Also known as: lawful interests · legal interest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal share in property or a right recognized under the principles developed by courts of law as distinguished from equity.
Landon Long erected a storage shed on Lila Lin's land with her permission. After permission ended, Landon sold the shed to Lattice Systems. Lattice Systems learned of the terminated consent but left the shed in place. Lila Lin may recover for trespass based on the continued presence.
Liam Larson leased farmland to Lucy Liu for five years. Before the lease, Levi Lowe held a recorded mortgage on the same land that was not terminable at Liam's will. Levi Lowe refused to agree otherwise. Lucy Liu's possessory rights remain subject to Levi Lowe's paramount interest.
Latoya Lane's predecessor in interest tortiously placed a fence on Lotus Pharmaceuticals' land. Latoya acquired the fence with knowledge of the tortious placement. She failed to remove it after learning the facts. Lotus Pharmaceuticals holds a trespass claim against Latoya.
Loyal Insurance purchased land for value without notice of an outstanding equitable interest held by Linden Logistics. The prior owner had created the equitable interest after an earlier lease. Loyal Insurance's legal interest prevails over Linden Logistics' claim.
A Florida court entered a judgment affecting a trust. The trust beneficiaries held only equitable interests created under Delaware law. The Supreme Court held that the Florida judgment could not bind those beneficiaries because they lacked minimum contacts and no legal interest in the Florida proceeding.
In 1935 Dora Browning Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust instrument in Delaware naming the Wilmington Trust Company as trustee. The corpus consisted of securities. Mrs. Donner reserved the income for life and retained a power of appointment over the remainder exercisable by inter vivos deed or will. She also retained the rights to amend, alter, or revoke the agreement, to change the trustee, and to require the consent of a trust advisor she appointed for sales of assets, investments, and participation in reorganizations. In 1944 Mrs. Donner became domiciled in Florida and remained there until her death in 1952. On December 3, 1949, while in Florida, she executed both her will and an inter vivos power of appointment. The appointment directed $200,000 to each of two trusts benefiting her grandchildren Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, with the balance appointed to her executrix. Mrs. Donner died on November 20, 1952. Her will was admitted to probate in Florida, naming Elizabeth Donner Hanson as executrix. Fourteen months after the death, residuary legatees Katherine N. R. Denckla and Dorothy B. R. Stewart petitioned a Florida chancery court for a declaratory judgment concerning property passing under the residuary clause. Personal service was made on the executrix and beneficiaries. Nonresident defendants including the Wilmington Trust Company and the Delaware Trust Company were served by ordinary mail and local publication under Florida statutes. The Delaware trustee did not appear. After the Florida suit began, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine rights to the trust assets held there. All trust companies and most beneficiaries appeared in the Delaware proceeding. The Florida chancellor initially ruled he lacked jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees because no personal service had been made and the trust corpus was outside Florida. He proceeded as to appearing parties and held the power of appointment testamentary and void under Florida law, so that the $400,000 passed under the residuary clause. The Delaware Chancellor ruled the trust and appointment valid under Delaware law and that the corpus had been properly paid to the appointees. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional ruling, held Florida law applied, and affirmed that the trust was invalid and the appointment ineffective. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its own judgment and refused to accord full faith and credit to the Florida decree. The United States Supreme Court postponed the question of jurisdiction in the Florida appeal and granted certiorari to the Delaware Supreme Court. Both state supreme court judgments are before the Court.
View caseA nonprofit organization challenged a federal land transfer on Establishment Clause grounds. The organization alleged only an interest in preventing unconstitutional uses of public funds. The Supreme Court held that the organization lacked standing because it asserted no personal legal interest that would be redressed by a favorable decision.
In 1942 the Department of the Army acquired approximately 181 acres northwest of Philadelphia and constructed the Valley Forge General Hospital on the site. The hospital provided medical care to members of the Armed Forces for the next thirty years. In April 1973 the Secretary of Defense proposed closing the installation as part of a plan to reduce the number of military facilities in the United States, after which the General Services Administration declared the property surplus. In August 1976 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of the former hospital grounds to petitioner Valley Forge Christian College. The appraised value of the tract at the time of transfer was $577,500, but the Secretary applied a 100 percent public benefit allowance that allowed the college to take title without any cash payment. The deed conveyed the land in fee simple subject to conditions subsequent that required the college to use the property for thirty years solely for the educational purposes described in its application. Valley Forge Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of the Assemblies of God. Its stated purpose is to offer systematic collegiate training to men and women for Christian service as ministers or laymen, and its degree programs are designed to train leaders for church-related ministries. Faculty members must have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God. In September 1976 respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a nonprofit organization with approximately 90,000 taxpayer members, and four of its employees learned of the conveyance through a news release. Two months later they filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the conveyance was null and void and an order requiring the college to return the property to the United States. The District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers and had failed to allege any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed by a divided vote. It held that respondents possessed standing as citizens claiming injury in fact to their shared individuated right to a government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.
View caseA person in lawful possession of land, such as a tenant under a valid lease, may sue for private nuisance. The claim protects the interest in use and enjoyment of land and extends to holders of recognized property rights or privileges, including nonpossessory interests like easements when the interference affects the protected use.
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Yes. A tenant who occupies and controls leased space with intent to control is the possessor for duty purposes. An easement holder likewise holds a lawful interest in the use and enjoyment of land that supports a private nuisance claim when interference burdens that interest.
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A legal interest in leased property held by a third party at the time the lease is made, and not terminable at the landlord's will or by the tenant's possession date, is paramount to both the landlord's and tenant's interests unless the third party agrees otherwise or recording law protects the tenant.
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A successor who acquires a legal interest in a chattel or structure with knowledge that a predecessor tortiously placed it on land, and who then fails to remove it, commits a trespass by the continued presence.
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