Also known as: leucas · leucæ · league · leuga
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
3 senses
A unit of distance consisting of 1,500 paces.
A unit of distance consisting of 1,000 paces.
A privileged space of one mile around a monastery.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A unit of distance consisting of 1,500 paces.
Lucy Liu measured the disputed border between two French estates using the leuca of 1,500 paces. The court accepted her calculation and fixed the boundary accordingly. The larger unit resolved the ownership claim in her favor.
1 common questions
A unit of distance consisting of 1,000 paces.
Latoya Lane received a royal charter granting her land measured by the leuca of 1,000 paces. Surveyors applied that shorter unit when marking the edges. The grant therefore covered less territory than she had expected.
A privileged space of one mile around a monastery.
Luis Lopez asserted rights inside the leuca surrounding an ancient abbey. He argued the one-mile radius protected his fields from taxation. The tribunal upheld his claim under the historic ecclesiastical measure.
The term denotes a unit of distance used in French law and general medieval measurement. One sense fixes the unit at 1,500 paces while another fixes it at 1,000 paces.
The University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia, maintains a Student Activities Fund financed by a mandatory $14 per semester fee assessed to each full-time student. The fund supports extracurricular student activities related to the University's educational purpose through payments to third-party contractors for approved groups that qualify as Contracted Independent Organizations. To obtain CIO status, a student group must be composed primarily of University students, file its constitution, pledge nondiscrimination, and agree to a disclaimer stating that it is independent of the University. CIO publications are eligible for printing-cost reimbursement if their content is related to the University's educational purpose, but the Guidelines expressly exclude funding for any activity that primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. In 1990, University of Virginia undergraduates formed Wide Awake Productions as a CIO and began publishing Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The first issue contained articles on racism, crisis pregnancy, prayer, C. S. Lewis, and reviews of religious music, each marked by a cross; subsequent issues addressed homosexuality, missionary work, eating disorders, and Christian theology, with advertisements from churches and Christian bookstores. In 1991, Wide Awake Productions requested $5,862 from the Student Activities Fund to cover printing costs for one issue. The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the request on the ground that the publication constituted a religious activity under the Guidelines. Wide Awake Productions appealed the denial through the Student Council and the Student Activities Committee, which upheld the decision. The group and three of its student editors and members then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the refusal to pay printing costs violated their rights under the First Amendment Speech, Press, and Free Exercise Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for the University. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLorenzo Lugo challenged a tax assessment based on a 1,000-pace leuca around his village. The assessor applied the shorter unit and reduced the taxable area. The lower figure lowered Lugo's liability.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View case1 common questions
One sense uses 1,500 paces under French law while the other uses 1,000 paces in a more general historical context.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseLeonard Lowe sought refuge within the one-mile leuca of the monastery. Officials measured the distance from the abbey walls and confirmed he stood inside the protected zone. They therefore declined to arrest him there.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections. Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others. All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003. More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC. The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits. Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules. The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names. A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
View caseLance Lee claimed exemption from royal dues inside the monastery leuca. The court measured one mile from the cloister walls and recognized the historic privilege. Lee's lands therefore escaped the tax.
In 1992, petitioners, a group of probation officers, filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The officers alleged the State had violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought compensation and liquidated damages. While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida in 1996. Upon consideration of that decision, the District Court dismissed petitioners' action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioners then filed the same action in state court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in 1998. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision conflicted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education. In light of the importance of the question presented and the conflict between the courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998. The United States intervened as a petitioner to defend the statute. Petitioners are a group of probation officers who alleged violations of federal overtime requirements by their state employer. The procedural path moved from federal district court through dismissal after Seminole Tribe, to refiling in Maine state court, dismissal there, affirmance by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, and finally review by the United States Supreme Court.
View case2 common questions
Yes. A third sense describes a privileged space of one mile around a monastery within which certain legal protections applied.
The sense describing a one-mile radius around a monastery governs claims involving sanctuary or tax exemptions near religious houses.
Syllabus Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for violating a Connecticut statute which makes it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article…