201 U.S. 562 (1906)
The parties married in New York in 1868.1 Immediately after the marriage the husband abandoned the wife without cause and the couple never lived together again.2 The wife remained a resident of New York throughout the marriage.3
In 1877 the husband established a domicil in Connecticut.4 In 1881 he obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of Litchfield County, Connecticut, on the ground of the wife's desertion.5 The Connecticut record shows that the wife was served only by publication in a local newspaper and by mailing a copy of the petition to her last known address in Tarrytown, New York; she did not appear.6
In 1899 the wife, still a New York resident, filed suit against the husband in New York Supreme Court seeking a decree of separation from bed and board together with alimony.7 Personal service of the summons and complaint was made on the husband in New York.8
The husband answered and offered the 1881 Connecticut divorce judgment as a defense. At trial before a referee the husband introduced the Connecticut judgment roll.9 The referee sustained the wife's objection and excluded the record on the grounds that the Connecticut court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and that the ground of desertion was false.10 The referee then found that the husband had abandoned the wife without justification, that the parties had never resumed cohabitation, and that the wife was entitled to a separation and alimony of $780 per year.11
The Supreme Court of New York confirmed the referee's report and entered judgment for the wife.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the record was remitted to the Supreme Court, from which the husband prosecuted a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.13
The federal question presented is whether the New York courts violated the Constitution by refusing to give the Connecticut divorce decree the faith and credit to which it was entitled.14
Whether the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires the courts of New York to recognize and give effect to a divorce decree rendered by a Connecticut court in favor of a husband domiciled in Connecticut against a wife domiciled in New York who received only constructive service by publication and mailing?15
The full faith and credit clause requires that a judgment rendered in one state be given the same effect in another state as it has in the state where rendered.16 This command applies only if the rendering court had jurisdiction over the parties.17 A personal judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the person is void and not entitled to enforcement elsewhere under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
No. The parties were married in New York in 1868. Immediately after the marriage the husband abandoned the wife without cause and the couple never lived together again. The wife remained a resident of New York throughout the marriage. In 1877 the husband established a domicil in Connecticut.
In 1881 he obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of Litchfield County, Connecticut, on the ground of the wife's desertion. The Connecticut record shows that the wife was served only by publication in a local newspaper and by mailing a copy of the petition to her last known address in Tarrytown, New York; she did not appear. In 1899 the wife, still a New York resident, filed suit against the husband in New York Supreme Court seeking a decree of separation from bed and board together with alimony. Personal service of the summons and complaint was made on the husband in New York.
The husband answered and offered the 1881 Connecticut divorce judgment as a defense. At trial before a referee the husband introduced the Connecticut judgment roll. The referee sustained the wife's objection and excluded the record on the grounds that the Connecticut court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and that the ground of desertion was false. The referee then found that the husband had abandoned the wife without justification, that the parties had never resumed cohabitation, and that the wife was entitled to a separation and alimony of $780 per year.
The Supreme Court of New York confirmed the referee's report and entered judgment for the wife. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife because she was domiciled in New York, the matrimonial domicil was in New York, and she was served only constructively.19 Therefore the decree is not entitled to full faith and credit in New York.20
The New York courts did not violate the Constitution by refusing to give the Connecticut divorce decree the faith and credit to which it was entitled.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Harlan, Brewer, And Holmes
Justice Brown dissented on the ground that a divorce decree obtained by a plaintiff lawfully domiciled within a state against a defendant domiciled in another state who has been served by publication or letter only is a valid defense to a suit by the latter for a separation and alimony.22 He argued that the case turns upon whether the Superior Court of Litchfield County gained jurisdiction by a residence of the plaintiff within the State for more than three years.23 Brown emphasized that the decree should be binding everywhere under the full faith and credit clause.24
He further emphasized that the record should have been received and that denying it effect reverses prior doctrine and returns to comity.25
Whether a state court acquires jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to extraterritorial enforcement under the full faith and credit clause when the decree rests solely on the plaintiff's domicil in the rendering state and constructive service on a non-resident defendant?26
Jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to extraterritorial enforcement under the full faith and credit clause requires either personal jurisdiction over both parties or jurisdiction based on the matrimonial domicil.27 The mere domicil of the plaintiff coupled with constructive service on a non-resident defendant is insufficient to bind the absent spouse in another state.28
No. The Connecticut decree rested solely on the husband's domicil in Connecticut and constructive service on the wife.29 The wife was domiciled in New York, the state of the matrimonial domicil from which the husband fled.30 The Connecticut court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the wife within the meaning of the fifth and seventh settled propositions.31 The decree could not be enforced in New York under the full faith and credit clause because it was a personal judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the defendant.32
A state court does not acquire jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to extraterritorial enforcement under the full faith and credit clause when the decree rests solely on the plaintiff's domicil in the rendering state and constructive service on a non-resident defendant.33
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Harlan, Brewer, And Brown
Justice Holmes dissented on the ground that there is no difference between Atherton v. Atherton and the present case except that in Atherton the forum of the first decree was that of the matrimonial domicil whereas here the court was that of a domicil afterwards acquired.34 He argued that jurisdiction no more depends upon both parties having their domicil within the state than it does upon the presence of the defendant there.35 Holmes further argued that the decision reverses the necessary consequences of Atherton v. Atherton.36
Whether the marital relation constitutes a res located entirely within the state of the plaintiff's domicil so as to permit a divorce decree binding on both parties without personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse?37
The marital relation is not a res located entirely within the state of the plaintiff's domicil so as to permit a divorce decree binding on both parties without personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse.38 Treating the marriage relation as a res does not authorize one state to affect the status of a person domiciled in another state.39
No. The marriage was celebrated in New York between citizens of that state.40 Before the husband deserted the wife in New York the res was in New York and not in Connecticut.41 The husband never established a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut.42 The power of one state did not extend to affecting the thing situated in another state.43
The argument that the res was indivisible and therefore wholly in Connecticut amounts to saying that the same thing can be at one and the same time in different places.44
The marital relation does not constitute a res located entirely within the state of the plaintiff's domicil so as to permit a divorce decree binding on both parties without personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse.45