Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A party to a lawsuit. The term encompasses both plaintiffs and defendants who assert or defend claims in judicial proceedings.
Luna Lang sued her former employer for wrongful termination. During closing argument her lawyer stated that the company's CEO was personally responsible for the firing and deserved punishment. The opposing counsel objected that the remark violated ethical limits on statements about a civil litigant's culpability.
Leo Lynch proved that Loyal Insurance breached its policy but could not show any actual financial loss. The court entered judgment in his favor and awarded one dollar in nominal damages to recognize that a litigant had established the cause of action.
Latoya Lane sued a university for employment discrimination. The assigned federal judge had previously served as a trustee of the university while it negotiated with Lane's counsel. After the conflict surfaced, the court of appeals vacated the judgment because the judge should have recused himself from the litigant's case.
Landon Long, a physician, filed suit to challenge a state criminal statute restricting certain medical procedures. The court held that Long had standing as the direct target of the statute and could assert his own constitutional rights as a litigant.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseLucas Lee alleged that federal agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights during a search. He brought a damages action directly under the Constitution, seeking relief as a litigant whose federal rights had been invaded without statutory authorization for the remedy.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseLevi Lowe filed a federal antitrust complaint alleging parallel conduct by several telecommunications firms. The district court dismissed the action, holding that the allegations failed to state a plausible claim under the standard governing a litigant's complaint.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseA litigant is a party to a lawsuit. The term covers both plaintiffs who initiate claims and defendants who respond to them in judicial proceedings.
Model Rule 3.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from stating a personal opinion about the culpability of a civil litigant or the credibility of a witness during trial. The rule prevents lawyers from becoming unsworn witnesses about the parties.
A litigant who establishes a cause of action but fails to prove compensable loss receives nominal damages. The award recognizes the legal right without compensating for actual harm.
Yes. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine a litigant may attack a law restricting expressive activity as substantially overbroad on its face to prevent chilling of protected speech by others.
…123. 2. Roe had standing to sue; the Does and Hallford did not. Pp. 123-129. (a) The normal rule of federal standing is that a litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights or immunities. The rule has no application where, as here, the plaintiff is himself or herself the immediate object of the challenged statute.…