578 U.S. 212 (2016)
Respondents consist of more than 1,000 victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist acts, their estate representatives, and surviving family members, organized into 16 discrete groups.1
Each group brought suit against Iran in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and obtained default judgments after establishing Iran's liability with evidence satisfactory to the court.2
The majority of respondents sought redress for injuries suffered in connection with the 1983 bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.3 Together, respondents have obtained billions of dollars in judgments against Iran, the vast majority of which remain unpaid.4
To enforce their judgments, the 16 groups of respondents first registered them in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.5 They then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 for turnover of about $1.75 billion in bond assets held in a New York bank account.6
Since at least early 2008, the bond assets have been held in a New York account at Citibank directly controlled by Clearstream Banking, S. A. (Clearstream), a Luxembourg-based company.7 At some point in 2008, Bank Markazi instructed Clearstream to position another intermediary—Banca UBAE, S. p. A., an Italian bank—between the bonds and Bank Markazi.8 Thereafter, Clearstream deposited interest payments in UBAE's account, which UBAE then remitted to Bank Markazi.9
This turnover proceeding began in 2008 when the terrorism judgment holders in Peterson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, filed writs of execution and the District Court restrained the bonds.10 Other groups of terrorism judgment holders were joined in No.11 10–CIV–4518, the Peterson enforcement proceeding, through a variety of procedural mechanisms.12
Invoking his authority under the IEEPA, the President, in February 2012, issued an Executive Order blocking all property and interests in property of any Iranian financial institution, including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States.13
To place beyond dispute the availability of some of the Executive Order No. 13599-blocked assets for satisfaction of judgments rendered in terrorism cases, Congress passed the statute at issue here: §502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 1258, 22 U. S. C. §8772.14
Although the enforcement proceeding was initiated prior to the issuance of Executive Order No. 13599 and the enactment of §8772, the judgment holders updated their motions in 2012 to include execution claims under §8772.15
Making the findings necessary under §8772, the District Court ordered the requested turnover.16 In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the financial history of the assets and other record evidence showing that Bank Markazi owned the assets.17
Resisting turnover of the bond assets, Bank Markazi and Clearstream filled the proverbial kitchen sink with arguments.18 After §8772's passage, Bank Markazi changed its defense.19 It conceded that Iran held the requisite equitable title to, or beneficial interest in, the assets, but maintained that §8772 could not withstand inspection under the separation-of-powers doctrine.20
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed.21 To consider the separation-of-powers question Bank Markazi presents, we granted certiorari, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), and now affirm.22
Whether Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 violates the separation of powers by purporting to change the law for, and directing a particular result in, a single pending case?23
Article III of the Constitution establishes an independent Judiciary with the province and duty to say what the law is in particular cases and controversies.24 Although Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply pre-existing law to particular circumstances, Congress may amend a law and make the amended prescription retroactively applicable in pending cases. In United States v. Klein, this Court observed that Congress may not prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department in pending cases, but more recent decisions have clarified that Klein does not inhibit Congress from amending applicable law.25 A statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts.26
No. Respondents consist of more than 1,000 victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist acts organized into 16 discrete groups. Each group brought suit against Iran in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and obtained default judgments after establishing Iran's liability with evidence satisfactory to the court. The majority of respondents sought redress for injuries suffered in connection with the 1983 bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Together, respondents have obtained billions of dollars in judgments against Iran, the vast majority of which remain unpaid.
To enforce their judgments, the 16 groups of respondents first registered them in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 for turnover of about $1.75 billion in bond assets held in a New York bank account. Since at least early 2008, the bond assets have been held in a New York account at Citibank directly controlled by Clearstream Banking, S. A. (Clearstream), a Luxembourg-based company. At some point in 2008, Bank Markazi instructed Clearstream to position another intermediary—Banca UBAE, S. p. A., an Italian bank—between the bonds and Bank Markazi. Thereafter, Clearstream deposited interest payments in UBAE's account, which UBAE then remitted to Bank Markazi.
This turnover proceeding began in 2008 when the terrorism judgment holders in Peterson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, filed writs of execution and the District Court restrained the bonds. Other groups of terrorism judgment holders were joined in No. 10–CIV–4518, the Peterson enforcement proceeding, through a variety of procedural mechanisms.
Invoking his authority under the IEEPA, the President, in February 2012, issued an Executive Order blocking all property and interests in property of any Iranian financial institution, including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States. To place beyond dispute the availability of some of the Executive Order No. 13599-blocked assets for satisfaction of judgments rendered in terrorism cases, Congress passed the statute at issue here: §502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 1258, 22 U. S. C. §8772.
Although the enforcement proceeding was initiated prior to the issuance of Executive Order No. 13599 and the enactment of §8772, the judgment holders updated their motions in 2012 to include execution claims under §8772. Making the findings necessary under §8772, the District Court ordered the requested turnover. In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the financial history of the assets and other record evidence showing that Bank Markazi owned the assets.
Resisting turnover of the bond assets, Bank Markazi and Clearstream filled the proverbial kitchen sink with arguments. After §8772's passage, Bank Markazi changed its defense. It conceded that Iran held the requisite equitable title to, or beneficial interest in, the assets, but maintained that §8772 could not withstand inspection under the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed. Section 8772 changed the law by establishing new substantive standards, entrusting to the District Court application of those standards to the facts found by the court.27 The statute requires the court to determine whether the assets meet specified criteria including whether Iran holds equitable title, but it does not compel findings under old law.28 By contrast, §8772 provides a new standard clarifying that, if Iran owns certain assets, the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks will be permitted to execute against those assets.29
Section 8772 does not violate the separation of powers.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Sotomayor
Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that Section 8772 violates the separation of powers.31 No less than if it had passed a law saying respondents win, Congress has decided this case by enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties' specific legal disputes to guarantee respondents victory.32
He explained that the statute changes the law for these proceedings alone simply to guarantee that respondents win by sweeping away every defense including sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. §1611(b)(1). Section 8772(a)(1) eliminates that immunity. Bank Markazi had argued that its status as a separate juridical entity under federal common law and international law freed it from liability for Iran's debts.33 Section 8772(d)(3) ensures that the Bank is liable. Bank Markazi had argued that New York law did not allow respondents to execute their judgments against the Bank's assets.34 Section 8772(a)(1) makes those assets subject to execution.
Roberts emphasized that the law serves no other purpose and is limited by its terms to the single interpleader action referenced by docket number in Section 8772(b), with an express provision confirming it does not affect any other proceedings.35 Section 8772 authorized attachment, moreover, only for the financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings. And lest there be any doubt that Congress's sole concern was deciding this particular case, rather than establishing any generally applicable rules, §8772 provided that nothing in the statute shall be construed to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceedings other than these.
Roberts concluded that the majority's approach leaves Article III as a mere parchment barrier easily circumvented by Congress picking winners and losers in pending cases. Today's decision will indeed become a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power at the Judiciary's expense, feeding Congress's tendency to extend the sphere of its activity and draw all power into its impetuous vortex.