people. The General Assembly therefore had to redraw the State’s 13 congressional districts to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement.
State Senator Robert Rucho and State Representative David Lewis chaired the redistricting committees and hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller to prepare the new map. The legislature adopted a plan that significantly altered Districts 1 and 12.
District 1 had been substantially underpopulated. To comply with the Constitution’s one-person-one-vote principle, the State needed to place almost 100,000 new people within the district’s boundaries. Rucho, Lewis, and Hofeller chose to take most of those people from heavily black areas of Durham, requiring a finger-like extension of the district’s western line. With that addition, District 1’s BVAP rose from 48.6% to 52.7%.
District 12 was reconfigured by adding areas in Guilford County. The changes produced a net gain of 35,000 African-American voters of voting age and a net loss of 50,000 white voters of voting age, raising its black voting-age population from 43.8% to 50.7%.
Registered voters in the two districts, including David Harris and Christine Bowser, sued North Carolina officials. They alleged that both districts were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. After a bench trial a three-judge District Court held that racial considerations predominated in the design of both districts. The State appealed and the Supreme Court summarily vacated the District Court’s decision. On remand the District Court again found that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence showing race as the predominant factor in drawing both districts.
Evidence at trial included the legislature’s own documents directing the creation of two majority-black districts. The map-drawing software allowed monitoring of racial composition. Public statements by Rucho and Lewis attributed changes in District 12 to Voting Rights Act concerns. Congressman Mel Watt credibly testified that Rucho disclosed a majority-minority target for District 12. An expert report by Dr. Stephen Ansolabehere showed that black registered voters in the six counties overlapping with District 12 were three to four times more likely than white registered voters to be placed in District 12. The District Court credited the plaintiffs’ evidence, including live testimony, over the State’s contention that politics alone explained the lines.
Maximizing Districts Not Compelling
Mariam Mansour sues over four majority-minority districts created after the Justice Department objected to an earlier plan that contained only two. The new lines connect distant minority populations while ignoring compactness and county lines. Legislative records cite the goal of maximizing such districts to satisfy federal policy rather than remedying specific past discrimination.
Shaw v. Hunt517 U.S. at 905-906
After the 1990 census, North Carolina’s congressional delegation increased from eleven to twelve members. The State General Assembly adopted Chapter 601, which created one majority-black district known as District 1 in the northeastern region of the state. The legislature submitted the plan to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights objected because the plan failed to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in the south-central to southeastern part of the state.
The legislature then enacted Chapter 7, which added a second majority-black district, District 12, located in the north-central Piedmont region rather than the area specified in the objection letter. The Attorney General precleared the revised plan. District 1 is hook shaped, extending from the northeast with finger-like extensions into the southern part of the state near the South Carolina border. District 12 stretches approximately 160 miles along the Interstate 85 corridor in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas.
Five North Carolinians filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against state officials. After the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s initial dismissal in Shaw v. Reno, the case proceeded to a six-day trial on remand. The District Court unanimously found that the plan’s lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts of a specific racial composition. A majority of the District Court upheld the plan as constitutional, while one judge dissented, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Two of the appellants, Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, reside in District 12.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does drawing a majority-minority district trigger strict scrutiny?
Strict scrutiny applies when race is the predominant factor in drawing district lines and traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are subordinated. Direct evidence such as racial targets in legislative materials or circumstantial evidence such as bizarre district shapes can establish predominance. Once strict scrutiny applies, the state must show that the use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
Is maximizing the number of majority-minority districts a compelling interest?
No. Maximizing the number of majority-minority districts pursuant to a Justice Department policy is not a compelling governmental interest. Remedying the effects of identified past discrimination can qualify as compelling, but an abstract goal of increasing the number of such districts does not.
Supporting sources
How do courts determine whether race predominated in creating majority-minority districts?
Courts examine both direct evidence such as legislative materials referencing racial targets and circumstantial evidence such as district shape, compactness scores, and whether the lines bypass nearer communities to reach minority populations. A fixed numerical minority-population goal combined with disregard for traditional criteria supports a finding of predominance.
Supporting sources
Can states still create majority-minority districts after Shaw and Miller?
Yes, but only when race does not predominate over traditional districting principles. States may create such districts when necessary to avoid dilution of minority voting strength under the Voting Rights Act, provided the lines respect compactness, contiguity, and political subdivisions unless a compelling interest justifies the departure.
Supporting sources
majority-minority districts
" violate the Qualifications Clauses even if it were to survive scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment? Cf. Shaw v. Reno , 509 U. S. 630, 649 (1993) ("[W]e express no view as to whether…
, as well as a third
district
in which African-American voters although not a
majority
made up about 35% of the voting population. The U. S. Attorney General refused to preclear the plan for…
under the Equal Protection Clause. These decisions, like Justice Powell's opinion in Bandemer , have also considered the process by which the districting schemes were enacted, looked to…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · Equal protectionUBEFoundational