judgment execution

Harris, a resident of North Carolina, owed Balk, also a resident of North Carolina, the sum of one hundred eighty dollars. Balk in turn owed Epstein a larger sum of approximately three hundred forty-four dollars. While Harris was temporarily present in the State of Maryland, Epstein caused a writ of attachment to be issued against Balk in a Maryland court and served the writ upon Harris as garnishee. The Maryland court entered a judgment condemning the debt owed by Harris to Balk and directing that Harris pay the sum of one hundred eighty dollars to Epstein. Harris complied with the judgment and made the payment to Epstein. Balk then commenced an action against Harris in the courts of North Carolina to recover the same debt. Harris interposed the Maryland judgment and his payment thereunder as a defense to Balk's suit. Balk had notice of the attachment and judgment within a few days after it was entered and after Harris returned to North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to give any effect to the Maryland judgment in the action, and the case came before the Supreme Court of the United States for review of that refusal.

Getty Oil Co. and Pennzoil Co. negotiated an agreement under which Pennzoil was to purchase about three-sevenths of Getty's outstanding shares for $110 a share. Appellee Texaco Inc. eventually purchased the shares for $128 a share. On February 8, 1984, Pennzoil filed a complaint against Texaco in the Harris County District Court, a state court located in Houston, Texas, the site of Pennzoil's corporate headquarters. The complaint alleged that Texaco tortiously had induced Getty to breach a contract to sell its shares to Pennzoil. Pennzoil sought actual damages of $7.53 billion and punitive damages in the same amount. On November 19, 1985, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Pennzoil, finding actual damages of $7.53 billion and punitive damages of $3 billion. The parties anticipated that the judgment, including prejudgment interest, would exceed $11 billion. By recording an abstract of a judgment in the real property records of any of the 254 counties in Texas, a judgment creditor can secure a lien on all of a judgment debtor's real property located in that county. If a judgment creditor wishes to have the judgment enforced by state officials so that it can take possession of any of the debtor's assets, it may secure a writ of execution from the clerk of the court that issued the judgment. Such a writ usually can be obtained after the expiration of thirty days from the time a final judgment is signed unless the judgment debtor files a good and sufficient supersedeas bond in at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs. Even before the trial court entered judgment, the jury's verdict cast a serious cloud on Texaco's financial situation. The amount of the bond required would have been more than $13 billion. Texaco would not have been able to post such a bond. The business and financial community concluded that Pennzoil would be able to commence enforcement of any judgment before Texaco's appeals had been resolved. The effects on Texaco were substantial: the price of its stock dropped markedly; it had difficulty obtaining credit; the rating of its bonds was lowered; and its trade creditors refused to sell it crude oil on customary terms. On December 10, 1985, before the Texas court entered judgment, Texaco filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in White Plains, New York, the site of Texaco's corporate headquarters. Texaco alleged that the Texas proceedings violated rights secured to Texaco by the Constitution and various federal statutes. It asked the District Court to enjoin Pennzoil from taking any action to enforce the judgment. The District Court rejected Pennzoil's arguments under the Anti-Injunction Act, Younger abstention, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It found that Texaco had shown a likelihood of success on its constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the due process and equal protection claims were within the District Court's jurisdiction, that Texaco had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that abstention was unwarranted. Later that same day the Texas trial court entered judgment against Texaco for $11,120,976,110.83. On February 12, 1987, the Texas Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the judgment but remitted $2 billion of the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) and considered the case.

Knudsen filed a claim for compensation against Benson under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act with Deputy Commissioner Crowell of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. The evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner was directed largely to the employment issue and was conflicting. After considering the evidence the deputy commissioner found that Knudsen was in Benson's employ at the time of the injury and filed an order for compensation. Benson then brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award. Benson alleged that Knudsen was not his employee at the time of the injury and that the claim lay outside the deputy commissioner's jurisdiction. An amended complaint further challenged the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds. Those grounds included alleged violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and the judicial power provisions of Article III. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the law. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this Court granted writs of certiorari.

Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan in November 2001 during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban regime that then governed the country. The militia turned him over to the United States military, which transported him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in June 2002. Over a year later, on July 3, 2003, the President determined that Hamdan was eligible for trial by military commission for then-unspecified crimes. Subsequently, on July 13, 2004, the government charged Hamdan with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission. The charging document alleged that from February 1996 to November 2001 he had joined an enterprise with al Qaeda members and committed four overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy. Hamdan then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge both the authority of the military commission and the procedures it would employ. The District Court granted Hamdan's habeas petition on November 8, 2004, stayed the commission proceedings, and concluded that the commission lacked authority under the law of war and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable and that the commission's jurisdiction and procedures were lawful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2005. On December 30, 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, after which the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court postponed ruling on the motion and later denied it, retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.